New analysis fuels debate over alternative F-35 engine

Pentagon study advises against funding an alternate engine for the jet, despite finding that doing so would cost no more than procuring only the primary engine.

A new Pentagon analysis strongly advises against funding an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, despite finding that doing so would cost no more than procuring only the primary engine for the jet.

The analysis, sent to the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday, comes amid threats from Defense Secretary Robert Gates that he will recommend President Obama veto any defense legislation that keeps alive the program to develop an alternate engine to the one the Pentagon plans to use in all 2,400-plus F-35s it is buying.

"The department's position is based in part on updated analyses which continue to show that the business case for a JSF alternate engine is not compelling, and that the alternate engine program would require a significant DoD investment of additional resources," according to an "information memorandum" accompanying the proprietary report.

The Pentagon has tried since 2006 to cancel the alternate engine, which is produced by General Electric and the British firm Rolls Royce. But lawmakers, sighting the benefits of competition, have repeatedly added funding to keep the engine alive, most recently inserting $465 million in the fiscal 2010 Defense Appropriations bill for the unwanted program.

In 2007, the Pentagon estimated that the alternate engine would cost an additional $1.2 billion. But $1.75 billion added by Congress over the last four years eliminated the cost difference.

"While the 2010 updated result is in fact more favorable to a competitive acquisition strategy than the 2007 analysis suggested, the fundamental conclusion remains the same: the potential life-cycle cost savings from a competitive sourcing of engines for the JSF program do not provide a compelling business case," according to the memo.

The Pentagon estimates it will need $2.9 billion over the next six years to finish developing the engine and buy support equipment and spare parts.

"This money can clearly be better spent buying capabilities that our warfighters do need," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said on Thursday. "This is a luxury we cannot afford."

But even with that upfront investment, the analysis concludes that "the estimated costs of a competitive engine acquisition strategy are projected to be approximately equivalent to a sole-source scenario."

A House Armed Services information paper on the analysis criticized it for ignoring the nonfinancial benefits of buying two engines -- including using competition to spur technological innovation and make the contractors more responsive to government concerns, as well as supporting a more robust industrial base.

"While the committee is still reviewing the analysis, it appears that the department's approach focuses on near-term costs to the exclusion of what the committee sees as the long-term benefits of this program," House Armed Services Chairman Ike Skelton, D-Mo., said in a statement Thursday.

Skelton added that the report does not consider the risk posed by not having a backup engine on a 2,400-plus fleet of F-35s, which will be flown by the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

"With this program, as with all others, we cannot use near-sighted vision when long-term security is at stake," Skelton said.