Airport security has nowhere to go but up, experts say

The news was surprising and not very reassuring: In 70 percent of all tests, undercover government agents were able to sneak knives past airport screeners; in 60 percent of their attempts, they succeeded in slipping simulated explosive devices past the screening system; and 30 percent of the time, they were even able to get guns through. Overall, airport screeners failed to detect prohibited items in 48 percent of all tests.

Those stunning statistics, first reported last month by USA Today, came from a confidential inspector general's audit of 32 American airports conducted from November to early February. Of course, that was before the new Transportation Security Administration took over screening responsibilities on February 17, as mandated by the airport security legislation that was signed into law last year. Nevertheless, the study screamed out an obvious point: The government has a lot of work to do to improve airport security. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta acknowledged as much in a recent interview with CNN. "This is going to be a continuing work in progress," he said.

But for pragmatists, the screening study also underscored another point: No matter what kind of improvements the government eventually makes, the airport security system will never be foolproof. Each year, 650 million people travel by plane in this country, going through 429 commercial airports. The airline industry makes money by getting those passengers to their destinations as quickly as possible. And perhaps most important, technological and financial resources for improving security are limited.

"The security system is better now than it was six months ago. And six months from now, it will be better than it is today," said David A. Fuscus, president of Xenophon Strategies, a firm specializing in crisis communications for U.S. commercial airlines. "But 650 million people use the air transportation system, and we'll never be able to [reach] 100 percent on all levels of security."

As the TSA transforms airport screeners into higher-paid federal employees, it plans to conduct similar tests in the future to evaluate their progress. Yet given these two facts--that airport screening must improve, and that it will never be perfect--the question that transportation policy makers must answer is: How are we going to measure success? In other words, exactly how secure does our airport security system need to be?

Darryl Moody, a TSA program manager who's on loan from his job at KPMG Consulting, takes a stab at that difficult question. He explains that the agency is currently taking basic measurements of the effectiveness of every aspect of the screening process: Was each screening task done or not? Was it done in accordance with standard operating procedure? Were the screeners who were performing each task certified to do them? And if a metal detector alarm went off, was the situation resolved appropriately? "All of these things will be measured in some way," he said.

"If we do all of these things [well], then it will be as secure as we can almost humanly get."

But Moody argues that it's impossible to come up with a numerical benchmark for success. "Any number that could be provided right now would be a goal, but not a well-educated goal," he said. Yet he guesses that once the federal government's security system is up and running and is staffed with sharp and alert employees, screeners will be able to catch 80 or 90 percent of all weapons. And, he admits, "that's probably as good as it's going to get."

Moody points out, however, that the screening process is just one of several "rings of defense" that make up the airport security system. One ring is the reservations process (where the task is to identify passengers); another is the baggage screening system (which should detect explosives in luggage); and the final ring is the air marshals (who should forcibly stop any terrorist who boards a plane). Once all those rings are working well, Moody explains, you can get as close as possible to 100 percent security. "That is the goal-that there are no successful disruptions or harm done to the aviation system."

For other aviation experts, though, the real goal isn't 100 percent security--it's 100 percent deterrence. A system that allows 50 percent of weapons to pass through security obviously invites future terrorist attacks. But by reducing the percentage, say to 20 percent, you reduce that vulnerability, especially if there are other deterrents in place, such as air marshals and fortified cockpit doors. "It will never be a perfect system," said James Burnley, who served as Transportation secretary during the Reagan administration. "But where the deterrence factor is high, you will [stop] terrorists."

Some critics, however, believe that the screening system provides neither safety nor deterrence, and they don't expect much improvement. Michael J. Boyd, an aviation consultant based in Colorado, says the problem is that the same bureaucrats who ran the old security regime under the Federal Aviation Administration are now running the TSA. "We can never be perfect, but we can be a lot better than we are now," he argued. "We don't have better security because the people who are running the security aren't better. They are the same."

Other critics note that the TSA's policy of applying the same screening standards for all passengers--from 80-year-old grandmothers to suspected terrorists such as Richard Reid--is wrongheaded. "That is a recipe for disaster, and we need to get past that," said Robert W. Poole Jr., a transportation expert at the Reason Foundation, a conservative think tank. Poole says that instead of this one-size-fits-all approach, we need a screening system that would divide passengers into three groups: trusted travelers (frequent flyers, who would need little scrutiny), occasional travelers (who would face current screening standards), and suspicious travelers (who would undergo a greater level of scrutiny). This three-tiered system, according to Poole, would better allocate screening resources.

But Burnley, the former Transportation secretary, is more optimistic about the TSA's ability to improve the system. He contends that it's too early to pass judgment; in fact, the TSA employees who will be training the new federal screening workforce just began their own training last month. "Very little time has passed.... They are moving with all the speed they can to build up a workforce," Burnley said. "The jury should still be out on how they are doing."

The TSA certainly believes that security is getting better. "We are collecting more items, we are turning away more people, we are shortening the wait, and we are improving the customer-satisfaction levels," said TSA spokesman Jonathan Thompson. "We are seeing results already."

But however one measures the effectiveness of current airport security--and the capacity for improving it--the inspector general's audit makes one thing clear: There's certainly nowhere to go but up.