The New Reserves

Shifting from a supplemental force to a standing military raises questions.

The historical role of the military reserves is significantly changing. Once maintained in reserve as a militia, the force now is fully integrated with and controlled by the regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. This hampers another historical role of the militia-to be a counterforce to a standing army. This approach dates from the English civil wars of the 17th century and was adopted in the United States during colonial times. Standing armies tended to render allegiance to kings rather than to country or residents. Militias, however, with leaders elected and drawn from the local populace, did not pose the same threat to individual liberties.

In the war on terror, which might change in intensity but is unlikely to end, we rely on our reserves and National Guard to move in and out of active roles. This differs from past wars in which many reservists and National Guardsmen were called up, trained, deployed, but then released from active duty. The reserves' intense support role in Iraq and Afghanistan results from the 1973 Total Force policy under Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. The goal was to integrate the active military and reserves in a cost-effective manner while maintaining the smallest active peacetime force possible.

After Vietnam, Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams implemented the Total Force policy for the Army by moving many support and logistical functions (police, civil affairs, logistics, intelligence and others) to the reserves. That meant a war could not be fought without mobilizing the Army National Guard and Reserve. Because such a mobilization would draw on a broad range of citizens, it would require the support of the American people.

The role of the reserves has changed from that of providing a large emergency supplement for the regular forces-used only rarely-to one that provides specialized skills at all times, and as a surge capability. This new reality is making the reserves adjuncts of the active military, required to respond frequently at almost any level of need. Whether this will work in the long run as more demands are placed on citizen soldiers, is yet to be determined. At some point, reservists might decide that these demands are too great and switch to the active military, or pull out altogether.

The Defense Department is moving even closer to total integration of the active military and the reserves under a concept called Continuum of Service. It would allow a free flow of people between active, reserve and even civilian status. This approach would require cultural differences, assignments, training, promotion and other aspects of military personnel management to be worked out.

CoS would allow reservists to train or be on active duty for as little as a few days a year up to 365. Under some circumstances, civilians could participate as temporary reservists and reservists could convert to the active military service. Members of the active military would be allowed to temporarily convert to reserve status-to accommodate sabbaticals for personal reasons such as childbirth, graduate study or other special events-and then return to active status.

These changes would result in a fundamental shift in how the reserves are structured, trained, employed and viewed in this country. They also would effectively eliminate the militia. These shifts have been under way for more than three decades. Their full impact, however, is not well understood, even within the Defense Department and surely not by the American public. What has not yet occurred is a complete airing of these issues and the long-term implications of removing the buffer of a militia between the government and the people.