Energy Department counters claims of weak nuclear security

A top Energy Department official has rebutted allegations that the nation's nuclear weapons facilities cannot withstand attacks by suicidal terrorists. John Gordon, the administrator of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, issued a statement late Wednesday contesting the position taken Wednesday by Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., six security whistleblowers and the Project On Government Oversight (POGO), a Washington-based watchdog group. "Allegations that the Department of Energy has lax security at its nuclear weapons facilities are false and misleading," wrote Gordon, a former Air Force general and former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. While the department welcomes serious inquiries into its security practices, Gordon wrote, "it is unfortunate that some try to create a climate of fear grossly disproportionate to the risks to the public." The department takes security "seriously as a critical part" of its mission, Gordon wrote. "The strong group of professionals who protect our sites are a source of pride and it is grossly unfair to characterize individuals or the systems as uncaring or ignoring problems." Gordon said an October 2001 report from POGO, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk," used "outdated data" and has contributed to "misleading conclusions," though he admitted "security was progressively degraded" when budgets were cut in the mid-1990s. Energy now "aggressively" protects its people, facilities and material, he wrote. Furthermore, Energy displays "a formidable security posture to potential attackers." On Thursday, Danielle Brian, POGO's executive director, replied to Gordon's statement with a letter that declared he was "clearly being misled." "The managers running security who are briefing you on these matters," she wrote to Gordon, "are the very people responsible for the ongoing problems." Furthermore, she questioned the methods Energy uses to ascertain whether the forces that protect nuclear facilities are prepared for terrorist attacks. The exercises conducted to determine the readiness of nuclear security officers have no element of surprise, she wrote. Plus, the "scenarios are dictated by the facilities themselves," she wrote. "The adversarial forces' tactics, weapons and communications are below the realistic capabilities of terrorist organizations." Brian applauded Energy for upgrading its security posture after the Sept. 11 attacks, but she said most security teams at Energy facilities are "undermanned, inadequately trained and outgunned." Finally, security officers would not be able to withstand a terrorist attack that used chemical or biological weapons, even though two separate Presidential Decision Directives-PDD39 and PDD 62-call for officers to be prepared for such eventualities, she said. Gordon's position was unequivocal. "Our forces are well-trained and well-equipped," he wrote. "They are tested by outside challengers, often to failure-so we know where weaknesses are. Then we fix the problem." He ended his statement by asserting that nuclear material "is not at risk at [Energy] facilities."