Clearance applications not processed within target times

Average time for initial clearances granted in early 2006 was 446 days, GAO finds.

Processing times for security clearance requests exceed Bush administration goals, and Pentagon contractors with unresolved issues in their applications are granted Top Secret credentials frequently, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.

Government contractors waited on average 446 days for their initial security clearance and 545 days for clearance updates, the report (GAO-06-1070) stated. The study examined 2,259 cases where private sector personnel were granted Top Secret security clearances in January and February 2006.

The Office of Management and Budget has instituted a goal for the application-submission process to take 14 days or less, but it took an average of 111 days in the cases reviewed, GAO said. It also took the Office of Personnel Management an average of 286 days to complete an initial background investigation, well in excess of the 180-day OMB-mandated deadline, the report stated.

Delays can be attributed to an inexperienced investigative workforce that failed to fully use available technology, the report concluded. Statistics from OPM, which started handling about 90 percent of the government's investigations needs for the clearance-granting process in February 2005, failed to accurately represent the actual length of time spent, hindering congressional oversight, the report stated.

GAO found that incomplete investigative reports submitted to the Defense Department by OPM resulted in the granting of security clearances to industry personnel who had unresolved issues, such as inconsistent financial records and trips to foreign countries that weren't explained completely.

In reviewing 50 reports on clearances granted, GAO found that 47 were missing required documents. More than half contained at least one unresolved issue, but none of the sampled industry personnel were denied security clearances.

"The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in granting Top Secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information," the report stated.

In a statement, OPM Director Linda Springer said the report is based on outdated information, and background investigations performed in fiscal 2005 were completed "within an ever-improving timeframe." GAO's "critical findings do not accurately reflect the current state of affairs," she said.

Springer wrote in her response that she is concerned about a "number of inaccurate facts" on which the report is based. For example, GAO's conclusion that OPM data on processing times is incomplete and inaccurate is based on a faulty comparison of two databases, she said.

Derek Stewart, author of the report and director of GAO's defense capabilities and management division, disagreed, saying that while the audit used information from both databases, it used one to supplement the other rather than as a comparison.

House Government Reform Committee Chairman Tom Davis, R-Va., said in a statement that while the report reveals bad news regarding the speed and quality of clearance investigations, GAO's information is out of date.

Davis said the review's focus on security clearance applications that, on average, would have been submitted in 2004, fails to consider the February 2005 transfer of the Defense Security Service's investigations work to OPM and the security clearance reforms included in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

"I believe this report largely verifies that the clearance process was, indeed, in terrible shape when DOD transferred its investigations functions to OPM," Davis said. "I am certain that a sample of more current cases would show significant improvement in both timeliness and consistent investigative standards."

GAO recommended that OMB direct OPM and the Pentagon to fully measure and report the time it takes for an applicant to receive a security clearance. OMB should launch an interagency working group to resolve information technology problems that created some of the delays, the report said.

OMB also should require OPM and the Pentagon to establish and submit procedures for eliminating deficiencies identified in the investigative process and should issue guidance that clarifies whether clearance adjudicators are to issue security clearances despite incomplete reports, GAO said.

In response to the report, Clay Johnson, deputy director for management at OMB, said while he may disagree with some of the report's specific statistics, he agrees that the government is a long way from accomplishing its goals.

Johnson said the White House National Security Council's Security Clearance Working Group established a subcommittee, chaired by the National Intelligence Director's office, to find ways to improve the quality and timeliness of background investigations.