IG recommends early contracting personnel involvement in reconstruction

A special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction advised that agencies consider developing a set of contracting rules for use in defense contingencies and that they involve purchasing personnel earlier in predeployment planning, among other measures.

In a report on lessons learned in contracting and procurement, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen emphasized that agencies should involve procurement personnel in all planning stages; clearly define and communicate procurement roles and responsibilities for cooperating agencies; emphasize contracting support for small, easily executed projects in the early reconstruction phases that can quickly meet immediate needs; and avoid using sole-source and limited competition contracting strategies that hurt transparency.

The 140-page report, presented to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Wednesday, described how more than $20 billion in U.S. grant funding and several billion more in Iraqi funds have moved through procurement systems, largely at the departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The IG noted that once the first round of hostilities had ended in Iraq, contracts based on limited competition should have been re-bid. The report also concluded that agencies should try to use fixed-price contracts for building projects, rather than design-build contracts that commit to using the same company for architecture, engineering and construction.

It recommended that agencies develop accurate data on their requirements before writing contracts or task orders, initiate contracting systems that can be tested in advance and deployed quickly, and designate a unified entity to take charge of post-conflict contracting activities. The IG also suggested creating a single set of uniform contracting rules for contingencies.

The report urged oversight bodies to consult with agencies in real time, as well as play a longer-term evaluative role. This type of approach would match the timing of oversight to the short time frames of contingency operations.

"The traditional approach to audits and inspections is for inspector general staff to conduct their inquiries, and then prepare and deliver their reports some months later," Bowen told legislators in testimony. "Iraq reconstruction managers do not have the luxury of waiting months to receive recommendations on how they could be saving money."

Bowen's office has been giving Congress quarterly reports on its oversight findings, in addition to developing this special contracting report and one on human capital management in contingency situations.

A new task force convened by the Pentagon's Business Transformation Agency will look at similar questions related to consolidated contracting authorities and systems, and possibly changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation that could improve Defense Department contracting in Iraq. Jim Mitchell, Bowen's assistant inspector general for congressional and public affairs, said that task force was launched after Defense officials saw an early draft of the newly released report.

Many of the concerns raised in relation to Iraq contracting were also found in contracts issued immediately after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 2005. The Government Accountability Office wrote in March 2006 that responding agencies were impaired by inadequate contingency contracting plans and poorly defined and communicated responsibilities, among other problems.