Energy officials can't account for plutonium loaned abroad
The Energy Department cannot account for small but potentially dangerous amounts of plutonium that the United States has donated or loaned to foreign countries since the 1950s, according to an Energy inspector general report released this month.
The report concluded that "the oversight of radioactive sealed sources provided by the U.S. to foreign entities was inadequate given current realities."
The United States loaned or gave two to three kilograms of plutonium to 33 countries as part of the Atoms for Peace program, according to a 1996 Energy report. Several of those countries have since developed nuclear weapons programs or raised concerns about nuclear proliferation, including India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel.
Most of the plutonium was provided in the form of sealed sources, which contain nuclear or radiological material and are used for nuclear research and to calibrate radiation-measuring devices.
The Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Department's predecessor, required that information regarding sealed sources be reported to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) and later to a separate Sealed Source Registry.
The department and its predecessors, however, did not enforce reporting requirements and stopped tracking the sources in the mid-1980s, the report says. Therefore, there is no database with current information on where the sealed sources are today.
"The department does not have current information on the location and condition of the sealed sources that it and its predecessor agencies provided to foreign countries from the 1950s through the 1970s," the report says.
"Without controls in place to detail the location, condition, and ownership of sealed sources located in foreign facilities, the department cannot effectively administer its nuclear materials management program. Inaccurate inventory records limit the department's ability to detect stolen or lost material, and to effectively carry out its responsibility to dispose of nuclear materials," the report says.
The Energy inspector general also concluded that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. State Department and the International Atomic Energy Agency do not maintain records of loaned sealed sources and could not sufficiently track their location and condition.
Another problem is the issue of ownership of the sealed sources. When the United States first provided the materials to foreign countries, the United States retained ownership, the report says. Later the United States changed its policies to donate or sell the materials, but confusion remains over which materials the United States still owns and which it does not.
Energy, however, did not keep adequate records regarding ownership. It is quite possible that 536 U.S. government-owned sealed sources exist unaccounted for in other countries, the report says.
The issue of ownership is important partly because the United States is responsible for finally disposing of the materials.
The report concludes that accurate and current information does not exist because the United States did not appropriately monitor where its sealed sources went. Additionally, the report says, international agreements limit the type of information foreign countries provide to the United States on nuclear materials and international safeguards that control other forms of nuclear material do not apply to all sealed sources.
The inspector general expressed concern that the sealed sources could be used to create a "dirty bomb"--a conventional explosive that spreads radioactive materials.
"While the quantities of nuclear materials in sealed sources are small, in the wrong hands, these sources could be misused," the report says, adding that the material also poses a serious health risk if it is accidentally released.
"Recent world events have underscored the need to strengthen the control over all nuclear materials, including sealed sources," the report says. "Individually and collectively, sealed sources represent a health, safety, and material security concern."
Energy should update and reconcile tracking systems to account for sealed sources and work with the IAEA to control the materials, Inspector General Gregory Friedman wrote. The department should also quickly determine which materials the United States owns and locate them.
The department's security office and the National Nuclear Security Administration must work together and with the IAEA to account for and control the sealed sources, the report says.
The security office's director agreed with the inspector general's report and proposed ways to improve NMMSS data on sealed sources, according to Friedman.
The NNSA disagreed with recommendations for itself and some general conclusions, according to a letter from Anthony Lake, NNSA associate administrator for management and administration.
"While it is a good idea to be aware of the locations and conditions of any material, it is not the current policy of the U.S. government. Should the policy change, various governmental elements would require additional funding from the Congress to undertake this initiative, which could well be expensive," the NNSA said.