Lining Up at the Pump

division of the Defense Logistics Agency, the DESC supplies fuel to all of the military services. Among Wells' first tasks was visiting the 26 countries encompassed by his command. He wanted to meet his counterparts and the suppliers DLA relies on for fuel. U.S. military forces use foreign air bases to refuel cargo planes and jets and to supply fuel for troops on the ground. Wells needed to get a sense of the capabilities of those bases in case the United States needed support.

But the Sept. 11 attacks cut short his trip.

"We had not yet ventured into the Central Asian countries or Pakistan or Afghanistan," Wells says.

Had he been able to visit those countries, Wells would have found only a limited capacity to support a U.S. military operation in the region. Instead, it was baptism by fire. Almost immediately, demands for fuel to fight the war in Afghanistan overwhelmed operations at the foreign bases. In Qatar, for instance, the air base at Doha could pump only 300,000 gallons of fuel a day. At Seeb Air Base, Oman's military could supply U.S. forces with just 350,000 gallons a day. That was far less than what was needed.

To solve the problem, DESC turned to the private sector. Within days, the agency negotiated contracts with foreign and multinational oil companies to supply fuel. The agency contracted with 28 companies in the region. As a result, fueling capabilities in Qatar jumped to 700,000 gallons a day and to 600,000 gallons a day in Oman. Overall, the military used nearly 900 million gallons of fuel during the first year of the war, more than half of it coming from commercial suppliers.

DESC also faced the challenge of getting fuel to troops in Afghanistan. With horrible roads and only limited rail lines, transportation in Afghanistan was abysmal. And fuel could not always be flown in because U.S. air strikes had destroyed most landing strips in the country. It was weeks before they were rebuilt to support U.S. operations. Needing a quick solution, DESC again turned to the private sector, contracting with Pakistani firms to drive fuel to military camps. For the most part, the contracts were easy to arrange, says Wells. The biggest hurdle, he says, was dealing with companies that were not used to the quick turnaround time needed to negotiate a contract. Still, most deals were closed within a matter of days, he says. For security reasons, the drivers rarely entered the bases. Generally, they stopped a mile or so away to unload fuel into large bags, which military personnel then would drive onto the bases, or they funneled fuel into Army-built pipelines leading to bases.

WARLORDS

Even with delivery contracts in place, the agency faced other challenges, primarily ensuring that the fuel made it to U.S. camps. Decades of hatred and mistrust between Afghan and Pakistani warlords put the fuel supplies at risk. "Afghanistan is like the Wild West," says Col. Jack Vance, deputy director of operations for DESC. "The Pakistani driver comes over the border and all the ethnic hatred is there. The Pakistani drivers fear for their lives." Some Pakistani drivers have tried to take advantage of the tension. They've faked the disappearance of trucks or drivers in hopes of getting the United States to pay ransom. Rarely has the United States obliged, according to DESC sources.

Vance says the presence of marauders makes it difficult to ensure the safe and timely delivery of fuel. But DLA has only limited ways to stop attacks because U.S. military leaders have decided not to secure the routes used for the deliveries. "The Russians tried that and they lost a lot of people. They were easily picked off by locals. Central Command has chosen not to expend a lot of military assets to secure those transportation lanes," Vance says. As a result, the State Department must negotiate with local warlords in Afghanistan to ensure the safety of fuel shipments.

Wells is not concerned about running into similar problems should the United States go to war with Iraq. For starters, he is in constant contact with DLA officials and war planners to assess the potential requirements for such an operation. Additionally, the Middle East is an oil-rich region and the United States has strong ties with governmental and commercial suppliers dating back decades. During the last Gulf War, for instance, Saudi Arabia provided the United States with more than 1 billion gallons of fuel. "We are going out and talking with suppliers to ensure that they have the capabilities to support those potential requirements," Wells says.