Report cites improvements in weapons facilities’ security
The Energy Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration have made progress in improving security at U.S. nuclear weapons facilities, but there are still several issues of concern remaining, the General Accounting Office said in a report released this week.
Energy and the NNSA have completed 65 percent of the 75 security initiatives begun in 1998, with the remainder scheduled for completion by the end of this year, according to the report, "Nuclear Security: Lessons To Be Learned From Implementing NNSA's Security Enhancements" (GAO-02-358). Not only will the successful implementation of these new measures help improve security at NNSA facilities, but also will help ensure the success of future initiatives, the report said.
One of the lessons learned in implementing the new security measures is that the perspectives of Energy and NNSA field offices should be considered when the measures are drafted, according to the report. GAO investigators who visited two nuclear weapons facilities found the facilities' databases on foreign visits and assignments were incompatible with the Energy Department's database, because of the fast-track approach taken in its creation, the report said.
The report also said Energy and the NNSA need to better communicate security initiatives to facilities. For example, a contractor at a nuclear weapons laboratory received multiple instructions on cybersecurity initiatives from a number of Energy Department and NNSA offices, according to the report.
"This lack of clear communication produced confusion at sites about which requirements they needed to implement," the report said.
A coordinated process within NNSA facilities on enacting new security measures has been found to be beneficial, according to the report. At the Pantex nuclear weapons assembly plant in Texas, new security measures were put into place through a process developed by the entire site security team, unlike the case at two nuclear weapons laboratories where new measures were only implemented by the security teams at areas within the laboratories most affected by the new measures, the report said.
The 2-year-old NNSA has made progress in establishing a security organization, according to the report. Two offices on security and counterintelligence are almost fully staffed, and a review of security policies, conducted with Energy, is almost completed. The NNSA has also taken steps to create a "security-oriented culture" within the organization and both headquarters and field sites have conducted short-term security improvement measures and begun more long-term initiatives, the report said.
There are still several issues within the NNSA that need to be resolved, however, in order for the agency to be effective, according to the report. The agency needs to do more to establish clear lines of authority for security oversight, it said. The Energy Department and the NNSA also need to clear up confusion about the roles and the authority of Energy and NNSA security offices, according to the report. Contractors and NNSA field staff have said they have received guidance on security from both Energy and the NNSA, making it difficult to determine which security measures need to be carried out and how to do so, the report said.
The NNSA also needs to further develop ways to evaluate the effectiveness of security initiatives, the report said. The creation of security performance measures could also aid in the preparation of the annual performance plan required to be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, it said. Lacking these performance measures, however, leaves both the Energy Department and the NNSA without any way to determine the effectiveness of security initiatives, the report said.
"While NNSA is addressing all these issues, clarifying who provides security direction and establishing clear lines of accountability ... for security activities as quickly as possible take on increased importance in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks," the report said.