Midcourse Correction

NASA is sorting through a mountain of recommendations produced by reviews of its recent string of mishaps and failed missions.

Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team

Chair: Henry McDonald

Reviewed major shuttle systems, examined ground and flight software validation and verification, investigated workforce human factors, evaluated organizational issues.

Report issued: Report to Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, March 7, 2000

General findings:

• Four requirements for immediate inspections and repairs prior to shuttle return to flight in October 1999.
• 37 requirements for additional inspections, repairs and process improvements within four flights.
• 30 requirements for process improvements and better risk management by January 2001.
• 10 requirements for better risk management and shuttle technical upgrades by January 2005.
• Insufficient resources and staffing erode flight-critical safety.
• Desire to reduce costs, reliance on past successes erode risk management process.
• Shuttle is not an "operational" vehicle, and shuttle program trend toward airline-style
  maintenance operations is ill-advised.

NASA Faster, Better, Cheaper Task Force

Chair: Anthony Spear

Assessed best practices through series of interviews and workshops involving NASA headquarters,
10 NASA centers, industry and academia July 1999-February 2000.

Report issued: Final Report, March 2000

General recommendations:

• Stay the course, benefit from lessons learned.

• Focus on core competencies, develop stable funding environments and retain expertise for in-house projects.

• Propagate faster, better, cheaper with effective center-to-center teaming arrangements.

• Improve teaming among NASA centers, industry and academia.

• Place higher priority on advanced technology development.

• Place higher priority on personnel acquisition, motivation and training.

Mars Program Independent Assessment Team

Chair: Thomas Young

Reviewed and analyzed six recent Mars and Deep Space missions; reported on loss of Mars Polar
Lander and Deep Space 2 missions.

Reports issued:

Mars Program Independent Assessment Team Report, March 14, 2000

Mars Program Independent Assessment Team Summary Report, March 14, 2000

Report on the Loss of the Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space 2 Missions (by the Mars Program

Independent Assessment Team), March 22, 2000

General findings:

• Faster, better, cheaper is effective if properly implemented.
• No established definition and implementation procedure for faster, better, cheaper exists.
• New technologies have not been a cause of failure.

Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board

Chair: Art Stephenson

Reported on loss of Mars Climate Orbiter; reviewed and analyzed NASA project management.

Reports issued:

Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase 1 Report, Nov. 10, 1999

Report on the Loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter Mission, Nov. 11, 1999

Report on Project Management, March 13, 2000

General findings:

• Faster, better, cheaper programs emphasize cost and schedule reduction.
• Too much emphasis on cost and schedule reduction increases risk to unacceptable levels.
• Process and project leadership deficiencies induce risk and compromise mission success.