Coping With Your Political Boss

Coping With Your Political Boss

By Robert Maranto

s of the beginning of August,
according to The Washington Post, a whopping 40 percent of the top 773 executive branch political appointments in the Clinton administration had not yet been filled. Usually midway through the first year of the President's second term, most appointees have settled in. Some fault the Clinton White House for the slow start, but much of the blame falls on forces beyond the President's control. From Kennedy to Clinton, each president has had more trouble filling executive branch positions than the president before. An "obstacle course" appointment process of endless financial reports, FBI checks, internal vetting to guard against political problems and increased congressional scrutiny delays selection and confirmation of nominees, and discourages many of the best-qualified candidates.

Once in government, long hours, the glare of publicity and relatively low salaries push political appointees to shorten their stay, producing a steady stream of vacant positions that are ever harder to fill. The stress felt by recent political appointees is reflected in their memoirs, which have such titles as:

• Are You Tough Enough? (McGraw-Hill, 1986) by Reagan Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford.

• Leaving Town Alive (Houghton Mifflin, 1993) by Bush National Endowment for the Arts Chairman John Frohnmayer.

• Locked in the Cabinet (Alfred A. Knopf, 1997) by Clinton Labor Secretary Robert Reich.

Similarly, among the best recent scholarly works on political appointees are:

• The Confirmation Mess (Basic Books, 1994) by Stephen Carter.

• Obstacle Course (1996) by G. Calvin Mackenzie and Robert Shogan.

• Presidential Lightning Rods (University Press of Kansas, 1994) by Richard Ellis.

With images like these, one wonders why anyone would take a political position in government.

Most experts agree that we need simpler ethics rules, fewer political appointees and better orientation for those who are selected. But none of these reforms is coming soon. In the meantime, career executives have to work with a steady stream of political appointees who may not stay long enough to really know their jobs. What can executives do to make the process work?

In the first place, they can hope they work in an organization that is supported by the administration. After surveying 180 Reagan and Clinton political appointees and more than 1,000 career executives, I found that if the President supports an agency's mission, as in the Reagan Defense Department or the Clinton Department of Health and Human Services, career-noncareer relations are likely to start well and stay that way.

But even the most conflict-prone agencies usually undergo what public administration experts Paul Lorentzen and Jim Pfiffner have called a "cycle of accommodation." Political-career relations often start badly but improve, as the most controversial appointees (and career civil servants) move on and others learn to work together. The longer they work with career employees, the more likely appointees are to respect them.

So what can career executives do to speed up the cycle of accommodation? From interviews and surveys, I have come up with the following, common-sense prescriptions.

Avoid stereotypes. Too often, career executives believe the harsh stereotype that political appointees are envelope-licking campaign creatures, and that the numerous exceptions are just that, exceptions. In fact, in the Bush administration, most Senate-confirmed appointees were well-educated (78 percent had advanced degrees) and had substantial public or private sector experience. We have no comparable data on Clinton appointees, but there is every reason to think they are equally credentialed. Lower-level Schedule C political appointees are less qualified, but even so, tens of thousands of campaign workers want jobs in government but only a few are selected. Typically those few are highly capable. (Successful campaigns are not run by fools.) Even if they start out without much knowledge of the executive branch in general or your agency in particular, they usually are smart enough and hard-working enough to make a contribution.

Do reconnaissance. Remember, every political appointee has something you don't. It may be knowledge of the budget process or public relations skill. It may be business experience. It may be a White House or Office of Management and Budget or congressional connection. It may simply be a fresh pair of eyes with new insights about the agency. Whatever it is, find out what talents appointees bring, if possible even before they come on board, and think about how they can help your agency work better.

Put new appointees in touch with their predecessors. Most new political appointees are literally "home alone." They enter a strange new organization knowing few or none of its people. Fully 45 percent of Reagan political appointees reported not knowing any of their agency's political appointees before joining government; 35 percent of Clinton appointees said the same. Fewer still knew career officials. At the same time, 81 percent of Clinton appointees report a desire to consult their predecessors. Accordingly, some agencies include as part of the regular briefing materials for new appointees the names and whereabouts of all those who previously held the position, regardless of political party or administration. Since appointees usually face a stressful wait of several months from the time they are designated to the time they actually take office, there is ample time and desire to consult predecessors.

Make the first move. Political appointees' biggest complaint about career executives is the same one careerists have about them: a failure to communicate. Or, as one career senior executive told me in 1993, "The trouble with the civil service during a transition is that we're just too civil. We don't say anything." New appointees may not know how to communicate with career executives. There is no standard etiquette, and each organization has a distinct communications culture. Nearly 70 percent of Clinton appointees say careerists should "initiate contacts with appointees, who may not know how to work with the bureaucracy." Career executives should request a one-on-one meeting with a new appointee to get acquainted, to explain what career officials do, to see what the appointee needs, and to find out the appointee's preferred style of interaction-in person, by telephone, or by memo. This gives executives the chance to show political appointees that they know who's boss-appointees are. In addition, career executives should ask new appointees to orient career officials, who may not understand the appointee's agenda. If careerists don't know what appointees want, they can't help them get it.

Forgive them their trespasses. Just as career executives stereotype political appointees, political appointees are likely to come to government with their own stereotypes about bureaucrats. This is particularly true if the president's party has not held the Executive Branch for some time. Usually, negative views of bureaucrats soon become positive, but this may happen more quickly if you remember the biblical admonition that "a soft answer turneth away wrath."

Never step on enthusiasm. With rare exceptions, political appointees join government more for patriotism than for money. Though they probably know less about the agency than you do, and may hold a different view of the public interest, they want to do a good job. They are frustrated by the many constraints that frustrate all government executives. Help them figure out how to overcome those constraints. At the same time, not all their ideas will be practical. When you disagree with an appointee, explain why in terms of external forces or standards. Rather than simply saying an idea is bad, say: "You have a good idea, but I fear Congress won't accept it. How might we develop a strategy to change that?"

Don't get in the line of fire. As Richard Haas writes in The Power to Persuade (Houghton Mifflin, 1994), political appointees exist in part to take risks for the agency and for the President's agenda. Their short tenure frees them to battle Congress and take on the press. Career executives are in a different position. Support your appointees, but explain the limits of what you can do on their behalf, given that you might someday have to work for a different team.

Move, if necessary. If you have firm disagreements with your political boss, request different duties. As one career executive told me: "I was once proposed to be detailed to a position supporting a political official who was developing regulations. I suggested that this would be a bad idea for me and for the person for whom I would work because I had a very basic disagreement with the policy. I was not detailed, and this is the way these matters usually are resolved." But suppose you disagree with your boss's agenda, or simply can't work with him or her? Should you wait it out? Probably not. Most studies suggest appointees serve an average of less than two years in their positions, but my own data from the Reagan administration show that in two-term administrations, political appointees serve an average of 2.6 years in their position and 3.7 years in their agencies-a long time to wait. And anecdotal evidence suggests that the best and worst appointees stay in place the longest-the former because they love their work and the latter because they have nothing better to do. Rather than persevere with what you think of as a toxic boss, it might make more sense to seek a soft landing elsewhere.

Keep perspective. In our democracy, the worst ideas of political appointees seldom last long. They are blocked by other appointees, Congress, or The Washington Post (or by the very thought of The Washington Post). The best ideas often live on after appointees have left government. Political and career executives may have different struggles, but the best government happens when they put them aside to struggle together. n

Robert Maranto is a senior faculty member at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Va. He co-authored The Politics of Civil Service Reform, to be published in December by Peter Lang. His e-mail address is ramarant@opm.gov