DHS chief describes confusion in Katrina response

Federal effort was plagued by communications gaps, Michael Chertoff tells lawmakers.

Senior Homeland Security Department officials experienced critical communications gaps in the days after Hurricane Katrina, the department's secretary said Wednesday.

Communication problems were so acute that top Homeland Security officials could not reach the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency the day after the hurricane hit the Gulf Coast, and in the days that followed continued to receive conflicting information about what was happening on the ground, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff testified before the House Select Committee on Katrina.

Chertoff's appearance before the special investigative committee marked his first public testimony on the matter.

Committee members were heavily critical, and at times argumentative, when former FEMA Director Michael Brown appeared before them Sept. 27. They were much less pointed in questioning Chertoff, even though the secretary was ultimately responsible for the federal response to Katrina.

Overall, Chertoff defended the government's response. "I don't think it was a lack of a sense of urgency or complacency," he said. "If there was a lack, it may have been in some better planning that should have been done in terms of our general capability for dealing with catastrophes."

Chertoff said he and President Bush "were deeply and personally engaged" before and after the hurricane hit.

But he acknowledged problems with the immediate response. Brown was the government's "battlefield commander on the ground" for dealing with preparations and response to Katrina, Chertoff said.

Brown told the committee he suspected that the Louisiana state emergency operations center was dysfunctional the day the hurricane hit. But Chertoff said Brown never informed him of that concern.

Brown said he decided against telling Chertoff. "I had confidence in my people down there, that it was just a matter of getting into a battle rhythm," Brown testified on Sept. 27. "Sorry. I obviously messed that one up."

Chertoff told the committee he did not agree with Brown's assessment that the state level response was dysfunctional. "I don't endorse those views," he said. "I did not have a problem dealing with state and local officials."

Chertoff said he asked Brown the day before the hurricane hit if anything else was needed to help with preparations or response, and was told that everything was fine. Chertoff said he also called the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama on Sunday and was assured that everything was set. He said he did not discuss the issue of evacuations with the governors.

The day after the hurricane hit and New Orleans was submerged in flood waters, however, Brown could not be reached, Chertoff said. He said he and DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson could not reach Brown until shortly before 8 p.m. Tuesday. "I made it clear to him that I needed to be sure that he was going to personally be on top of the situation from Baton Rouge," Chertoff said.

Later that night, Chertoff designated Brown as the "principal federal official" for Hurricane Katrina.

Chertoff said he was able to stay in touch later with Brown, but became "very troubled, really distressed" by scenes shown on television and stories from the field.

"I found myself both with a concern about the degree of the accuracy of picture I was getting, because I was getting conflicting information, and also a concern about whether we were moving forward in a sufficiently urgent and disciplined manner," Chertoff said.

He said a "heightened sense of frustration" eventually led him to question whether Brown was getting the job done. Chertoff said that by the sixth day of response operations, he began to consider naming Coast Guard Vice Adm. Thad Allen to replace Brown. Allen was named the principal federal official the next week. Brown was told to go back to Washington, where he eventually resigned under mounting criticism of how FEMA handled the hurricane.

"It was enormously frustrating to me," Chertoff said. "I became angry sometimes. Certainly, as the hours rolled on between Tuesday and Wednesday and Thursday, I pushed harder and harder about why some things weren't moving.

"I still don't know the full story about why some things didn't move, and I'll look forward to hearing the answer to that," Chertoff added.

The committee is under a congressional mandate to issue a report on its findings by Feb. 15.