The next counterintelligence threat may be hiding in federal hiring

The federal government spends considerable time determining who can be trusted with sensitive information. But a recent report from the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) suggests agencies should be paying closer attention to what happens before an individual ever enters the personnel vetting process.

Foreign intelligence services are exploiting the very activities government agencies and defense contractors rely on to build their workforces: resume submissions, recruiting outreach, professional networking and expert consultations.

In its latest report, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Report of Threats to Cleared Industry, DCSA identified approximately 2,900 incidents involving foreign entities seeking sensitive information or technology during fiscal 2025. The agency received more than 22,000 suspicious contact reports during the same period.

While the report focuses on cleared industry, its findings have implications for the federal government, particularly as agencies work to recruit specialized talent, modernize hiring practices and compete for expertise in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, engineering and other mission-critical fields.

The takeaway isn't that federal hiring needs more bureaucracy. It's that agencies need to recognize hiring and professional engagement as potential counterintelligence vulnerabilities and equip the people managing those processes to identify threats.

From resumes to relationships

One of the more interesting findings in DCSA's report is how foreign collection methods are evolving. In the agency's previous annual report, resume submissions accounted for 28% of reported collection attempts, making them the most common method of operation. Exploitation of experts accounted for 21%.

In the latest report, exploitation of experts has moved into the top position, accounting for 28% of reported incidents. Academic resume submissions remain a significant method of contact, accounting for 15%, while email continues to dominate at 30%.

The distinction between a method of operation and a method of contact is important, but so is the broader trend. Foreign intelligence entities are not simply trying to gain access to organizations through job applications. They are increasingly seeking out individuals whose professional knowledge, relationships and technical expertise make them valuable intelligence targets. That should concern anyone responsible for managing the federal workforce.

A federal employee with specialized expertise in acquisition, intelligence analysis, artificial intelligence or weapons systems may be valuable to an adversary even without access to classified information. Knowledge of government priorities, technical challenges, program requirements and organizational relationships can provide significant intelligence value.

The federal resume is an intelligence roadmap

Consider the professional information available through resumes, conference biographies, public profiles and professional networking platforms.

An adversary looking for insight into a particular defense capability doesn't necessarily need to penetrate a classified network to begin identifying relevant experts. Publicly available professional information can help establish who works in a particular technical field, what organizations they support and where they may have developed specialized expertise.

The objective should not be to discourage applicants from demonstrating their qualifications. It should be to encourage relevant, skills-based descriptions rather than unnecessary disclosures about sensitive programs, customers or operational environments.

It should also be to recognize that the federal hiring process isn't just essential to accomplishing the mission. It's a key element of the government's counterintelligence and security posture.

HR is part of the security perimeter

When federal agencies discuss counterintelligence threats, the conversation typically centers on cybersecurity, insider threats, classified information and personnel security. Human resources and recruiting rarely receive the same attention or a similar budget.

The current threat environment and the prevalence of professional credentials and resumes as counterintelligence risks demand a more deliberate relationship between human resources, hiring managers, personnel security and counterintelligence teams.

A security clearance doesn't solve the entire problem

The federal government has invested significant resources in modernizing personnel vetting through Trusted Workforce 2.0, continuous vetting and improvements to investigative and adjudicative processes. Those efforts are important. But they address a different part of the risk equation.

A security clearance determination assesses whether an individual is eligible for access to classified information. Continuous vetting provides ongoing assessment of individuals within covered populations. Neither process eliminates the risk of foreign intelligence entities approaching government employees, contractors, researchers or prospective hires through professional channels.

And we know not every federal employee holds a clearance.

Agencies employ thousands of individuals whose work may involve sensitive but unclassified information, acquisition strategies, proprietary technology, critical infrastructure or specialized technical expertise.

The DCSA findings underscore the importance of treating counterintelligence awareness as a workforce-wide responsibility, tailored to the sensitivity of an employee's role.

That doesn't require subjecting every federal applicant to an intelligence investigation. But it does highlight the importance of a principle emphasized through Trusted Workforce 2.0: considering every vetted worker's role in national security and the risks posed by foreign adversaries.

The government can't afford to make hiring harder

There is a risk in responding to reports like this by adding another layer of screening, another compliance requirement or another reason to delay an already lengthy federal hiring process. That would be the wrong lesson.

The federal government is competing for highly skilled workers in a labor market where speed, transparency and candidate experience matter. After a year of significant cuts and reductions in force, many federal agencies are highlighting significant staffing shortages, specifically in highly specialized skill sets — the exact ones most at risk of foreign targeting.

For agencies struggling to recruit cyber professionals, engineers, data scientists and other specialized talent, a hiring process that becomes more suspicious of applicants rather than more effective at identifying risks could make existing workforce challenges worse.

Agencies can start by giving HR professionals practical guidance on suspicious contacts and reporting procedures. Hiring managers should understand what information can appropriately be shared during recruitment. Employees should receive guidance on unsolicited consulting opportunities and requests for technical expertise.

Protect the talent, not just the technology

Another important implication of DCSA's report is what it says about the value of the federal workforce itself. Foreign intelligence services aren't simply targeting technologies. They're targeting the people who understand those technologies.

The shift from resume submissions toward exploitation of experts suggests that adversaries understand something federal workforce leaders should recognize as well: Institutional knowledge, professional relationships and technical expertise are strategic assets.

The answer isn't to make federal workers harder to find or federal jobs harder to obtain. It's to make the government's hiring and workforce practices smarter about the threats surrounding them.

Because in today's national security environment, the most valuable target may not be a classified document or a sensitive technology, but the person who knows how it works.