Airport security initiatives raise more questions than answers

Observers of the airport security debate disagree on whether the government has gone too far or not far enough to protect the skies.

Air marshals. Fortified cockpit doors. Federalized airport screeners. Before September 11, few had paid much attention to these terms or to their policy implications. But after terrorists--armed only with small box-cutter knives--hijacked U.S. jetliners and slammed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the words have become part of the lexicon, especially among policy makers. Indeed, in the past four weeks, the federal government has undertaken a host of measures to strengthen airport security. On September 27, President Bush called for expanding the federal air-marshal program; requiring a larger governmental role in ensuring airport security; putting the National Guard in the nation's 420 commercial airports; and distributing $500 million in grants to fortify cockpit doors and undertake other security improvements. Congress, meanwhile, has been busy grappling with legislation that would implement some of the proposed security measures. The Transportation Department and the Federal Aviation Administration banned passengers from carrying small knives on board and limited them to just one carry-on bag. "Safety is always of paramount importance, and in these extraordinary times, we intend to be vigilant," said Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta the day after the attacks. But as Washington has rushed to beef up airport security, aviation experts, the press, and airline passengers appear to be drawing two different conclusions: that the government is going too far with the proposed security measures, or that it isn't going far enough. The gone-too-far crowd has criticized many of the smaller changes, such as the confiscation of nail clippers and disposable razors, the ban on steak knives in first-class seating, and the limit of just one carry-on bag. They complain that these actions make air travel a hassle, and do nothing to make U.S. airports and skies much safer. The biggest example of the federal government going overboard, they say, has been its push to federalize airport security screeners. In the Senate, lawmakers have crafted a bipartisan bill that would turn airport security personnel at commercial airports into federal employees. Supporters argue that the current system of having the airline companies hire screeners (who earn close to the minimum wage and experience high job turnover) is very flawed. "The current system dumbs-down security," said Sen. Max Cleland, D-Ga., one of the bill's sponsors. "We have to federalize the system. We have to have a federal corps of people." This proposal, however, has produced a hostile backlash. Detractors warn that such a move would create another huge layer of bureaucracy; they also contend that airport security wasn't the problem in the September 11 attacks. "This was not a failure of security.... The [terrorists] got on the plane with only the things they were legally entitled to have," said Ronald Utt, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. "The hapless minimum-wage workers did their job." (The Senate voted late Thursday to federalize aiport security.) To such critics, it's no surprise that Washington's policy-making establishment is going too far. For better or worse, they point out, the federal government has a history of being a reactive institution. It took thousands of drunken-driving fatalities, for instance, before the government established a federal blood-alcohol-content standard for drivers. And it took the chaos from last November's presidential election before it started seriously analyzing some of this country's flawed voting methods. "It's policy by disaster," said Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen. Kenneth Quinn, a counsel for the Aviation Security Association, which represents private firms that provide airport security personnel, contends that policy-by-disaster can often lead to overreaction. And this drive to transform screeners into federal employees, he explains, is a classic example. "Any time there is a major tragedy, there is a rush to do something. And sometimes in that rush, we really do not proceed in a deliberative or informative manner. We come up with answers that have nothing to do with the problem." He notes that the terrorists' success resulted from intelligence and immigration blunders, not from holes in airport security. Quinn admits, however, that it's unfair to single out Congress and the Bush administration for overreaching in response to the terrorist attacks. "They respond to public perceptions," he said. In fact, the news media play a huge role in helping to push the government into a policies-by-disaster type of response. For weeks, major media outlets have been running print and television stories on lax airport security, forcing policy makers to confront the question: What are you going to do about the problem? Yet, while some think that Washington has gone too far on new airport security measures, plenty of others believe that it hasn't done enough. For instance, the New York Daily News recently said that two of its reporters had been able to sneak knives, razor blades, and scissors past checkpoints at 10 major U.S. airports since the terrorist attacks. The paper also reported that some passengers believe that nothing has changed since September 11. "I don't see or feel any real difference," one airline passenger told the Daily News. "The security guards seem to be looking for something, but I'm not sure they know what it is." Billie Vincent, the former chief of security for the FAA from 1982-86 and currently the president and CEO of Aerospace Services International, argues that the federal government must do more to beef up airport security. So far, he says, it has implemented only "half-ass measures that will produce half-ass results." Vincent maintains that it's essential to arm pilots with handguns, establish a full-baggage passenger match for all domestic U.S. flights, enhance security at restricted airport areas, and install cameras in the cockpits and passenger cabins. Mary Schiavo, a former Transportation Department inspector general and a vociferous FAA critic, says that the federal government is focusing too much on the screening process, while leaving open other entry points. The government needs to conduct background checks on airport and airline employees, she says, and also to develop a system that checks mail and cargo. "We have worked to plug one of the holes. But if we plug that hole, we still have a couple of others," Schiavo said. "What we are doing is responding to the last terrorist threat." Some observers maintain that Washington policy making often doesn't go far enough, because solutions can get bogged down in the legislative process. At a congressional hearing on airport security last month, Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., noted that the General Accounting Office pinpointed many of the security flaws at U.S. airports after the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, but that Congress acted too slowly to make necessary improvements. "There has been a 15-year pattern on this aviation security issue, and that pattern is as follows," Wyden said. "First, there is a horrible aviation tragedy. Second, there is tremendous outrage in the Congress and in the country. Third, there are various recommendations issued by commissions and blueprint studies. And then fourth, there is slow-motion implementation of those recommendations." Wyden stressed that it's important to end this slow-motion process. "This time, we want to make the changes so that in six months or a year we don't have members of Congress back on the floor in a somber procession talking about ... another tragedy." Government watchdog groups attribute slow-motion reform to Washington's powerful interest groups. Public Citizen's Claybrook points out that corporations and other interests resist new regulatory efforts, particularly when they raise business costs. "It takes a lot to get [reform] through Congress," she said. "The lobbyists and the government have an enormous impact." Yet Claybrook does acknowledge that huge disasters can expedite reform: "An overarching issue is the only thing that breaks the lobbying chain." Which is worse-going too far, or not going far enough? For Vincent, the answer is simple: The United States must do everything possible to bolster airport security. "There are 6,000 people dead. We ought to be angry right now," he said. "There is no such thing as a middle ground on this. We will have an equal number of dead people in the future if we don't do this." In fact, the passengers who were aboard American Airlines Flight 1238 on October 8 would probably agree. As they traveled from Los Angeles to Chicago, a mentally ill man stormed into the cockpit. Although he wasn't a terrorist, other passengers and the crew subdued him, and two F-16 fighter jets intercepted the plane before it landed safely in Chicago. "Ladies were just crying," one passenger told the Chicago Tribune. "People thought they were going to die." If, as some believe, the federal government is going overboard in confiscating nail clippers and steak knives, limiting the number of carry-on bags, and proposing to federalize airport screeners, many Americans will probably be able to live with these increased security measures, especially if the new rules help to ease their minds the next time they fly. "Passengers now like to see all the extra security," said David A. Fuscus, president of Xenophon Strategies, a public affairs firm that focuses on aviation matters. "It gives them a sense of safety and comfort." But Fuscus admits that it'll be interesting to see whether Americans will continue to put up with these security measures as the months pass by. "Will people become less and less likely to wait in line?" he asked. "That's as good as anybody's guess."