The Allen Doctrine

The new Coast Guard commandant looks ahead.

In a wide-ranging interview with Government Executive May 2, Adm. Thad W. Allen discussed his view of the Coast Guard's evolving security role and his plans for the service upon becoming commandant at the end of the month. Excerpts follow:

On reorganizing deployable Coast Guard units:

We have for different reasons over a number of years built teams and detachments that are deployable that have always been stovepiped into different mission areas. My goal would be to take all of those and put them under one force structure and use that force structure to integrate with the Department of Homeland Security and create a more agile, flexible force that could deploy in advance of an event if you knew it was coming, or after an event to mitigate any threats or hazards. [It's] a more efficient way to organize, a more effective way to deploy in a post-[Hurricane] Katrina environment and a better way to mesh with the other operating agencies in DHS.

I don't intend to move them, but put them under the same command. The working title is Deployable Operations Group. These forces will still be owned by the field commanders, but [the new command] will build a common doctrine between them and create deployable logistics support for them. We would create packages that are capable of being airlifted in C-130s. The new command would train, equip and provide those forces to whoever needs them.

The Coast Guard's new home within Homeland Security:

Contrary to what may be believed by the public, the media and some other folks, I think our presence in the Department of Homeland Security significantly enhanced our ability to respond [during Katrina] and significantly enhanced the department's ability to respond.

When you start thinking about the capabilities resident in the department that can be married up with the Coast Guard, it's a very effective force if we just adapt it to the situation. If you look what [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] brings to the fight in terms of resources that can come in after an event, and I'm speaking specifically about urban search-and-rescue teams, the national disaster medical system, deployable medical teams, and you think how you can hook those up with say an agency that could provide security-the Federal Protective Service or Customs and Border Protection-and then you have ways to get in with Coast Guard small boats, for instance, that's where everything becomes very valuable because you get synergies with all those capabilities and competencies.

The failure of the federal response to Katrina:

The problem with Katrina was that [the National Response Plan] was a nascent strategy that just didn't deliver. There was insufficient training with the state and local levels to understand it and [Homeland Security was] in the process of reorganizing under Secretary [Michael] Chertoff's second stage review when the hurricane hit. So there was never any benefit from the work that had been done, starting with the creation of the department, to bring to bear when we had the most catastrophic natural disaster that we've encountered.

The flooding of New Orleans was the equivalent of a weapon of mass effect without criminality. We were pulling forces into [New Orleans], but there basically was not a capable authority-in terms of having radios that worked, a command center, etc. Those were the things I addressed when I got to New Orleans. Those are the things that are being addressed before this hurricane season.

If terrorists had blown up the levees, the response would have been different:

When the city was flooded you really had a different event tactically. Had that been a terrorist attack, you would have seen a criminal investigative agency in charge of the response, most likely Department of Justice, directing the on-scene response, but at the same time you would have had the recovery-and-relief resource come to bear. The difference is if you had a terrorist attack and everybody knew that, you would have somebody on the ground there supervising the response, and FEMA's role would have been a supporting role to deal with the consequences. In this hurricane, we kind of did it in reverse. Based on the hurricane model, we put FEMA resources in to be responsive pursuant to an emergency or disaster declaration at the request of the governor, and we backed into the second event.

Preparations for the 2006 hurricane season:

Dramatically different. Everybody's really leaning forward. As we meet this morning, there's a meeting going on down in New Orleans between FEMA, Coast Guard and other federal agencies, U.S. Northern Command on contingency plans on how to re-establish communications if they're lost again. That was one of the significant problems we had during Katrina. We're planning for the prospect that communications will be disrupted and how quickly they can be restored and we'll test those plans before 1 June.

The Coast Guard's dual military-civilian role:

We're always military, but we can apply our law enforcement authority in a civil manner. It's that dual character that makes us unique. Recently, we concluded a series of agreements with U.S. Northern Command and DoD and the Department of Homeland Security that allow the Coast Guard to quickly move in and become part of U.S. Northern Command forces if that's necessary and, conversely, if we need support from Northern Command they can flow forces to the Coast Guard and we can act for NORTHCOM as a task force commander. Those are very powerful instruments that are in place that allow the Coast Guard to move seamlessly between what I would call our Title 14 world and our Title 10 world, and also allow the DoD forces to flow back and forth. It's a really good piece of government.

The challenges of maritime security:

Entry into the air domain and space domain is pretty much inhibited by technology. But the oceans are probably the last great global commons. There are long-standing legal principles of freedom of navigation, right of innocent passage and things like that. Our challenge in a post-9/11 environment is to reconcile the use of those waters for commerce and transportation with the need to protect our nation, know what's out there, and understand if there are threats and defeat those threats at the greatest distance. That's a challenge. You can't just take the airspace solution, which is [that] we have an air defense information zone that's 200 miles off of each coast and if you penetrate that zone and you haven't checked in or you don't have a transponder identifying where you're at, you get met. It's a significant issue. We have to get better.