Customs, INS told to improve random inspection programs

Data on foreign travelers collected from random inspection programs operated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service is questionable, according to a December letter to agency heads from the General Accounting Office. Inspectors from Customs and the INS did not always follow proper random inspection procedures or conduct thorough examinations, according to a GAO letter sent to Robert C. Bonner and James W. Ziglar, the respective heads of the two agencies. As a result, the two agencies' random inspection programs, designed to measure the effectiveness of overall inspection at the nation's ports of entry, could not provide reliable statistics on foreign travelers who may have violated Customs or immigration laws, wrote Richard M. Stana, director of justice issues at GAO, in a Dec. 3 letter. GAO studied the programs at two ports of entry from July to September 2001, but has since suspended its investigation of port security because the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks have "dramatically" changed inspection priorities, the letter said. Customs and INS are authorized to inspect every person coming through a U.S. port of entry for contraband and proper documentation, respectively. According to GAO, most inspections are cursory checks, which can lead to a more extensive second inspection for suspicious travelers. At the time of GAO's study, second inspections were given to "a very small percentage of travelers." In the 1990s, Customs and the INS began their own random inspection programs at select ports of entry to assess the effectiveness of their overall inspection efforts. The two programs, known as COMPEX [Customs' Compliance Measurement Examination] and INTEX [Inspections Traveler Examination], were designed to randomly select and intensively inspect more international travelers than the usual inspections. Customs and INS would then use the statistics to estimate in its reports the proportion of total violations identified by each agency. Under COMPEX, all passengers are supposed to have an equal chance of being selected for a random inspection. But that was not the case at Los Angeles International Airport, according to GAO. "At one international terminal, [an inspector] who was monitoring two lines of passengers told us that he always makes a COMPEX selection from one line and not from the other," the letter said. Customs also did not use COMPEX to inspect pedestrians and buses at any land border ports, including San Ysidro near San Diego, Calif., which was included in GAO's study. As for INTEX, only five travelers a day were inspected at each large port, and even fewer travelers were inspected at smaller ports. And INTEX statistics showed that no port conducted all of its scheduled inspections in fiscal years 1999 and 2000. GAO also questioned the thoroughness of some inspections. "We observed inspectors briefly examining a vehicle selected for a COMPEX inspection," Stana wrote. "It did not appear that the inspectors interviewed the occupants or conducted computer checks, both mandatory parts of a COMPEX inspection." GAO recommended that Customs and INS inspectors get refresher training on conducting random inspections, and suggested the two agencies combine their two programs to avoid duplication. Both Customs and the INS agreed with GAO's findings. INS eliminated INTEX, which was a pilot program, in October because it did not suit the agency's purposes, and is looking at ways to work with Customs on a joint random inspection program.