A Strong Military Needs a Strong Vision

Certainly there were significant differences between the two candidates' approach to the appropriate use of military force, but the imperative for military reform crossed party lines. And now President Bush faces a number of major defense challenges in such areas as national security strategy, budget, programs, personnel and defense management.

Strategy

The Defense Department is required by law to release a new National Security Strategy by early June. This document will provide policy guidance and priorities to executive branch agencies responsible for foreign affairs. But should the strategy zero in on major regional wars or on smaller-scale contingencies? Perhaps a combination of both? In what regions? These issues drive both the size and composition of our military forces.

If the military services are to be able to rapidly deploy and sustain forces worldwide, major changes must follow. Change of this magnitude must be guided by the National Security Strategy and the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review. As Bush defense adviser Richard Armitage has said, "militaries should not be in charge of their own transformations." This is a tacit acknowledgement of the need for strategic guidance.

Budget

Fielding a force consistent with strategic demands will cost money. Spending on operations and maintenance has reached an all-time high, squeezing efforts to fund robust modernization. Personnel costs are also on the rise as benefits are improved to attract and keep well-qualified workers. At a minimum, steps must be taken to reduce growth in operations and maintenance spending. Such steps will be painful and will reopen the debate about the defense infrastructure. Nonetheless, increased spending on personnel and operations and maintenance is not feasible without a substantial budget increase.

If the new National Security Strategy endorses transforming the services into more rapidly deployable forces, more funds will be needed to maintain readiness, evaluate new approaches and buy new equipment. President Bush advocates increasing defense spending over the coming decade by $45 billion, while the military services and others have suggested annual increases of up to $60 billion, or 12 times more. This is a significant difference in need of resolution.

Programs and Personnel

The Bush administration faces strategic and budgetary decisions about programs and personnel.

• National Missile Defense. Republicans have routinely advocated an aggressive National Missile Defense program. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a system covering all 50 states would cost at least $60 billion over the next decade. This is not allocated, however, in either Defense funding or military force structure.
  

  Testing of the current "hit-to-kill" interceptor has been disappointing. Pursuing a completely new technological approach, however, such as the sea- or space-based system suggested by Bush and some of his advisers, would be expensive and time-consuming. If a missile defense were deemed necessary, it would have to be funded quickly in order to be in place by 2005, as some proponents have urged.
  

• Personnel. The Bush administration supports steps to make military pay more competitive with the private sector. Military medical care and housing also are competing for scarce dollars. But the major issue is whether, in these prosperous times, the military services can attract and retain enough high-quality personnel. An October study by Leonard Wong at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute suggested this would be increasingly difficult. In "Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps," Wong attributes high rates of junior officer attrition to a general disconnect between senior military leaders and younger officers.
  

  Pentagon planners are not forecasting growth in personnel expenses over the next decade, but they don't plan to cut military strength either. This isn't realistic given the rising employment cost index, the increase in college attendance rates and the decrease in young people attracted to military service. Quality fighters demand competitive wages. In short, the Pentagon will have to choose between raising its pay or reducing its rolls.
  

• Army transformation. Of all the services, the Army has made the most daring initial steps toward transformation. Not only is the service contemplating a new structure for its medium brigade, it also envisions new equipment significantly different from its current inventory. But the new brigade structure has prompted questions: Is it meant to provide a flexible unit capable of rapid deployment for contingency operations, or is it intended for quick deployment against conventional attacks? Either way, making major, additional investments in the less strategically mobile heavy forces organized around the traditional tank will be a hard sale.
  
• Air Force structural balance. Although its Expeditionary Aerospace Force is a significant change, the Air Force is maintaining its current strategies and equipment. Despite aspirations of providing "global power, global reach," the Air Force structure is heavily skewed toward short-range fighters, even as distance becomes more and more important.
  

  The mix of long- and short-range aircraft and the inventory of "low density-high demand" systems must be addressed. Also, the introduction of unmanned systems in both reconnaissance and strike roles is critical. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner, R-Va., has already urged the rapid introduction of more unmanned systems.
  

  As distance becomes a bigger factor and the absence of U.S. bases and enemy anti-access strategies become more evident, the currently planned Air Force structure is increasingly open to question. Production of more F-22 fighters and the need for a manned Joint Strike Fighter and a longer-range bomber force all need review. In addition, if the Army is fully transformed into a rapid deployment force, all the services' rapid air transport capabilities will come under scrutiny.
  

• The Navy's future fleet. Too few ships are being built to maintain a big enough fleet. To maintain the status quo, eight to 10 ships would have to be launched each year. The Navy must build more ships that are less expensive, scale back its deployed battle groups or curtail its international presence.
  

  The need for international visibility is a matter of policy, but structure and composition are military matters. To match platforms with requirements, the Navy should reconsider its discarded "arsenal ship" or the more radical "Corsair" concept, proposed by Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, president of the Naval War College, which would distribute aviation assets to numerous smaller ships instead of a few large aircraft carriers. Both approaches would conceptually expand fighting power while cutting personnel and costs.
  

  Like the Air Force, the Navy is becoming dependent on short-range strike aircraft. To achieve a greater long-range strike capacity, the Navy must consider an expanded inventory of missiles or unmanned aircraft.
  

• Marine aviation. To make its plans for "operational maneuver from the sea" a reality, the Marines need both the Joint Strike Fighter and the MV-22 Osprey, the controversial tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter and flies like a plane. Both programs are troubled. In addition to its limited range and the decreasing likelihood of close air support provided by aircraft flying across the forward lines, the Joint Strike Fighter continues to suffer from growing cost projections. And the dent-prone MV-22, which Vice President Dick Cheney attempted to eliminate in 1991 when he was Secretary of Defense, has yet to prove that it's technologically sound. Marine Commandant Gen. James Jones remains firmly behind both programs.
  

Three issues are being debated about defense management. The first is the continuing need for procurement reform. So far, the savings in acquisition have overwhelmingly come from procurement reductions rather than procurement reforms. Progress has been made, but numerous reports from the Defense Science Board indicate that program instability and inaccurate costing continue to plague weapons programs.

Second is the management of the defense industrial base. The fundamental issue is how much of a defense base does the United States need to stay first in technology, produce superior ships, aircraft and weapons, and be industrially efficient? The "winner take all" concept in the Joint Strike Fighter effort demands early attention from the Bush administration. As planned, either Boeing or Lockheed Martin would win the entire contract to build the Joint Strike Fighter. The loser is likely to be forced from the aircraft production business. This kind of business deal hinders the competition and innovation needed build a superior military force.

Finally, the Pentagon's internal strategic planning process needs to be reformed. Too often, program guidance is muddled and the services' planning efforts are not well integrated. As a result, decision-making suffers along with program stability. During the election campaign, there was frequent talk about the mismatch between strategic aspirations and budgetary constraints. Questions were raised about pay, the pace of military operations, the aging of military equipment, the readiness for battle-and more. Now is the time to come up with the answers that will determine U.S. military capability over the next quarter century.