Lawmakers: Defense must root out cause of weapons program overruns

House committee members say leaders have been too focused on the symptoms rather than underlying “culture of complacency.”

Defense Department leaders must change the cultural causes of waste and mismanagement in weapons programs, House lawmakers said on Tuesday.

The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee heard testimony on the significant cost and schedule overruns for weapons acquisitions detailed in a recent Government Accountability Office report. In its annual assessment of the programs, GAO found that none of the procurements it reviewed was meeting best practice standards for mature technologies, stable design or mature production processes by critical junctures.

While weapons acquisitions face difficulties similar to those in major procurements governmentwide, lawmakers are interested in them, in part because of the massive funding they receive. From 2000 to 2007, Defense roughly doubled its planned investment in new weapons systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion. Weapons systems now represent one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. The department expects to invest about $900 billion during the next five years in development and procurement, 37 percent of which will go specifically to new major weapons systems.

Cost overruns in major weapons acquisitions now reach almost $300 billion, according to the GAO report, making them "one of the biggest sources of wasteful spending in the federal budget," said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., chairman of the committee. Lawmakers' frustration and outrage crossed the aisle; the hearing was called by Rep. Tom Davis, R-Va.

Davis said the problems GAO cited are far from new, describing schedule and cost issues with the procurements of six small warships in 1794. The ranking member of the committee said Congress and the Defense Department have focused too long on symptoms instead of addressing the "root causes of chronic dysfunction in major system development projects."

"We should look beyond the persistent symptoms to the broader, deeply ingrained personnel and management practices that can empower -- or cripple -- complex procurements like these," Davis said.

Several lawmakers said department leaders have not done a satisfactory job prioritizing weapons acquisitions based on budgetary realities and the relevant security risks. "One gets the sense that the Pentagon is functioning as if resources are unlimited and no competing demands exist," said Rep. John Tierney, D-Mass.

Michael Sullivan, GAO's director of acquisition and sourcing management, said he has seen some improvement in the programs' leadership and believes that those at the top are working to make the hard decisions necessary. He also noted, however, that these improvements are taking place close to the end of an administration.

"There's reason for optimism, but the transitory nature of people at the top is really what keeps anyone from being able to change the underlying culture," Sullivan said.

James Finley, deputy undersecretary of Defense for acquisition and technology, said the best way to mitigate major shakeups at the political level to ensure there is a strong cadre of career employees in the acquisition community. "When I came in we brought in very senior executive people with industry experience and military experience and the passion to help our country," Finley said. "That has made an astounding difference from the leadership point of view."

Sullivan said the department has sufficient funding to acquire the weapons systems it needs, but it must improve internal oversight. The structure of the department, he believes, contributes to the difficulty in managing procurement programs.

"When you have the parochial nature and stovepipes that exist in the acquisition community, oversight within the Pentagon is critical. That's where hard decisions have to be made," he said. "Oversight within there has to improve significantly."