Thousands of scientists and researchers from Russia and China, some of whom were found to have "suspected foreign intelligence connections," gained access to three Energy Department nuclear weapons laboratories without security background checks, the General Accounting Office concludes in a new report.
The report, "DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories" (RCED-97-229), said that security procedures at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Los Alamos and Sandia Laboratories in New Mexico are not being fully enforced. Under law, DOE is required to obtain background checks on proposed visitors from several countries, including Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.
Of the 5,472 visitors from these countries between 1994 and 1996, only 892 visitors received background checks. Of the 1,464 visitors from China, only 199 were checked. Of the 2,237 visitors from Russia, 451 visitors were checked, the GAO found.
"Sensitive subjects may have been discussed with foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval," the GAO found. "This situation is viewed by counterintelligence experts as an ideal opportunity for foreign intelligence-gathering efforts."
GAO auditors were able to document 13 instances where persons with suspected foreign intelligence connections were allowed access without background checks--8 visitors went to Los Alamos and 5 went to Sandia. "The lack of a background check did not provide DOE the opportunity to implement countermeasures to mitigate the potential risk posed by these visits," GAO auditors said.
GAO also found that security controls in the laboratories do not adequately protect sensitive information from foreign visitors. For example, lab officials sent a departmental newsletter containing classified information to 24 uncleared visitors, 11 of whom were foreign visitors.
In another instance, lab officials allowed six open boxes of papers marked "sensitive material" to remain in a hallway accessible to foreign visitors.
On the basis of the report's findings, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Energy:
- Direct DOE's Counterintelligence Division to assess the espionage threat against DOE and the weapons laboratories to determine appropriate countermeasures.
- Establish appropriate performance measures for the laboratories' counterintelligence activities and require periodic performance reviews.
- Revise DOE's foreign visitor policy to require that the subjects of visits be independently reviewed by experts to verify that visits involving sensitive subjects are adequately identified.
- Require that laboratories inform headquarters of the names of all proposed foreign visitors from sensitive countries so DOE's Counterintelligence Division can obtain additional background checks at its discretion.
- Require that security measures at each laboratory's controlled areas be assessed to ensure that the controls over persons and information in these areas are effective.
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