Keeping Planes Safe

GAO also noted that a knowledge-based approach would involve controls or criteria to determine whether specific milestones had been met at each critical juncture. Such an approach would help to confirm the business case on which the effort was originally justified. Business 2.0, CIO, InformationWeek, Electronic Business Mobile Computing & Communications.
Homeland Security is spearheading a two-phase technology program to stop potential attacks on commercial aircraft.

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ince 9/11, the U.S. government has struggled to find the most effective ways of dealing with terrorist attacks on every front-air, land and sea. While the Transportation Security Administration is working to implement sophisticated technology and procedures to secure borders, the Homeland Security Department has spearheaded ways to stop potential attacks on commercial aircraft.

Congress got a wake-up call in the fall of 2002, when terrorists believed to be connected with al Qaeda fired small portable weapons called MAN-Portable Air Defense Systems, or MANPADS, at an El Al plane taking off from a Kenyan airport. Congressional committees held hearings last year to discuss ways to protect commercial aircraft from missile attacks like this. From those hearings came legislation that would require equipping commercial planes with antimissile protection similar to that used on military aircraft.

Many experts say that the proliferation of portable air defense systems has added another dimension to protecting U.S. aircraft. About 20 countries manufacture MANPADS, and nearly every nation in the world has them. According to a report by Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit research and advocacy organization in Washington, approximately 500,000 MANPADS exist today, many of which are thought to be on the black market and accessible to terrorists. These systems are attractive to terrorists for many reasons, including the fact that they are lethal, highly portable and concealable, inexpensive, and relatively simple to operate, notes Matt Schroeder, an arms expert at the Federation of American Scientists who co-authored the report.

Based on the congressional directive, DHS has initiated a two-phase program that will migrate the technology to deflect enemy missiles, which has been used in the military for many years, to the commercial aviation environment.

In Phase 1 of the program, which is expected to last six months, officials will investigate potential solutions, culminating in a detailed design and analysis of the economic, manufacturing and maintenance issues involved. Contractors will be BAE Systems of Nashua, N.H.; Northrop Grumman Corp. of Rolling Meadows, Ill.; and Austin, Texas-based Avisys Inc., a defense technologies and system integration organization led by United Airlines. Phase 2 will consist of an 18-month proto-type development program using existing technology. One or two of the Phase 1 contractors will be chosen to continue with Phase 2, says Parney Albright, assistant secretary of Homeland Security for science and technology.

Because of Congress' intense interest in the project and pressure to make the process quicker than the two years requested by DHS, representatives from the House Committee on Armed Services and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation asked the General Accounting Office to research the issue. The resulting report was released Jan. 30.

The report directed Homeland Security to use a disciplined and efficient systems engineering method throughout the development and implementation process-a knowledge-based approach.

FIRST THINGS FIRST

GAO outlined several challenges for Homeland Security in adapting a military counter-MANPADS system to commercial aircraft. The first is establishing system requirements; DHS must account for a variety of aircraft types in designing and integrating the system. The second involves dealing with maturing technology and design. The third GAO mentioned is setting reliable cost estimates for the procurement, integration, operation and support of such systems-cost estimates that don't exist for commercial aircraft.

Designing such a system is a complex process, Albright acknowledges. In the case of laser jammers, for example, the military generally installs three on each C-17 aircraft-one on each side and one on the tail. "They are worried about the air-to-air threat, not just the ground-to-air threat, and they maneuver their aircraft in far more dramatic ways," he says.

Setting reliable cost estimates also is a tall order, notes Burt Keirstead, program manager for the counter-MANPADS effort at BAE Systems. But it's one that can be tackled by combining an understanding of the acquisition costs with that of the operations and support costs. During Phase 1, the three contractors will focus on preparing a lifecycle cost model. "With any model, you want to make sure you have accurate inputs to reflect how things might change. If you have a good model in place, you can quickly input potential changes. Reliability and supportability are big inputs to cost," Keirstead says.

GAO concluded that dealing with these challenges would require Homeland Security to adopt a knowledge-based approach that:

  • Matches the customer's needs with available resources.
  • Allows a product's design to meet performance requirements and become stable about midway through development.
  • Shows that the product meets budget, schedule, quality and reliability targets before production begins.

IN THE KNOW

The GAO report is on target with its recommendations, says Keith Kerr, director of solutions development at Robbins-Gioia, an Alexandria, Va., project management consulting firm."Basically, the GAO report is saying [Homeland Security] should make sure they understand the differences and threats and alternatives, and bring all of that to the table in a cohesive package," Kerr says. "It's about setting up a disciplined approach and making it work by breaking the development into chunks: What type of training do your people need? Do you have all spare parts in place?

In many respects, Homeland Security already has taken a knowledge-based approach, although it's called various names. The preliminary design review, for example, evaluates progress, technical adequacy, proposed software architectures and risk resolutions; the critical design review determines whether the design satisfies performance and engineering requirements. Other knowledge-based processes include program management reviews, prototype development and systems engineering.

Albright says that despite appearances, the GAO report and the DHS team are in sync. The team's use of standard engineering practices addresses GAO's call to match the customer's needs and available resources, while the message about proving that the product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, quality and reliability targets has been heard. As for the GAO's other point-that a product's design meet performance requirements and become stable about midway through development-Albright says that by the end of Phase 1, scheduled for this summer, "everything will be locked in place."

"We agree completely with the GAO's conclusions, and that's why we have been very careful not to make any commitments as to what the actual deployment of the system will be," Albright says. "We don't say anything about deployment because we won't know for sure what we are going to have in terms of performance and cost of ownership until we have integrated these things onto an aircraft and prototyped and tested them. In our view, it's highly premature to make a deployment decision-which is what the GAO is saying-until we have those facts on the table."

BAE Systems' Keirstead agrees, noting the report was commissioned before Homeland Security began Phase 1. "They interviewed us in spring of 2003, and a lot has transpired in the ensuing months," he says. The conclusion of Phase 1 will provide the team with a preliminary design and a much better understanding of what must be done, he says.

The GAO report, however, questioned the two-year timetable noting that, given the complexity of the project, it might simply be too ambitious.

The deadline, although ambitious, is realistic, insists Albright, despite concerns from GAO and others that two years may not be enough time to fully investigate and test the technology. "We think it's an aggressive timetable, especially when we've got a senator or two telling us it should only take six months, but we think two years is about right," he says.

Douglas Laird, president of Laird & Associates Inc., a Reno, Nev., aviation consulting firm, thinks GAO might have a point. "Adapting a military MANPADS system to commercial aircraft is difficult in many ways, and they have to take their time and do it right," he says. "If I had one piece of advice to give DHS, I'd tell them not be pressured by an unrealistic time frame. Take your time and develop a system that meets your needs. But during that development, heed the GAO's advice."


Karen D. Schwartz is a writer specializing in technology and business issues. She has written for numerous publications, includingand

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