Secretary of State discusses her vision for spreading democracy

During the past year, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has emerged as a star of the Bush Cabinet. At home, Americans approve of her job performance in numbers that have politicos speculating about a possible 2008 presidential run, and overseas she is lauded for her diplomatic skills and instincts for multilateral cooperation. National Journal Staff Correspondent James Kitfield spoke recently with Rice. The following are edited excerpts of that interview. NJ: In the past year the State Department, Pentagon, and National Security Council seem to be working together much more cohesively. That stands in stark contrast to a first Bush term characterized by divisions between then-Secretary of State Colin Powell on the one side and Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on the other. What has changed?

Rice: Well, I know that there was a lot written about that division, and I happen to think a lot of it was overdrawn. There was a tendency on the part of the press to worry about what level four or five of the bureaucracy was saying, and not to listen to what level one was saying. But I won't deny that there were strong feelings and strong debates. It was a pretty dramatic time of trying to reconfigure American foreign policy. I think we've now come to a steady state.

The president's second Inaugural Address, in effect, became the foundational document for this administration's policy in a way that was perhaps still being worked through in the first term. After the question of overthrowing Saddam Hussein was out of the way, there was clear unanimity that the promotion of democracy was the way to go forward.

NJ: So you primarily credit changed circumstances for the change in foreign-policy approach in the second term?

Rice: In conditions of war, or the immediate aftermath of war, there's a sort of natural tendency for Defense to be more front and center. If you look back at the end of World War II, this debate about Defense versus State was also going on. As you move past that point and get into a period of consolidation, where you are focused on bringing the international community back behind your efforts, then the focus naturally shifts more to diplomacy. So, yes, I think changed circumstances mostly accounts for the change you perceive.

NJ: There's a strong conventional wisdom out there that holds that you are pursuing many of the same multilateral initiatives that Colin Powell wanted to advance, but you are given more leeway because you have President Bush's total trust and more closely share his foreign-policy vision. A prime example that people point to is North Korea, where you have given U.S. negotiators greater latitude than they were ever given in the first term. Is that how you see it?

Rice: Again, there is a tendency to caricature -- although that is probably too strong a word -- what actually happened in the first term. Colin Powell was a fine diplomat, and the idea that he somehow didn't have the president's confidence is just wrong. I sat in those meetings. I talked to both of them all the time, so I know that isn't true.

You mention the six-party talks with North Korea. That was really President Bush's brainchild. Despite all these high-paid and incredibly experienced foreign-policy advisers -- well, maybe not so high-paid, but certainly experienced -- it was the president of the United States who said, "Well, you know, unless China becomes a stakeholder in this, we're not going to solve this problem." And so the six-party talks emerged.

In terms of managing the six-party talks, we didn't want to get into a situation again where we fell back into bilateral talks with the North Koreans and they took advantage of that by trying to make it strictly a U.S. problem, rather than a problem for the whole neighborhood.

We did have lots of back-and-forth about that issue. And maybe from time to time it gave an impression of micromanagement of the talks themselves by the White House. I think that's fair. I think we have come to a place now where the six-party talks have matured. But I wouldn't deny that we've been more flexible in how these talks have proceeded, and I think that's been effective.

NJ: The critics would say that you spent four years criticizing the Clinton administration's 1994 Agreed Framework deal with North Korea and in your new flexibility are fashioning a deal that looks very similar. Is that fair?

Rice: Whatever the origins of the Agreed Framework in 1994, it left the United States as the chief stakeholder in the relationship with the North Koreans. So when the North Koreans decided to walk away from the deal, they effectively walked away from the United States, and not from the other participants. [President Bush] felt very strongly that we weren't going to repeat that mistake again.

It's funny, in a way, because people accused us of not being multilateral enough, and now we're being accused by some of contracting out our North Korea policy to China. But we actually believe this is not our problem alone, but rather everybody's problem.

We also don't want this to become just an arms control negotiation with North Korea. The president really cares about the fate of the North Korean people, and he wants others to care about their fate as well. So you'll notice that the Six-Party Declaration isn't just about nuclear weapons, it's also about a different kind of Korean Peninsula. So I think those are President Bush's lodestars concerning North Korea.

NJ: On Iran, you are also credited with showing greater flexibility in backing the negotiations of the Europeans on halting Tehran's nuclear program. Why the shift?

Rice: We wanted to demonstrate that the United States was prepared to support a negotiated solution, so we came up with the idea of removing our objection to the Iranian application to the [World Trade Organization] and maybe making spare parts available [for Iranian airplanes]. And then the president went to Europe and sort of tested the proposition himself. He talked to each of these leaders, and asked whether they were really prepared to back the [International Atomic Energy Agency] in doing something tougher if the Iranians didn't come around.

And I think President Bush came back from that trip convinced that the Europeans would back tougher action if negotiations failed and that they would not countenance a nuclear weapon in Iran's hands. We are now completely united with the Europeans, and to a certain extent with the Russians and others, in a way that makes Iran the isolated nation.

NJ: Because of the first-term focus on pre-emption and wars of regime change, many international observers listen to President Bush on the need to advance the cause of freedom and democracy, and they perceive his message as the United States spreading democracy at the point of a gun. Does that frustrate you?

Rice: Yes, I think it is unfortunate that sometimes people assume that pre-emption is now the dominant theme of our foreign policy. I've reread the National Security Strategy 2002 many, many times. Pre-emption is an element of that policy, but an element that's actually been there a long time in American policy. I also think people are beginning to understand that we did not think that democracy can be delivered at gunpoint. On the other hand, when there is a real threat and you do have to use military force, then it is your obligation to try and leave the foundations for democracy.

NJ: Do you see that obligation as following in the post-World War II tradition?

Rice: That's one reason I so often refer back to World War II. We didn't go to war against Adolf Hitler to bring democracy to Germany. We went to war to defeat Hitler's Germany. But once that was achieved, the American answer to the question of how to build a stable Europe with a different kind of Germany at its core was to emphasize a market economy and democratic institutions in Germany. So I think the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq today is similar in many ways. In places where we've had to use military force, we have an obligation to leave a foundation for a democratic future. That is in the American tradition.

NJ: Does your democracy agenda go beyond Afghanistan and Iraq?

Rice: There is a much broader democracy agenda. In some cases, that entails encouraging democracy in nations that have been our friends but where we expect better, like Saudi Arabia or Egypt. There are places where we have worked with others to remove a hindrance to democracy, like Syria's occupation of Lebanon. We've had the closest possible relations working with France on that issue. So there are lots of means to promote democracy. Our use of military force was never designed to deliver democracy at bayonet point.

NJ: In dealing with Uzbekistan's crackdown on democratic protesters, many observers credited you with hewing to a pro-democracy line even when some worried that it might cost the United States access to an important military base. Is that the case?

Rice: That's right, because President Bush has really focused us all on this false choice between our strategic interests and our interest in democracy. In fact, they are inextricably linked. Now, in the short term it may sometimes appear that you are sacrificing strategic interests in order to promote democracy. If you look at the longer-term picture, however, it's clear that when we have stable, democratic relations, only then do we have true peace. The alternative is a kind of false peace that's going to break down one day.

NJ: The flip side of the administration's emphasis on promoting democracy and freedom, however, is that you inevitably open the United States up to charges of hypocrisy when shorter-term goals take priority. Hasn't that been the case with Pakistan, where you have formed a close anti-terror alliance with President Pervez Musharraf, a general who took power in a coup?

Rice: I actually think that the need for a democratic foundation to what we do is really very, very powerful in all cases. But I also think you have to take nations as they are. Take a state like Pakistan, for instance, and look at where it was prior to September of 2001. There was not just a question about democracy. There was also the question of Pakistan having a fundamentally hostile relationship with the largest democracy in the world -- India. There was extremism taking root in Pakistan in ways that threatened to "Talibanize" the nation.

So Musharraf is not just an ally in the war on terrorism. He's also an ally who has started to think about a more open, moderate, and tolerant Pakistan. Musharraf has also made a commitment to holding elections in 2007, and when I was in Pakistan I said that we expect those elections to take place.

My point is that you may not be able to change the playing field overnight. But if you look at the trajectory of Pakistan, it's a much better trajectory even from the perspective of our democracy agenda than it was a few years ago.

NJ: How do you answer critics who say that Russia is actually less democratic today than a few years ago?

Rice: In terms of Russia, we should be careful not to overstate the case. I happen to know a lot about the former Soviet Union, and Russia today is not like the Soviet Union. At the same time, we are disappointed in the present course of Russia's democratic development. There have been some positive trends, such as the development of a mortgage-owning middle class in Moscow that I think will eventually make a difference. But there have also been several setbacks.

The good news is that President Bush has a good enough relationship with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin that they can and do talk about it. It's not as if the Russians say what the Soviets used to say, which was that this is our internal affair and none of your business. We don't go through that anymore. So, we'll keep pressing the democracy agenda with Russia. Because, perhaps more than any place else in the world, it's important that Russia finally find a path toward a democratic future rather than toward either the chaos or authoritarianism that have been Russia's history.

NJ: You and other senior administration officials have described the post-9/11 period as a "revolutionary," or "transformative," period in foreign affairs, and clearly those experiences inform your worldview today. Has that made you more of an idealist, and less of a traditional realist, in your worldview?

Rice: I think that, like a lot of people after September 11, I've become much more focused on the fact that it's no use to reach for temporary solutions. You really have to look for permanent ones. And permanent solutions rest in democratic development. You know, the United States and Europe tried to solve the problem of Europe for a hundred years, but nobody could keep France and Germany from fighting. And then after World War II we did it differently.

We started with support for a democratic Germany, and then we helped create an organization of avowed democracies pledged to the idea of collective security. And now, 60 years later, nobody can imagine France and Germany ever fighting again. That didn't happen by chance.

So then we looked at the Middle East and asked, "How could it be that something in this region is so wrong that it allowed the growth of this ideology of hatred, inspiring people to fly airplanes into buildings to kill innocent people, or to bomb a subway in Madrid or London, or to blow up a nightclub in Indonesia or a wedding party in Jordan? What is the solution to that?" Well, the temporary solution is, you try to hunt down and deal with Al Qaeda.

The permanent solution is that you transform the region into one that is democratic. Because then you will have legitimate channels for people to pursue their political, economic, and social interests. If you don't have legitimate channels, people will find illegitimate ones. And then you end up with the kind of malignancy we've seen with these terrorist attacks. I think that's what 9/11 really meant to me.

NJ: So Condi Rice, the noted Soviet expert and realist, has been transformed into an idealist?

Rice: You know it's not like I've ever been 100 percent realist. I was a Soviet specialist, but I spent a lot of time supporting democratic movements in Eastern Europe. And when we first came here in 1989, I was one of the people on our team who petitioned pretty hard to back the Solidarity movement, because we felt that a way had to be found for Poland to have its democratic revolution. At the time, I probably thought that democratic revolution would be particular to Eastern Europe. After 9/11, I see it in more-generalized terms. In fact, I see the democratic movement as the dominant principle underlying our foreign policy.