Government Executive - Authors - Mark A. Abramson

A fresh look at the federal workforce and the skills needed to solve today’s pressing problems

Mark A. Abramson — Fri, 21 Jul 2023 06:00:00 -0400

The federal government needs a new approach to solving the country’s biggest problems, from homelessness to vaccine development, argues the newest book from consultant William D. Eggers and public management scholar Donald F. Kettl, published in May. The common theme in this approach is collaboration—across federal agencies, with state and local governments, and with the private and non-profit sectors. Importantly, this fresh approach will require a new way of thinking about the federal workforce, Eggers and Kettl suggest in Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems (Harvard Business Review Press).

How can government cultivate these bridgebuilders, who will cross boundaries to transform governance from hierarchies to collaborative networks, from process to mission, and from fuzzy responsibility to accountability for results?

Based on the reality of blended government, Eggers and Kettl offer an intriguing redefinition of what constitutes the new “public workforce.” Instead of the traditional distinction between civil servants and contractors, they describe a public workforce consisting of “partnership talent (employees who are part of joint ventures), borrowed talent (employees of contractors), freelance talent (independent, individual contractors), and open-source talent (people who don’t work for government at all but are part of a value chain of services).”

They recommend specific actions government leaders can take to establish this new public workforce, starting with developing the careers of civil servants around “bridgebuilding.” Federal officials should create positions for public-private bridgebuilders and define what success in these roles would look like, Eggers and Kettl suggest. Policy-makers should also facilitate easier movement into and out of government, through special hiring authorities and by creating opportunities for short-term public service assignments through existing and new fellowship programs, the authors say.

To bring about a collaborative society working on national problems, specific new bridgebuilding roles for public servants would include:

Integrators who would build the ecosystem for participants to work together;
Problem solvers who would work out solutions for particular problems;
Enablers who would eliminate barriers to collaboration;
Motivators who would provide incentives for collaboration; and,
Convenors who would assemble a wide range of players and foster effective collaboration.

These roles offer intriguing possibilities for the government of the future. Could a new classification system be created for the five roles? Could current government positions be reclassified to reflect the reality of how employees actually spend their time? There are agencies, such as the Housing and Urban Development Department, in which many civil servants are already functioning in one (or more) of the roles suggested in Bridgebuilders.

Could the five roles serve as a recruiting tool for future public servants? Younger employees, many of whom have spent much time participating on social networks, might be very intrigued about a newly created position as a convenor or integrator.

Eggers and Kettl join a growing number of government experts who argue that an updated model of public service is needed to implement new approaches to solving national problems in a blended government. In her recent book, Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism, University College London economist Mariana Mazzucato argues that civil servants need to take more risks and be creative, innovative and entrepreneurial. Mazzucato advocates dramatic changes in how civil servants are trained, how their performance is assessed and how they are promoted.

In another recent book, Solving Public Problems: A Practical Guide to Fix Our Government and Change the World, Beth Simone Noveck, a professor at Northeastern University, describes the need for more mission-driven leaders who are agile, focused on data and human centered. Noveck argues that the federal and state governments need to articulate a vision for training their public servants in 21st century ways of working and addressing public problems.

Much like Mazzucato and Noveck, Eggers and Kettl argue that public servants need new skills to succeed in blended, collaborative government. The final section of Bridgebuilders contains a syllabus on how government can train civil servants for the new world of blended, collaborative work with partners inside and outside of government. Eggers and Kettl set forth a compelling roadmap for all sectors to begin to develop an increased number of bridgebuilders to meet the demands of the 21st century.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. His most recent book is Government for the Future: Reflection and Vision for Tomorrow’s Leaders (with Daniel J. Chenok and John M. Kamensky). His email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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The Veterans Benefits Administration is a Good Candidate for Tailored Reforms

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 06:00:00 -0400

A recent piece for Government Executive titled “Government Reform Isn’t Dead. It’s Just Changed” recommends that federal agencies no longer wait for large-scale reform and instead focus on smaller, tailored changes to fit the needs of their agency. An excellent candidate for agency-specific reform is the Veterans Benefits Administration, which faces challenges with customer service and could serve as an example for other agencies that fit into the broader category of “production agencies.”

Production agencies are characterized by three needs: delivering their required output, getting their metrics right for measuring success, and focusing on customers. In many respects, they resemble the factory floor in a manufacturing company, and they face a common challenge: They rely on their people to process applications for benefits in a timely fashion and respond to customer needs. Currently, hiring is simply too slow and ineffectual to meet customer demands. In the years ahead, these agencies will need to more nimble.

When he was undersecretary for benefits at the Veterans Affairs Department, Paul Lawrence, co-author of this column, saw production agency challenges first-hand. He was responsible for implementing new regulations to comply with a 2019 law regarding Blue Water Navy veterans, considered to be those who served aboard ships in the open waters off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and who did not go ashore. The law extended the presumption of herbicide exposure and made them eligible for benefits. The Veterans Benefits Administration was given six months to get the program up and running and to be able to accept applications on January 1, 2020, but because of the length of the hiring process, VBA was behind the required timeline from the start. The agency had no special authorities to bypass existing rules to get the program off the ground.

With special authorities, the hiring process could have been completed in no more than 30 days, instead of six (or more) months. While some of these hires might have been permanent staff, others might have been term appointments in response to meeting specific immediate challenges facing the agency. Flexibility to hire would also likely have decreased the agency’s reliance on contractors. Such flexibility to hire would mean increased ability to attract specialized staff to better manage key processes such as acquisition and technology.

In the private sector, it is now common for companies to place job announcements, receive resumes, interview candidates and hire immediately. In VBA 2.0, with new employees hired faster, there would have been ample time to train new hires on reviewing Blue Water applications and making accurate claim decisions. An increase in accuracy would have saved money in the reduction of rework time and a decrease in appeals of benefits decisions.

There will be more work that requires fast hiring at the Veterans Benefits Administration. In 2022, Congress passed legislation to improve the presumption process for burn pit veterans. VBA again faced new legal requirements and an increased workload with new rules and claims to process. The existing slow hiring process continues to make the job of VBA even more difficult.

In addition to quickly implementing new legislative mandates, VBA faces the continual challenge of updating its technological capabilities. With rapid advances occurring in artificial intelligence, it is likely that AI could be used in the future to make initial determinations on veterans’ claims. But implementing these new capabilities would require highly specialized information technology talent. Such talent is in high demand and in short supply at VBA. The current VBA faces a steep challenge to hire such talent. VBA 2.0 would be better equipped to hire such individuals, with both pay flexibility and hiring flexibility.

Another example where the present system of hiring and compensating employees hinders service to veterans involves financial management. VBA is essentially one of the country’s largest financial institutions, paying out $150 billion in benefits annually. This is a complicated undertaking and it is vulnerable to significant improper payments and fraud. Private sector financial organizations—banks, mutual funds and insurance companies—employ top talent and cutting-edge tools and approaches to thwart bad actors and secure their customers’ funds. VBA can’t do this now, because of the limitations it faces with its existing hiring authorities and compensation system, but VBA 2.0 would be better able to protect taxpayers and veterans with access to the same top talent.

Between now and 2028, we anticipate dramatic changes in the operations of the federal government’s production agencies, including the Veterans Benefits Administration. Rapid advances in technology and artificial intelligence will improve the ability of government to process benefits claims more quickly and accurately—the primary output of production agencies. Can VBA and other production agencies get there with their existing rules, regulations and hiring authorities? We are skeptical.

Production agencies all share many of the same common problems. Working together over the next five years, agency-specific reform is indeed possible and much needed.

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson are co-authors of Succeeding as a Political Executive: 50 Insights from Experience. Lawrence is the former undersecretary for benefits at the Veteran Affairs Department and can be reached at lawrencepaul@cox.net. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. and his email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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Government Reform Isn’t Dead. It’s Just Changed.

Mark A. Abramson and John M. Kamensky — Fri, 03 Mar 2023 06:00:00 -0500

The year 2023 marks several anniversaries in the recent history of large-scale government reform. It is the 45th anniversary of the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act, the 30th anniversary of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act, and the 30th anniversary of the launch of the Clinton-Gore Reinventing Government initiative. As we look ahead to the rest of 2023, it is also a good time to also look back over our 40-plus years in Washington.

We were both heavily influenced by our graduate school experience in schools of public policy. Upon reflection, we came away with an inherent bias in favor of large-scale reforms. Our “heroes” in public administration were the “good government” reformers of the Progressive Era and the New Dealers of the 1930s who strengthened the White House and the executive branch of government.

This era of change was reflected at the national level during the 1970s with the implementation of budget reform, new sunshine laws and an overhaul of the civil service system with the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act. Reform was “in,” and large-scale reform was indeed possible.

The decades since are best described by what Paul Light, professor at New York University's Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service, aptly called “the tides of reform.” The emphasis on large-scale, governmentwide reforms did indeed seem to go in and out with the tide. The 1980s were dominated by a focus on “fraud, waste, and abuse,” as reflected in the Grace Commission’s recommendations to reduce what it deemed as “waste;” the growth of agency inspectors general offices; and the mandating of internal control audits. The 1990s saw the Reinventing Government movement, which enacted both governmentwide reforms and agency-specific changes to reduce overly centralized controls and improve customer service.

The decades since can be characterized by a focus on legislation aimed at reforming specific mission-support functions, such as creating chief operating officers, performance improvement officers, chief human capital officers, chief data officers, chief acquisition officers, and other related measures.

From this perspective, how do we envision the future of government reform? Should we be waiting for another era of large-scale governmentwide reform, such as civil service reform or the Government Performance and Results Act? Or should we be looking elsewhere? Based on the political landscape of the 2020s, large scale reform seems highly unlikely. We have not seen much appetite for large scale reform over the last two decades in Congress.

Congressional interest in government management has been narrowly targeted. If anything, future debate on topics such as the civil service might be dominated by a defensive fight to keep current systems in place.

If our premise is correct that large-scale reform is indeed “dead,” we recommend that the public management community and government managers shift their focus to “fixing” and “improving” individual agencies. Strategically, this means taking executive branch action and each agency working with its congressional authorizing and appropriating committees.

The role of central management agencies such as the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management should be to encourage agency-level innovation. In addition, they should provide agencies more flexibility and encourage cross-agency collaboration. One such example is the Biden administration’s management agenda, which encourages agencies to collaborate around improving customer experiences for targeted “life experiences.”

Today, every federal agency faces a distinct marketplace for employees. A “one-size-fits-all” civil service may no longer be practical. The labor markets for flight controllers, data analysts, doctors and engineers are radically different. An example—and perhaps a model—for the future can be seen in legislation proposed by Congress for the Veteran Affairs Department. The legislation would replace the current “antiquated pay system for VA’s doctors with the goal of helping the department hire for “hard-to-fill” positions such as doctors in rural areas.

In a similar vein, the Defense Department recently created the Defense Management Institute to develop new approaches to improving the department’s management, organization, performance management and enterprise business operations. And the Homeland Security Department has created a Procurement Innovation Lab rather than waiting for governmentwide procurement reforms. VA, Defense and Homeland Security are not waiting for governmentwide reform. We believe that other agencies face similar unique needs to modernize their own operations.

In 2018, the National Academy of Public Administration’s report on the state of the civil service titled “No Time to Wait” declared: “Because agencies know best what they need to do their jobs, they need to have the flexibility for devising the human capital systems to accomplish their missions.” Interestingly, the NAPA report concluded that large-scale reform was not needed to fix many human resource problems in government and that much could be accomplished administratively. NAPA observed: “After all, many of the barnacles encrusting the current system come from regulations, not the specific requirements of the law, and what was created administratively can be removed administratively.”

So, is it really the “End of Reform?” Well, maybe we’ll all be surprised, like Frank Fukuyama was after publishing his 1992 book The End of History when, in 2018, the New Yorker said that Fukuyama concluded that The End was postponed. While we may be facing the “death” of large-scale governmentwide reform, there are many sparks of smaller tailored reforms happening at the agency level. All is not lost.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. His email: mark.abramson@comcast.net. John M. Kamensky is emeritus fellow at the IBM Center for The Business of Government. His email: john.m.kamensky@gmail.com. They are co-editors (with Daniel Chenok) of Government for the Future: Reflections and Vision for Tomorrow’s Leaders (2018).

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Making the case for a Federal Management Corps

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson — Mon, 04 Apr 2022 17:06:00 -0400

In a recent Government Executive column, a Management Corps was proposed as a valuable new tool for achieving the President’s Management Agenda goal of making every federal job a “good job.” In the column, it was argued that a new set of skills will be needed to manage a more complex hybrid workforce in the years ahead.

The Office of Personnel Management has historically had the authority to approve demonstration projects to test out new human resource ideas. The concept of a Management Corps is clearly an idea worthy of testing and, based on our observations and experience, the Veteran Benefits Administration (VBA) in the Department of Veteran Affairs would be a strong candidate to test its potential.

VBA administers the wide range of benefits Veterans earn for their service. This includes disability compensation, the GI Bill education, home loan guarantee and many more. As many as 25,000 employees administer more than $100 billion of benefits annually. The key VBA performance measures are speed, quantity and accuracy of benefits delivered.

Why a Management Corps?

A major argument in favor of a Management Corps is the need for more highly trained managers who are equipped to manage a hybrid workforce of in-house civil servants, remote civil servants, in-house contractors and remote contractors. During the pandemic, the number of telecommuting workers at VBA dramatically increased, and while government managers have long had experience with remote staffers, the number of teleworkers created a new “ballgame” for the federal government.

Managers in VBA told agency leaders that they had no training and limited experience in managing remote staffers. In addition, there were instances in which managers mishandled issues related to telework. VBA top leadership spent much time resolving these issues and attempting to develop consistent policies for managing telecommuters. It became clear that VBA managers had not been trained or prepared to manage remote staff.

At VBA, managing daily performance for both in-house employees and teleworking employees is a key activity of leaders at all levels within the agency. Traditionally, managing daily performance has been done in-person through observation and meetings. With everyone working remotely during the pandemic, leaders began to experiment with new ways to provide “over-the-shoulder” assistance. Without an existing playbook, new approaches were developed. A well-trained new Management Corps could identify and adopt the most effective approaches.

A second argument supporting the concept of a Management Corps is the need to create new pay scales for managers. Based on the experience of VBA, the pay differential between managers and non-managers is negligible. Potential employees who would have been strong managers saw there was little financial incentive to become a manager. Thus, many talented employees opted not to become managers.

While pay is not only the reason to become a manager, pay is an important ingredient to the professionalization of managers in government. Today, management is not viewed as a profession. At VBA, it is an auxiliary responsibility to their “day job” of processing claims. By creating a Management Corps, management becomes a full-time responsibility and has a clear managerial track. Today, like many other federal agencies, there is no management track at VBA.

Implementing a Management Corps

There are three key steps in implementing a demonstration project to test the potential value of a Management Corps at VBA. First, there is the nitty-gritty bureaucratic work to be done prior to the creation of the Management Corps. Jobs will need to be classified (or reclassified) as part of the new Management Corps. Equally important, some jobs now classified as management will be “taken out” of the management since these positions may be primarily technically oriented and not managerially oriented. A pay band system for managerial salaries will need to be created. The creation of a pay band system will solve the issue of pay differential which now discourages VBA employees from applying for managerial positions.

Second, after the bureaucratic apparatus is in place and the number of Management Corps positions agreed upon, the application process will begin. This is a key step in that it will involve key decisions by two groups of employees within VBA: those who decide that they are interested in pursuing a managerial career and those who decide that they no longer want to manage people and in fact, may never have been eager for a managerial position. Many civil servants historically “fell” into the managerial ranks because of the government seniority system and the existing classification system. We believe that there are many civil servants (many of whom have not yet been identified) who have the skills and interest in developing employees, engaging employees, and improving employee productivity.

Once the new members of the VBA Management Corps are selected, they will be sent to the VBA Management Academy to receive training in federal “management.” Managing the new hybrid workplace would be one of the core courses. The new course on hybrid management will discuss the challenge of developing both remote employees and in-person employees. Other courses might include customer service and employee engagement.

Mark A. Abramson and Paul R. Lawrence are co-authors of Succeeding as a Political Executive: 50 Insights from Experience. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. Lawrence is the former Under Secretary for Benefits, Department of Veteran Affairs. They can be reached via email at: mark.abramson@comcast.net and lawrencepaul@cox.net.

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Making the Case for a Federal Management Corps

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson — Fri, 01 Apr 2022 05:59:00 -0400

Why a Management Corps?

Implementing a Management Corps

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Managers May Be the Key to the Future of Work

Mark A. Abramson — Mon, 14 Feb 2022 05:59:00 -0500

As we enter a post-pandemic transition year, there are many unanswered questions about the 2022 workplace. The Washington Post recently reported that governmentwide and agency-specific office reopening guidance were under debate, but there is not yet a schedule for when -- or if -- federal employees will return to their offices in 2022. The federal government now faces its own challenge for “building back better.”

At this point in the year, there are clearly more questions than answers about workplace 2022. In fact, the General Services Administration released a Request for Information containing a list of questions the government has to address as it tackles the “future of work.”

A new book, Out of Office: The Big Problem and Bigger Promise of Working from Home by Charlie Warzel and Anne Helen Petersen, also presents a series of questions based on their anecdotal assessment of how workers fared in their work-at-home experience during the pandemic. Warzel and Petersen do not present any clear recommendations on the future of work. Their emphasis is on prompting managers and workers to evaluate their at-home experience and to develop new, more productive ways to work in the future.

The questions about the “future of work” are not new. The Clinton administration’s National Performance Review (Reinventing Government) asked many of the same questions being posed today. Government has now had over 25 years of experience with telecommuting. In 2000, I edited a report on telecommuting, Managing Telecommuting in the Federal Government: An Interim Report by Gina Vega and Louis Brennan, for the IBM Center for the Business of Government. Numerous management books of that era addressed questions about new office space, new office furniture, productivity software, and more flexible work schedules.

How Will We Work?

After reading Out of Office and following how organizations are responding to the challenges of returning to the office, I began thinking about whether organizations were neglecting an equally crucial issue: are our current set of managers equipped and ready to “manage” the new hybrid workplace? Thus, the question is not just office-first, remote-first, hybrid, or no office, but how will these new combinations be managed?

One premise of Out of Office is that many workers have been overworked, are not fully productive – even with the latest technologies – and are not being managed very well to achieve an organization’s desired performance.

Warzel and Petersen write, “The whole post-pandemic ‘when and how will we return to the office’ debate is, in some ways, just a big distraction. The true issue at hand is not where we all work but how we will work.”

They specifically highlight the challenge to managers of creating an equitable workplace between in-office and remote employees.

“You can easily imagine,” write Warzel and Peterson, “those who spend more time in the office resenting a workplace that privileges remote workers, and employees working from home will resent coworkers with easier access to superiors.”

Do You Even Want To Manage?

In addition to focusing on the “future of work,” the federal government should now begin focusing on the “the future of the manager.” While criticisms of government managers have been in currency for many years, many are still true. Some promotions to management are based on seniority, not management expertise. Many managers most enjoy working in their area of expertise, not managing subordinates. Some managers’ personalities are not, in fact, suited to managing people. The incentive to seeking management positions has often been to receive a promotion, a higher grade, and a larger salary, not because an individual actually likes managing people and eagerly seeks an opportunity to mentor, develop, and improve the work life of their subordinates.

The job of the manager is going to get more complex in the years ahead. Managers already face the challenge of the blended workforce: civil servants and contractors. Now, they will be facing the challenge of potentially managing four sets of workers: in office civil servants, in office contractors, remote civil servants, and remote contractors. Each will need the support of their manager. In addition, the President’s Management Agenda notes that the government will face the challenges of implementing “expanded flexibilities in work arrangements, including expanded telework and alternative work schedules and increased adoption of technology, such as cloud computing, collaboration tools, and automation.”

A Corps For Managers

How can the federal government best address the need for well-trained, equipped, and emphatic managers? One solution might be to create an elite Manager Corps (MC). Individuals would have to apply to this new Manager Corps and in essence, volunteer to assume managerial responsibilities. They would receive “rank-in-person,” much like the Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service. Individuals would come from the ranks of current GS 13-15s. Members of the Corps could be transferred anyplace in government (out of town assignments would be negotiated).

Once an individual is accepted into the Manager Corps, they would be sent to a new Management Academy to receive training in federal “management.” Managing the new hybrid workplace would be one of the core courses. Paying attention to and developing remote employees, as well as in-person employees, will require special training. Other courses might include customer service and employee engagement. Continuing the often-haphazard process of selecting managers will not meet the challenges of the future.

The President’s Management Agenda has the worthy goal of making every federal job a good job. The Agenda envisions a workplace “where all employees are engaged, supported, heard, and empowered with opportunities to learn, grow…” But engagement, supporting, listening, and empowering are not self-executing. The federal government will need well-trained and motivated managers to make the federal government a truly desirable workplace. Management should no longer be an auxiliary task. It should be the primary task of a new, elite management corps.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. His most recent book is Government for the Future: Reflection and Vision for Tomorrow’s Leaders (with Daniel J. Chenok and John M. Kamensky).

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How Government Is Failing Public Servants

Mark A. Abramson — Wed, 20 Oct 2021 12:46:39 -0400

Volumes have been written about the promise of new technologies and analytical tools to solve countless problems facing the nation—if we could just get public servants and congressional appropriators to adopt them, seems to be the argument. Beth Simone Noveck brings a different lens to that challenge in her recently published Solving Public Problems: A Practical Guide to Fix Our Government and Change Our World. The book is based on her experience working with successful problem solvers inside and outside of government and the tools and methods they use to make change. She is currently a professor at Northeastern University, where she directs the Burnes Center for Social Change and its partner project The Governance Lab. Concurrently, she is the Chief Innovation Officer of the State of New Jersey.

Mark Abramson: Tell us about the origins of Solving Public Programs. What was your goal in writing the book?

Beth Simone Noveck: The origin of the book dates back over the last decade. Over that time, I have been working with social innovators, both inside and outside of government, to help them use technology, data, and innovation to apply to their own projects. For example, I coached a program with 16 jurisdictions on data-driven criminal justice reform. I have also worked with innovators from all levels of government to use new tools such as crowdsourcing or open data.

Based on my experience working with public entrepreneurs, I began to understand the skills that future leaders will need. I would like to see more agile public problem solvers. In Solving Public Problems, I wanted to share the lessons I learned from those both inside and outside of government, community leaders, and activists. I thought all these individuals would benefit from having a set of tools and methods that they could use in their problem-solving and implementation activities.

MA: From reading the book, I received the impression that you have a clear vision of the role of civil servants in the years ahead, which is different from their roles today. Can you tell me about that vision?

BSN: We have already seen many examples of civil servants who are entrepreneurial, especially during COVID. But I would like to see more mission-driven leaders who are agile, data driven, and human centered. I have a vision of civil servants as public entrepreneurs who are passionate about solving problems. Many civil servants do have these characteristics. But many civil servants are still burdened by rules and hidebound by culture. I would like to see public servants who work with other sectors to get things done quickly and innovatively. I would like to see the passion of public servants unleashed. I would like to see them use data in new ways and increase their use of public-private partnerships. I would also like to see more agile implementation, more collaboration, and more measurement of what works.

MA: How do you envision preparing civil servants for their “new” job?

BSN: One of the arguments I make in the book is that we are not doing enough to invest in public servants. We need to teach them new methods and tools such as data analytical thinking, human-centered design, equitable engagement practices and other innovative practices enabled by new technology. We can’t presume that everybody knows how to do these things. Skills are not innate. While we mandate training on a variety of topics such as sexual harassment and cybersecurity, we aren’t giving public servants the know-how, processes, or technologies for them to be more entrepreneurial and analytical. I don’t see a training plan for federal government employees right now. The federal government and state governments need to articulate a vision for training their public servants in 21st century ways of working and addressing public problems.

The public sector is not doing as good of a job in training as is the private sector right now. Also, many other nations have civil service academies. These countries don’t charge for training. Today, most U.S. government organizations charge for training. Agencies need to pay for it out of their own funds. Few agencies have dedicated training budgets. This is a real disincentive for training. In contrast, Singapore has a civil servant training college which does not charge its public employees. Germany has a new digital academy, which teaches “New Work.” Argentina gives points to public servants who have received training in innovation skills. Argentina has trained 36,000 civil servants on the use of data and other tools. And in New Jersey too, we have created a free innovation skills training platform for public servants.

MA: Can you tell us about your current activities?

BSN: I wear a few hats. I am a professor at Northeastern University, where I direct the new Burnes Family Center for Social Change, where we are focusing on teaching public problem solving, and its partner project the Governance Lab (The Gov Lab). I also serve in the Governor’s cabinet in New Jersey as the Chief Innovation Officer. In New Jersey, I have a staff of 20 engineers, designers and policy professionals who work together with agency partners and the State’s Office of Information Technology on improving citizen services. We are proud of building a COVID-19 hub for New Jersey. We also work on modernizing services for businesses. We work with our partners in the state Department of Labor on modernizing unemployment and developing new services such as virtual coaching for the unemployed.

MA: Can you tell us about GovLab and some of its current activities?

BSN: The GovLab was created in January 2013 and focuses on governance innovation. We work with mission-driven partners to use data and technology to improve how they govern and solve problems. I am proud of the work we have done this year during the pandemic in using new technology to help partners in government and philanthropy engage with families, students, and educators on the future of education. What I am excited about is that we demonstrated the use of technology to listen to communities. We use engagement and collaborative tools to listen to the priorities and greatest challenges of over 20,000 participants and we used AI-based engagement tools to follow that up with citizen assemblies with a representative sample of 500 caregivers and students. The whole project was co-designed by a group of 20 high school and college students from across America. We used engagement in very agile ways. We did it in a matter of weeks rather than years. I am glad to continue to have a foot in a university because we can conduct research and do experiments and can then apply what we learn in government. Also, universities are a great source of talent that we can recruit for the public sector.

MA: Can you tell us about your time in the Obama administration?

BSN: It was a wonderful experience to lead the open government initiative and how I first became interested in upskilling and training for government. We learned new ways of working in government to make government more transparent, participatory, and collaborative. There was a clear appetite for using new skills. There was a strong will to make changes, but we were lacking in skill building. Many people did not know what “open data” was. We introduced civil servants to new ways of working.

MA: How would you describe the state of technology today in the federal government? Do you see the federal government taking advantage of new technology tools such as artificial intelligence, automatic robotic processing, and use of more sophisticated data sets?

BSN: We have made a lot of progress but have a long way to go. When we started, we had 47 open data sets and nobody knew how to use them. I see a strong commitment to evidence-based government today. We have come a long way on government support for integrated data systems. However, we have lots more to do on working toward increased use of data analysis to improve performance and tackle hard problems.

The next wave is artificial intelligence and machine learning. While these big data tools are already helping the public sector to automate processes and create predictive algorithms, there is much more to be done, first to ensure greater adoption of transparent and unbiased machine learning and second, to apply these techniques to enhance citizen engagement. Given how machine learning can make it possible to sort, summarize and make sense of large quantities of information, we can use it to find new ways to listen to citizens.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. His most recent book is Government for the Future: Reflection and Vision for Tomorrow’s Leaders (with Daniel J. Chenok and John M. Kamensky). His email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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The Future of the Secret Service: A Conversation with Carol Leonnig

Mark A. Abramson — Mon, 07 Jun 2021 14:14:42 -0400

In her new book, Zero Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Secret Service, Washington Post reporter Carol Leonnig presents a highly critical portrait of the Secret Service. Based on interviews with present and former Secret Service agents, she found the agency has become “a paper tiger … weakened by arrogant, insular leadership, promotions based on loyalty rather than capability, years of slim budgets, and outdated technology.” I had the opportunity to talk with Leonnig about her thoughts on the future of the Secret Service.

Mark Abramson: I found the book to be pretty alarming about the state of the Secret Service. How concerned should I be about the safety of President Biden and Vice President Harris?

Carol Leonnig: The dedication of the men and women of the Secret Service has made the difference between life and death for many presidents and they continue to serve that vital role of presidential protection. As an agency, however, the Service has lots of chinks in its armor. The people I spoke with, many of whom risked their careers to speak to me, are worried about their agency and the ability of the Secret Service to do [its] job.

MA: Has the Secret Service made improvements after its numerous incidents in recent years?

CL: Absolutely. The agency has tried to patch its vulnerabilities. It has almost completed its hiring initiative. It has raised the fence around the White House to make it more difficult for fence jumpers to get onto the White House grounds, including the house itself. The Service has also spent some money on replacing failing technologies, but it still has a long way to go to bring their security into the twenty-first century.

MA: Your book describes many episodes of late-night drinking and the infamous Cartagena, Columbia incident of Secret Service agents and prostitutes.

CL: Lots of bad behavior was covered up for many years in the Secret Service. Their culture [embodied the] attitude that “if you work hard, you can party hard.” International trips were viewed as perks for all their selfless work in safeguarding the president. Because of its job protecting the president, the Secret Service has many “secrets” in how they protect the president. Some agents have used this culture of secrecy in a bad way.

MA: You were often told in your interviews that the Secret Service needed more women. Has the agency increased the number of female agents?

CL: I don’t know what their hiring numbers are right now. When I started my book, only 13% of Secret Service agents were women. Women have told me that it is a difficult place to work. There is workplace hazing of women. Women have told me that they have to be as “strong” as men to be agents. The Secret Service has traditionally been dismissive when women sought to serve on the presidential protection team. Female agents were told that the presidential protection is “like the NFL.” When she was First Lady, Hillary Clinton inquired about a female protection team but was unsuccessful. Second Lady Karen Pence also requested more female agents on her protection team and was successful.

MA: I was struck by the leadership ineptitude of many of the past directors. You talk about the tension between picking a director from inside the Service and picking a director from outside. Did you come to any conclusions about whether you would recommend a director from the inside or outside?

CL: Interestingly, the agency has resisted like crazy having anyone from outside the agency serve as director. There was always the belief that only an agent who has protected the president can serve as director of the agency. This is now a 7,000 -erson agency. Protecting the president no longer solely equips an individual to serve as director. Protecting the president does not provide experience charting a strategic mission, making IT changes, and getting a budget approved by Congress. Many of the previous directors failed to get the agency the money it needed to do its job. One director, Julie Pierson, looked at the books and was honest in concluding that the agency did not have adequate funding and she went to the Office of Management and Budget to request additional funding. Professional management is needed in the Secret Service. The director can be a former agent if they trust and listen to their professional managers.

The agency has been mostly run by insiders until very recently. A few managers have been brought in from outside the agency. Former Director Joseph Clancy brought in a former military official to help with contracting. The Department of Defense does know how to do contracting. For many years, the Secret Service placed agents in charge of budgeting and information technology who had little management experience. They had agents planning their strategic mission and agents in charge of national security planning for the agency.

It is really not a question of an “insider” or “outsider” running the agency. It is a question of bringing somebody in who will look at the agency with fresh eyes and be willing to absorb the ideas of those outside the agency. A director needs to listen to outsiders and not just listen to those inside the agency.

MA: In hindsight, do you think moving the Secret Service to the Department of Homeland Security was a mistake? Did the Secret Service receive inadequate oversight by DHS?

CL: When the Secret Service moved to DHS, they did get overlooked and short changed. If OMB and Congress had wanted to, they could have put more resources into the Secret Service. But in that time period, all the money and all the energy went to the other behemoth homeland security agencies.

The critical issue is that the mission of the Secret Service is too large and its budget too small. In addition, agency leadership has not been strategic and they have favored the status quo. The organizational location of the agency has not been the crucial issue.

MA: What impression did you come away with regarding congressional oversight? Was it ever very effective?

CL: Historically, the Service was very successful in convincing Congress not to look too closely at it. This ended with the increase in fence jumping and the Columbia sex scandal. Those incidents really got the attention of Congress and motivated them to bring about change. For a time, there was bipartisan support for change. Both Republicans and Democrats had a shared reason to be concerned. But for the most part, Congress has been in a reactive mode. Not much interest in proactive measures to prevent future catastrophes.

MA: Do you have some thoughts on fixing the Secret Service?

CL: Based on my reporting and long interviews with the selfless patriots who have worked at the Secret Service, there is agreement on the following needed changes. First, the agency needs a mission overhaul. Second, they need a technology refresh and updated technology. Third, they need to undertake a close examination of its leadership structure and its promotion system. Historically, the agency promotion system was all about loyalty and not about standout performance.

MA: What is the likelihood of change actually taking place?

CL: I hear that respected alumni of the Secret Service are talking to the White House about the need to take a hard look at the agency and the need to rebuild it. The Biden administration has an eye on the problems surrounding the Secret Service, but the administration has lots on its plate right now.

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‘The Premonition’: Two Takeaways for Government

Mark A. Abramson — Fri, 28 May 2021 15:13:03 -0400

Over the next several years, books about the COVID-19 pandemic will be a growth industry. One of the first out of the gate is Michael Lewis’ The Premonition. While future books will likely offer chronological accounts of decision-making and the consequences, Lewis does what he does best—he tells impressionistic “stories” based on the first-hand experience of interesting people.

Lewis presents the pandemic from the vantage point of three individuals. The three “heroes” of the book are Charity Dean, a public health doctor with experience working at the county and state level in California; Carter Mecher, a career civil servant in the Department of Veterans Affairs; and Joe DeRisi, a biochemist at the University of California-San Francisco. Each played a role in providing early warnings about the forthcoming pandemic to individuals throughout the various levels of government. By seeing government performance through the eyes of Dean, Mecher, and DeRisi, there is much to learn. There are two major takeaways.

First: American governance is messy, disorganized, disconnected, and unwieldy. While this will surprise no one, Lewis presents a powerful description of governance that should make all government leaders seriously analyze how they can make government work better in the years ahead. Lewis writes:

“One day some historian will look back and say how remarkable it was that these strange folks who called themselves ‘Americans’ ever governed themselves at all … Inside the United States were all these little boxes … Each box became its own small, frozen world, with little ability to adapt and little interest in whatever might be going on inside the other boxes … One box might contain the solution to a problem in another box, or the person who might find that solution, and that second box would never know about it.”

The 300 pages of The Premonition provides descriptions of how government “boxes” looked to Dean, Mecher and DeRisi from their perspective. Lewis also presents the first-hand experiences of his three protagonists prior to 2020 and the start of the pandemic. He devotes much attention to Dean’s experience as a public health doctor, writing, “The larger apparatus of American public health was very different on the inside from how Charity had imagined it from the outside. The Centers for Disease Control, the apex authority, wasn’t of much practical use to her.” Lewis describes an outbreak of meningitis at the University of California at Santa Barbara where Dean was responsible for responding to and managing the crisis. He quotes Dean: “’I was always saying to the CDC, ‘This is your job! Do your job! But after the UCSB outbreak, my motto was, ‘Stop waiting for someone to come and save you. Because no one is coming to save you.’”

The problem of “boxes” has long been the subject of numerous academic studies. The public administration literature is full of articles on collaboration, networks, “boundary spanning,” and so on. There will undoubtedly be more studies and conversations about the jurisdictional problems in the years ahead. The pandemic provided clear evidence that our current inter-governmental system is not working. While the United States has muddled through (to be put it mildly) the pandemic to date, there is a clear need for future improvements. Much of the first half of 2020 was spent with governors and the White House arguing about which level of government was responsible for which specific activities.

Second: The use of informal professional networks, or “backdoor” bureaucracy, can be a powerful mechanism. While Lewis does not label the ongoing communications among Mecher and his colleagues as a professional network, the stories presented by Lewis do indeed demonstrate the power of a network. In many ways, the networking presented by Lewis is a response to the disjointed and disconnected layers of American government.

One of the most powerful stories in The Premonition is the work of the “Wolverines,” an informal network of seven doctors who came together over more than a decade each time a biological threat presented itself. Lewis writes, “MERS, Ebola, Zika: they’d all been involved in each of these outbreaks, one way or another, behind the scenes. In flurries of phone calls and emails, they’d seek to figure out what was going on, and what each might do to influence the situation and save lives.” On January 8, 2020, Mecher activated the network by typing an email to Richard Hatchett, a former colleague when both served in the Bush White House in 2005. Lewis observes that Mecher and Richard “never really stopped working together” over the next 15 years.

As professionals, civil servants at all levels of government really have two jobs: one working inside the bureaucracy and another job working outside the bureaucracy in professional networks across boundaries. In the Foreign Service, backdoor diplomacy has long been a tool that foreign service officers deploy in doing their jobs. For civilians, Lewis describes a backdoor bureaucracy in which professionals exchange information, ideas, and contacts. The Premonition shows how this backdoor bureaucracy worked as America struggled to effectively respond to the pandemic in 2020-2021.

In emails and phone calls, the Wolverines concluded that one of their goals was “to find at least one state to take the lead and roll out an aggressive response to the virus, introduce the social interventions outlined in the pandemic plan, and create a domino effect.” One member of the group knew and reached out to Charity Dean in California. Lewis presents the experience of Dean in working with California Governor Gavin Newsome to become the first state to issue a stay-at-home order.

America has much to learn from its response to the pandemic. No doubt many books will be written about how we might have done better. Michael Lewis has provided us with a good starting point for that discussion.

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Big Government Is Back. Is the Civil Service Ready?

Mark A. Abramson — Fri, 07 May 2021 16:45:15 -0400

During my 40 plus years in Washington, I have seen the pendulum swing from “big government” to “small government” and back again many times. Big government in. Big government out. Privatization in. Privatization out. Contracting out in. Contracting out out.

With the progressive Biden presidency, an era of big government seems to be returning. The $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan has passed. A $2 trillion American Jobs Plan is now being negotiated on Capitol Hill. A $300 billion (or more) American Families Plan has been unveiled. In her new book, Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism, Mariana Mazzucato provides an academic framework in support of ambitious big government. Mazzucato, a professor in Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London, argues that it is time to change the conventional wisdom that government is a “clunky bureaucratic machine that cannot innovate.” She argues that the traditional view that civil servants are not as creative and risk-taking as the entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley needs to change.

Mazzucato asserts that the nation cannot effectively attack its many challenges until government becomes a more proactive leader in public-private endeavors. Her model for a proactive government is based on the successful Apollo spaceflight program. She sets forth six attributes of the program that she argues should guide government action in the 2020s: a clear vision and goals; risk-taking and innovation; organizational dynamism; collaboration across multiple sectors; long-term horizons and budgeting; and dynamic partnerships between the public and private sectors. Mazzucato discusses how Apollo exemplified each attribute and how this model can be applied to current national challenges, such as climate change and health care.

Instead of limiting itself to “fixing” market failures when necessary, Mazzacuto argues for what she calls “market shaping” in which government takes proactive action to build new markets and associated ecosystems. In addition to NASA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency serves as another model of “market shaping.”

Mazzucato sets out the following challenge: “What if government, instead of being viewed as cumbersome while the private sector takes the risk, bears the greatest level of uncertainty and reforms its internal organization to take …risks?”

If we are entering another era of big government as the first 100 days of Biden’s term certainly signals, the administration must seriously consider whether the current civil service is equipped and ready to effectively implement a big government agenda. Specifically, the administration should explore the following questions:

Are there enough civil servants to implement a big government agenda? Mazzucato discusses the “hollowing out” of the UK government in recent years, noting that between 1985 and 2015, the civil service was cut by one-third as public spending doubled. The Biden administration needs to examine the head count of each department and agency to understand the dynamics of attrition.
Do civil servants have the right skills to implement a big government agenda? With the increase in contracting out services in both the United States and United Kingdom, Mazzucato observes that government has not been attracting the level of in-house expertise it once did. If the most challenging mission work is outsourced, the most highly skilled employees will find work in the private and non-profit sectors more attractive, she argues. During the Apollo years, government easily attracted top-notch scientists because of both the mission—sending humans to the moon—and the opportunity to be involved in cutting-edge scientific work. Mazzucato quotes a UK minister, “Not only is outsourcing outrageously expensive … it deprives ‘our brightest (civil servants) of opportunities to work on some of the most challenging, fulfilling and crunchy issues.’”
How does the Biden administration create a cadre of risk-takers in the civil service? In many ways, this is the most difficult personnel challenge now facing the White House. Mazzucato writes, “Since the 1980s, a mindset of aversion to risk has filled civil servants with the fear of doing anything more than facilitating the private sector. Risk-taking is not supposed to be part of their job description.”

Mazzucato proposes rethinking how the civil service is managed—how workers are trained, how their performance is assessed and how they are promoted—as well as how the work itself is managed to create an environment more tolerant of risk and experimentation. This will indeed be a challenge.

The first 100 days of the Biden administration saw the passage of major legislation; the second 100 days may bring an even greater expansion of programs and promises to the American public. To ensure these promises are kept, the administration will need a highly skilled, high-performing civil service to deliver results.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. His most recent book is Government for the Future: Reflection and Vision for Tomorrow’s Leaders (with Daniel J. Chenok and John M. Kamensky). His email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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How New Agency Leaders Can Get Off to a Successful Start

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson — Tue, 23 Mar 2021 14:09:22 -0400

Change is coming. New political appointees are arriving almost daily and career executives are being assigned to new positions. So where should leaders begin when they arrive at a new organization? We had the unique opportunity to ask 65 Obama administration appointees this question. There was clear agreement that new executives should do the following:

Deal with immediate problems
Assess the organization
Decide where to focus your attention

Deal with Immediate Problems

New executives are likely to face immediate fires, unfinished business from their predecessors, and priorities already set by the White House. And by “immediate,” we mean before you’ve had time to arrange your office furniture. Erica Groshen, former commissioner at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, recalled, “My first 24 hours were my hardest. I had to choose to eliminate three programs due to a sequestration. I discussed with the staff why it made sense to cut these three programs. I had to get up to speed quickly and fully understand the reasoning behind this plan before signing my name to it,” she said. “No day since then has been so hard.”

During the Obama administration, new executives found that one of their major priorities was implementing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Flash forward to 2021 and new executives will face the challenge of implementing the Biden administration’s American Rescue Plan. Jonathan Adelstein, former administrator at the Agriculture Department’s Rural Utilities Service, said, “By the time I (arrived), much of the work on setting up the Recovery Act’s Broadband Initiatives Program had been completed with oversight from the secretary’s office and the White House … So I didn’t have a role in the design of the first round of the program. I had to work with what I found. I gave a speech to the agency within a week of my arrival [and] I let the staff know that I supported their mission.”

Executives also frequently arrive after a mandate has been handed down by the Office of Management and Budget (or another White House unit) to undertake a specific set of activities. The late Brad Huther recalled his arrival at the Housing and Urban Development Department as Chief Financial Officer, “Before I arrived, OMB had mandated the drastic move that HUD go to shared services. We had to redirect everything to shared services. It was a whole new process and we were the first cabinet department to do it … We had to build political support for this change within the department and had to report to OMB once a week on our progress.”

Assess the Organization

Executives face their first management challenge when they arrive at their new organization. They must decide how quickly they want to move on assessing their organization. David Kappos, former director of the Patent and Trademark Office, wanted to meet quickly with his staff so that each could begin to assess one another: “I wanted to hit the ground running, but I didn’t want to jump out of the chopper shooting.”

Nearly all of the executives interviewed wisely avoided the tendency to “jump out of the chopper shooting.” David Stevens, former commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration, described his deliberate pace: “I spent my first days at FHA assessing the organization. I would go out into the field and talk with our staff. We held large staff meetings and an offsite planning retreat. I wanted to better understand the major issues facing the department. I focused on what I thought I could accomplish and what would make a real difference.”

During his initial assessment, Stevens said, “It became obvious to me that we needed to better manage risk. We needed a risk office and a chief risk officer. I felt FHA needed to go outside of the organization to recruit some top-notch deputy assistant secretaries. We needed to recruit people with experience in credit risk, credit policy, and lending.” Stevens concluded that reorganization was not needed so he put his efforts into assessing the talent already in the organization.

Several of the executives interviewed launched initiatives to examine a specific set of activities within the organization. Often these reviews led to personnel changes. John Thompson, former director of the Census Bureau, recalled, “When I got here, Census staff were all over the map about how to proceed in 2020 … I needed to get the staff to understand a new way to manage the census. We could not simply use our existing methodology.” So he launched a “rocket team” to evaluate the options and come up with a new approach. “It took six months. In that time, I also put in a new leadership team for the Decennial Census.”

Assessments are especially crucial when an executive arrives to find the agency in a firestorm of negative publicity. David Strickland, former administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, found himself in that situation when he arrived in the midst of furor over a massive Toyota automobile recall. “When I got here, there had already been a significant amount of work in progress on Toyota,” Strickland said. “My first task was to determine whether NHTSA was broken. Some people were saying that we had a broken culture here. I decided that they were wrong and that NHTSA was not broken. That decision was a risk I had to take, but I believed it. It turns out that I was right. The final analysis showed that NHTSA had done a fantastic job on the Toyota recall.”

Decide Where and How to Focus

Margaret Hamburg, former commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, was advised by several former commissioners to just pick out a couple of issues and focus on those items. “Instead,” Hamburg recalled, “I found that I had to focus on positioning FDA for the future. I wanted it to be as effective as it could be. This required a whole new level of engagement with the agency. I wanted to strengthen the quality of the work done here. The agency needed an advocate for itself. There was no beginning and end to the initiative of improving the agency. I felt that if we didn’t address this issue, we would be losing critical ground. We needed to forge stronger working relationships with many groups.”

David Kappos reached a similar conclusion at PTO. He launched an aggressive campaign on multiple fronts: “The job of leadership is to work on all the challenges. You need to do it all. There is no one single thing that you have to do; you have to do a hundred things. Change is the sum of a lot of little things. I don’t believe there is a magic bullet or a single fix. I believe it is about making day-by-day changes and continuously working toward improvement. I believe philosophically that you are never done. Change goes on forever.”

David Stevens took a different approach. Because of the financial crisis confronting the nation and HUD when he arrived at FHA, Stevens adopted a management strategy to focus on just a few major issues. “I’ve learned to just focus on two or three issues and give those my full attention,” says Stevens. “That meant I gave other issues much less attention. On other issues, I just needed to know enough to give people my go-ahead to keep them going. You really have a short time here and you have so much to get done, you have to focus on just a few things. I had to focus on a couple of things and dig in to get them done.”

Mark Rosekind, another former administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, described a similar experience: “The intensity and tempo are never-ending … There was one staff meeting early on where a lot of new ideas were developed and subsequent assignments were handed out. One staff member said after the meeting, ‘Can we stop adding more to-dos to our agenda?’”

Arriving at a new agency is indeed a challenge. But take it from those who have been there before: Dealing with immediate problems, assessing the organization, and deciding on how to focus your attention are good places to start.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. Paul R. Lawrence is the former Under Secretary for Benefits, Department of Veteran Affairs. This article is adapted from their book Succeeding as a Political Executive: 50 Insights from Experience. Their email addresses: mark.abramson@comcast.net and lawrencepaul@cox.net.

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After Confirmation: The Golden Hour for Political Appointees

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson — Fri, 05 Mar 2021 15:24:18 -0500

With confirmation hearings underway across the Capitol, the new administration is slowly filling out the top ranks of federal agencies. For President Biden’s nominees now arriving on the job, this is when the challenge of governing begins. Based on our interviews with 65 former Obama administration officials, we offer some insight on how political appointees can get an effective start to the job.

Be ready to go to Washington on short notice. Sometimes the Senate has a clear schedule for confirming political appointees, but more frequently prospective nominees are caught off guard when a confirmation vote takes place. Voting often happens prior to the Senate going on a recess. Several of our interviewees were caught by surprise, in some cases after having waited for several months for a confirmation vote.

David Kappos, former director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, recalled, “The whole confirmation process places heavy demands on political appointees … I was confirmed at 11:00 a.m. on a Friday and I was supposed to start work on the following Monday. I had to leave my family on short notice. There was no time to plan on where to stay. But I managed to get to D.C., find a hotel, and start on that Tuesday.”

Don’t expect the red carpet—or a nice office. Some political appointees might expect a royal welcome upon arrival. Former Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission Inez Tenenbaum’s experience was different. “The physical office space was a real mess,” recalled Tenenbaum. “The walls had not been painted. I found old furniture in my office that needed replacing. The building itself was run down. It was a pretty dreary place. We had very few supplies, and we also had no business cards or stationery. At the start, I just had one staff member who I brought with me from South Carolina. We have since improved the physical look of the building and created standard operating procedures.”

Rhea Suh, former assistant secretary for policy, management and budget at the Interior Department, had a similar experience. She recalled, “During my interview process for the job, I visited the building and was struck by how old the building was. It was really worse for wear. And my new position was responsible for the building.”

Besides the potentially disappointing physical space, new appointees will usually be arriving alone without any additional political executive colleagues. “I felt like an outsider. I had only been in the building twice before,” said John Porcari, former deputy secretary at the Transportation Department. “I was familiar with the organization of DOT since the Maryland Department of Transportation (which I headed) was set up the same way DOT is. We had highways, airports, and ports in Maryland. But I found DOT to be somewhat alien and very different. I felt I was largely on my own in the beginning.”

Be prepared for briefings—probably too many of them. “I was overtaken by briefings in the first days and weeks,” recalled Marcia McNutt, former director of the U.S. Geological Survey. “I had just gotten sworn in when I started to get briefings. There were lots of things that the agency wanted me to know about, and there were conferences and Congressional testimony coming up on a variety of topics. But I felt that the agendas were being managed and I had other things to do … My time was being chunked up into 15-minute components. I think the intent was good—the agency wanted to tell me as much as they could in a short amount of time. But I needed to have more time for myself so that I could figure out what needed to be done.”

Meet with career staff at headquarters. Like many of our interviewees, Kappos held a staff meeting during his first morning on the job. “Everybody was a bit nervous about the new guy on board. I knew the issues facing the USPTO, so I wanted to get off to a fast start. I know you only have a certain period of time in these jobs, so I didn’t want to waste a single day.”

Mary Wakefield, former administrator for Health Resources and Services at the Health and Human Services Department, reached out to the entire organization: “On the day I arrived, I went through the entire agency—1,600 people. We have 10 divisions on 10 floors. I was excited about the privilege of holding office and the opportunity to work with great people. I spoke to each of the divisions that ranged in size from 70 to 200 people. I wanted face time with each office. I wanted them to see me and I wanted to see them.”

One interesting finding from our interviews was the eagerness of career civil servants to meet with and hear directly from the new political appointee. “My position had been vacant for most of the previous two years (dating back to the prior administration),” Suh recalled. “I think this created a higher anxiety from civil servants than usual. Some people were eager for new leadership while others were not. I felt I had to meet people and earn their respect. They wanted to know what I wanted to do.”

Meet with career staff in the field whenever possible. Many of our interviewees emphasized the importance of meeting employees outside headquarters. Given the vast array of field offices, Kathleen Merrigan, former deputy secretary at the Agriculture Department, made visits with field staff a priority. “Many employees in our county offices had never had people from Washington visit, not just in [the Obama] administration, but some told me not in the 35 years they had worked for USDA. Employees come to these meetings expecting a big speech, but after five minutes of remarks, I turned to questions and assured them that they could be frank and that everything was on the table.”

Michael Huerta, former administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, said that whenever he traveled, he took time to visit FAA facilities. “I didn’t just visit control towers—that is just too easy. I met with our operating offices and talked to employees. I just talked to them and answered questions. Many FAA employees are not used to seeing people from headquarters, including the administrator.”

A good start is essential. The tenure of a political appointee is often shorter than anticipated, for a variety of reasons. Thus, a quick, effective start is essential. Based on his previous experience in government, Seth Harris, former Labor Department deputy secretary, said, “I realize how short the time you have in government really is when you’re a political appointee. The challenge is whether you are going to leave footprints in concrete or footprints in the snow. There are so many things that can be undone after you leave or an administration changes. In this position, I came in with a better understanding of how to succeed.”

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Reflections on Public Service During a Pandemic

Mark A. Abramson — Thu, 11 Feb 2021 08:00:00 -0500

After a management consulting career spent working with federal agencies to improve their performance, Paul Lawrence became the 7th Under Secretary for Benefits in the Veterans Affairs Department, a job he held from April 26, 2018, to January 20. The position gave him the unique opportunity to practice what he preached. I sat down with Lawrence to discuss his experience at the Veterans Benefits Administration and the challenges of managing a large organization during a pandemic.

Mark Abramson: How would you describe your time as Under Secretary?

Paul Lawrence: As a veteran myself and coming from a family of veterans, it was an opportunity for me to extend my family’s commitment to public service.

Professionally, I wanted to make a difference. It was an important time to be involved with veterans. There were lots of resources being devoted to veteran issues, new laws to implement, and a great deal of energy around improving how we support veterans.

I felt I had the right experience to be able to make a difference. As a management consultant, I had familiarity with what VBA did: large scale paper processing, providing college education financing, mortgage applications, and insurance servicing.

MA: What surprised you when you arrived at VBA?

PL: Given my experiences, I understood the nature of the work to be done at VBA. I knew that it would be a demanding full time job. But I quickly came to appreciate two other aspects of the job which would be equally demanding.

First, VBA has an active group of stakeholders, including the veteran service organizations and the departments of veterans affairs in every state. Working with veteran groups rightly required a significant amount of time and energy.

Second, VBA, like all government agencies, has to work closely with Congress. I participated in significant congressional oversight, ranging from testifying in congressional hearings to supporting constituent services.

The surprise was that I thought I had signed up for one significant job, leading VBA programs, but I quickly found out that I had two other significant responsibilities to fulfill.

MA: What is the accomplishment for which you are most proud?

PL: In the period of time I was there, we provided more benefits faster than any time in VBA history. This was accomplished by aligning the right public servants to the right job, investing in continuous process improvement, and working closely with VA’s chief information officer to improve VBA technology.

We also had three key pieces of legislation that were recently passed, which VBA had to implement on tight time schedules. The Forever GI Bill, the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA), and Blue Water Navy (BWN) all required significant amounts of my time and attention. AMA and BWN were implemented on time as required. The Forever GI Bill required a change of schedule, which was then successfully met.

MA: How did the pandemic impact you in your role as Under Secretary?

PL: It impacted me in two ways. First, it eliminated my ability to interact with staff in the field. Prior to the pandemic, I would regularly go to visit our regional benefit offices and conduct in-person town halls fielding questions directly from our staff at all levels. These sessions were invaluable to me as I learned what was going on in the field and I heard their concerns directly.

Second, it eliminated my ability to directly interact with veterans on their home turf. Prior to March 2020, I visited with veterans’ organizations in the evenings after having met with regional staff in the daytime. Visits to American Legion and VFW posts gave me the chance to talk directly to veterans and hear about the quality of our services directly from them.

MA: How did you respond to these new limitations caused by the pandemic?

PL: At the end of March, I began to conduct a series of telephone town halls with veterans in each state. By the end of 2020, I had conducted 110 tele-town halls reaching all 50 states. The 110 tele-town halls included tele-town halls which were dedicated to each of the seven major veterans’ organizations. In total, I connected with 5.7 million veterans and fielded 1,600 questions. These town halls gave me insights into what processes we needed to improve. The tele-town halls also gave veterans the opportunity to hold me, as the highest ranking person in the organization, accountable for agency performance.

Surprisingly, VBA staff began to listen into the tele-town halls and they also gained insights into veteran’s concerns and worked to solve them. Most importantly, staff heard me doing customer service and not just talking about it and telling them to do it.

MA: Do you think the pandemic has permanently changed the way government will operate in the future?

PL: I hope so. During the pandemic, many processes were streamlined to get services to citizens faster. Making those temporary changes permanent will have a tremendous impact on the government’s ability to provide services to citizens. For example, electronic signatures replaced “wet” signatures. Direct hiring authority decreased the hiring process at VA by months. Tele-counseling enabled us to help hundreds of thousands of veterans who we would never have been able to see in person. All of these changes have had positive impacts and I hope they will last.

MA: What did you learn about managing a large organization during your time at VBA?

PL: First is the importance of identifying a very limited number of performance metrics on which we would pay attention to and get everybody focused on those measures. When I arrived, VBA collected and reported on too much data, which made it difficult to understand what veterans really wanted from us. By reducing the amount of data collected and getting everyone focused on it helped us improve performance. The simple process of reporting our results every quarter on the VBA Performance and Results Webcast let everybody know what we were doing for veterans and how well we were doing.

Second, the scale of government is seldom seen in the private sector. The need for communication to your employees, stakeholders, and customers is critical. This led me to an expansive presence on social media, hundreds of radio and television interviews, and the development of tele-town halls to communicate how we were supporting veterans.

MA: Paul, any final thoughts?

PL: This was the most demanding job I ever had. The hours were long, and the issues were complex. Nonetheless, the ability to help veterans was so rewarding that I would not change one minute of the experience. I recommend everybody consider public service during their career.

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The Deputy Secretary: Linchpin to Making Government Work

Paul R. Lawrence and Mark A. Abramson — Mon, 01 Feb 2021 14:25:05 -0500

Memorandum

To: All Biden Administration Deputy Secretary-Designates

From: Mark Abramson and Paul Lawrence

Subject: Succeeding in Your Role as Deputy Secretary

Congratulations on your nomination. During the Obama administration, we had the unique opportunity to interview 16 deputy secretaries. We asked each about their experiences, how they defined their position, and how they measured their success. They shared insights we think are still relevant and want to share them with you.

While there was substantial agreement on the roles played by deputy secretaries, several emphasized the ambiguity of the position. After two years in office, one told us, “the job of the Deputy Secretary is still a little unclear to me.” While the position is often dependent on the relationship with the secretary, there was agreement that it consisted of several primary and secondary roles. Success was defined as understanding those roles, developing an effective working relationship with the secretary, and helping achieve the administration’s goals.

Primary Roles

Serve as the department’s chief operating officer. The role of a department COO is clear. One deputy secretary reported, “I work on the infrastructure of the department. There are many actionable items and a bunch of moving parts. We need to work on many fronts.” These fronts include working on the culture of the organization, as well as focusing on the people.

It’s not just your agency’s bureaucracy you’ll be engaged with. Deputy secretaries also spend time on interagency committees, including the President’s Management Council. In describing the COO role, one said, “My job is really a T-shape as I do a lot of collaboration across government with other agencies. It helps that I have a network of people I know across government. Then my job goes straight down the bureaucracy.”

The official designation of COO responsibilities dates back to an October 1993 memorandum from President Clinton establishing the President’s Management Council and asking each department to designate a chief operating officer. With a few exceptions, departments designated the deputy secretary as COO. In 2010, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act, which codified the COO role into law. The law, signed by President Obama, states that the COO shall be responsible for improving the management and performance of the organization and “achieving the mission and goals of the agency through the use of performance planning, measurement, analysis, regular assessment of progress, and use of performance information.”

Lead departmental initiatives. When there is a high-priority initiative, the secretary often asks the deputy secretary to take the lead. Such initiatives may originate with the department or the White House. For example, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act quickly became a top priority for the Obama administration, and deputy secretaries in all departments assumed some responsibility for oversight of the law’s implementation.

Serve as a liaison to stakeholders. Many deputy secretaries have been selected because of their relationships to specific stakeholder groups. That puts them in a position to serve as the key liaison between their department and that community. This responsibility often entails giving speeches to those stakeholder groups and spending time on the road. One deputy secretary reported, “When I came in, I thought I would just be doing management. But the secretary wanted me to do more public outreach. So I ended up with a mixed portfolio. Part of my time was on public policy. Part of it was interfacing with the public. The rest of my time was on management.”

Secondary Roles

Serve as a Convener. Several of the deputy secretaries emphasized their role as “convener” of key decision-makers within their own departments, and often key leaders from outside their department. “The office of the secretary,” said David Hayes, former Interior deputy secretary, “is the only place where everything comes together. Traditionally, the agencies have tended to work alone in the Department of the Interior. Integration can only happen when the secretary, deputy secretary, and assistant secretaries get involved.”

In describing his role at the Health and Human Services Department, former deputy secretary Bill Corr also emphasizes the importance of bringing people together to develop solutions and ensure continuous momentum. Corr said, “One key aspect of my job is to get the right people in the room, determine the decisions that need to be made and ensure that we not lose our focus on our goals.”

Serve as crisis manager. The deputy secretary often assumes the role of crisis manager. Corr noted, “A major difference between my tenure in the Obama Administration and my time at HHS in the Clinton Administration is that the department now has a critical emergency preparedness role. We now have emergency response capabilities for natural and man-made disasters that we did not have the first time I was here.” During Corr’s tenure, HHS confronted a series of emergencies during its first term: the H1N1 swine flu crisis, the Haitian earthquake, the Japanese tsunami, and the [Deepwater Horizon] oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Hayes also faced a crisis at Interior: “I was the operations lead for the department on the Gulf oil spill,” Hayes says. “I spent every day—as did much of our team—from April 2010 to September 2010 on the oil spill … We were also involved in the response, the cleanup phase. We negotiated with BP every step of the way. I am proud of what we did.”

Serve as a policy advisor. Because of their extensive careers inside and outside government, deputy secretaries generally bring a great deal of policy expertise and experience to their positions. This makes it natural for deputy secretaries to expect to play a policy role in the department. Based on our interviews, the policy role varies dramatically from department to department. In some cases, the deputy secretary may be asked by the secretary to participate in the policy making process on a specific issue because of his or her expertise in that area. In other cases, a deputy secretary may be thrust into a policy making role because of the need for a strong individual to lead the policy making process. One deputy secretary told us, “I had to step into the policy development and policy agenda-setting process. I ended up driving the policy process. So I had to do two and a half jobs for a while. This isn’t the regular job of the deputy secretary.”

Serve as an alter ego for the secretary. One deputy secretary described this function this way: “My major role is backing up the secretary. We want to make sure that we make the best use of his time. I’m the back stop. I’m available across the board on many issues. Your job [as deputy secretary] is to serve the secretary in whatever capacity he or she desires. I support the secretary and focus on what is important to him. That has been my view from the first day I was here.” This role includes filling in for the secretary when he or she is unavailable to attend key government meetings and serving as acting secretary when necessary. As one deputy secretary put it, “I have to be here when the Secretary is out.”

Several Deputy Secretaries noted that there was an ebb and flow between various roles over the course of his or her tenure. One remarked, “We started out on management and we spent a lot of time on that during our first year. That was very important. Then the secretary asked me to play a greater role in another area. There are also the unexpected events which nobody can predict. So you must learn to live with this ebb and flow, and you have to be ready to respond to unanticipated events.”

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. Paul R. Lawrence is the former under secretary for benefits at the Veterans Affairs Department. This article is adapted from their book Paths to Making a Difference: Leading in Government. Email them at mark.abramson@comcast.net and lawrencepaul@cox.net.

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What to do Between Nomination and Confirmation: Insights for Political Appointees

Mark A. Abramson — Thu, 14 Jan 2021 17:26:40 -0500

Over the next several months, the Biden administration will nominate over 700 individuals for government appointments requiring Senate confirmation and then shepherd them through the confirmation process. Here’s what those nominees should expect, based on interviews with 65 Obama administration appointees who offered the following insights for future appointees on how to spend the time between nomination and confirmation.

Be Prepared to Wait

The confirmation process can be lengthy. The Obama sub-Cabinet appointees interviewed experienced wait times ranging from eight days to 358 days, with three months being the average. One study of all Obama administration nominees found that the average length of time between nomination and confirmation (from 2009 to 2014) was 127 days.

Erica Groshen, former commissioner at the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, had a long wait for her appointment. At the time of her nomination, she was a vice president in the Research and Statistics Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. After her nomination in mid-February 2012, Groshen recalls, “I started spending my time finishing up my work at the Federal Reserve. I was put on ‘garden leave,’ which removed me from day to day activity. In July 2012, I was told that my nomination would be held up until after the presidential election in November. So I went back to work, doing some short-term projects … I was prepared for the possibility of a delay, and fortunately, I knew that if it ultimately did not work out, I could stay at the Federal Reserve. I focused on getting my work and home in order. I also spent time considering my living options and preparing a budget for Washington.” Groshen was confirmed in January 2013, nearly 11 months after her nomination.

Unlike Groshen, Terry Garcia’s experience did not end as well. In May 2011, Garcia was nominated to be deputy secretary of Commerce. When nominated, Garcia was an executive vice president at the National Geographic Society. His nomination, along with several other Commerce Department nominations, was held up by the Senate in order to put pressure on the Obama White House to send three free trade agreements to Congress for approval. In October 2011, Garcia was reported to have become frustrated with the continued delay and asked that his nomination be withdrawn. An Obama administration official told Reuters, “He has been held up for no specific objection to him, his qualifications, or background. We’ve had this happen with a lot of our nominees, where there’s an objection raised that has nothing to do with their qualifications.”

Mum's the Word

Groshen summed up this period well: “I was told what not to do. I was basically told to avoid doing anything public and not to talk to anyone.” The Groshen experience was typical for many of those interviewed. All agreed that this was a difficult time. Prior to setting a date for a confirmation hearing, there will likely be little interaction between the appointee and their new department. Federal regulations prohibit nominees from having office space prior to confirmation.

Sloan Gibson, former deputy secretary at the Veterans Affairs Department, said, “The time between nomination and confirmation was frustrating. Department officials could not speak to me and I was not getting information from the department. In this period, I did everything I could to prepare myself for the job. When we started getting ready for the confirmation hearing, I (finally) met with people in the department.”

Talk to Predecessors

David Stevens, former commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration, did his homework for the new position while still working at his prior position. “I would spend weekends with binders to learn more about the department. I would also make phone calls to talk with people about the position. These phone calls were very helpful to me. You need to use your pre-confirmation time wisely. You should talk to previous incumbents and find out about their experience. I used the time to become as knowledgeable on issues as possible and find as many resources—both people and written materials—as I could.”

Nearly all of those interviewed spent time talking with their predecessors. Many strongly advised seeking out predecessors from all previous administrations, regardless of party affiliation. Leon Rodriguez, former director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, recalls, “Regarding predecessors, I talked to Ali Mayorkas (my immediate predecessor) and two Bush (Republican) Administration appointees to this job. Ali gave me a fresh perspective on the agency. I had been an enforcement guy. I found my conversations with the Bush administration appointees helpful. They told me that on a certain level, this agency is a factory—it’s a huge organization with a huge amount of output. Part of the director’s job is to make sure it works. While it does enforcement and legal affairs, it was a more complicated agency than just enforcement.”

Seek Information

Today, it is much easier to obtain information about an agency than in the old days. While nominees ultimately will receive briefing books in advance of their confirmation hearings, many nominees initially will be on their own.

“I have been confirmed twice for presidential appointments,” recalls Kathryn Sullivan, former deputy administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “The confirmation process was similar in both instances, but my pre-confirmation preparations were very different. Prior to my first appointment, my parent agency detailed me to the Office of the Administrator of NOAA. The projects I took on for former Administrator John Knauss served as a great introduction to NOAA programs and issues.” But the second time, in 2010, she said, “I relied on the Internet for my preparatory research. The variety and volume of materials available online—budgets, program evaluations, independent review reports, and more—allowed me to become quite familiar with NOAA’s current operations and challenges.”

During this interim period, the nominees reviewed Government Accountability Office reports, congressional testimony, speeches by former leaders, and comments by lawmakers and other politicians of both parties. Because of their prior research, many needed less time getting up to speed during their initial time on the job and had more time to spend on executing their agenda.

In addition to talking to predecessors, many also sought out experts with different perspectives on their new position. Peter Appel, former administrator for research and innovative technology at the Transportation Department, said, “I had been in the transportation business for 20 years, so I reached out to the ‘wise’ people in the profession to get their perspectives. I also talked to congressional staff.”

After the initial flurry of nominations in January and February, the backlog and wait times for nominees will likely grow. It’s imperative that they put the time to good use so that they can hit the ground running after confirmation.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. This article is adapted from Succeeding as a Political Executive: 50 Insights from Experience (with Paul R. Lawrence). His email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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Waiting for a Call From the Biden Team With a Job Offer?

Mark A. Abramson — Wed, 23 Dec 2020 10:14:10 -0500

Now that President-elect Biden has announced most of his Cabinet nominees the transition team is turning its attention to the all-important sub-cabinet—hundreds of deputy secretaries, agency heads, assistant secretaries and other key positions across the executive branch. In the coming weeks, individuals across the nation will be waiting for the phone to ring with an invitation to join the new administration and many others will be taken by surprise when such a call comes.

Should one accept the appointment or not? The tendency always is to say “yes.” But no one should be too quick with an answer. First, they should weigh the pros and cons of accepting an appointment.

Reasons to Accept an Appointment

There is just one reason to say yes: to serve the nation. During the Obama administration, I had the unique opportunity to interview 65 members of the Obama sub-cabinet. I asked each about their reasons for accepting their position. The answer was nearly unanimous: public service.

Margaret Hamburg, former commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, told me, “I would encourage people to come into public service. You cannot always accomplish everything you want, but you can have an impact. You can gain different perspectives and have an extraordinary experience. You need commitment and a passion for the work.”

John Morton, former director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, echoed Hamburg. He says, “Public service is very rewarding. You are motivated every day. You are doing right and serving people. I would recommend public service without reservation. Individuals should do public service for the right reasons. They have to be motivated to take on an organization and believe in its mission. You have to get it right and come for the right personal reason. You are asking people in the agency to follow you into the trenches.”

Reasons to Decline an Appointment

Hamburg and Morton both believed they were the right person at the right time, and they could make a contribution to their organization. But it does not always work out that way. Some individuals end up accepting appointments for which they may not be the best fit. Individuals may not be offered their first choice (or even their second or third) and thus face the dilemma of taking a job that may not suit them.

Not enough attention is given to why someone should not accept a position but the reasons are many. Every individual should ask themselves (and honestly answer) the following questions:

Does my experience prepare me for the job? (The experience fit)
Is this the “right” job for me? (The job fit)
Does the job fit my personality and work style? (The personality fit)
Am I willing to subject myself and my family to the scrutiny of the nomination process? (The scrutiny fit)

Experience

While many people might be unwilling to admit that their experience does not prepare them for the job they are seeking, individuals considering an appointment should ask themselves the following specific questions:

What is my experience dealing with the mission of the organization to which I have been invited to serve?
What is my relevant management experience?
Do I have the management and leadership experiences that will instill confidence in my agency?
Do I have a plan to be successful in the job?
Am I prepared if something goes horribly wrong?
Do I have experience dealing with a crisis comparable to one that could happen during my tenure?

The decision to accept or even seek a presidential appointment is a difficult one involving many professional and personal considerations. In making the decision to accept an appointment, there is one overarching question that each prospective appointee must ask: Is this the right position for me? Determining whether the position is the right fit is crucial to ultimate success in office. If the answers to the above questions are “no,” candidates should not kid themselves into believing that they will be able learn what they need to learn on the job.

The Job Itself

If one decides that their experience fits the job, the next key question is whether the specific position offered is the “right” job. While appointees often are reluctant to admit that they were appointed to the wrong position, there is much anecdotal evidence of people changing jobs to find the right fit. This is especially true of management people who are placed in policy positions (or vice versa). Gil Kerlikowske recounted his experience after serving for four years as director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy when asked for recommendations to head the Homeland Security Department’s Customs and Border Protection agency: “I volunteered myself to head CBP. I was eager to get back into operations and get away from policy.” Kerlikowske had spent his career in law enforcement, including serving as chief of police in Seattle prior to accepting the position at ONDCP.

Kerlikowske’s experience leads to an important insight: No one should take an operational job without prior experience doing operational work. Those with policy experience often underestimate the different skills needed to perform operational positions. Successful “operations” political executives have deep experience in running organizations that is quickly transferable to managing in the federal government.

Personality

Some people are not well-suited for bureaucracy. Bureaucracies move slowly, with many obstacles standing in the way of a specific goal. In reflecting on his government service, Michael Whitaker, former deputy administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, advises, “For some people, they will find that government does not move fast enough for them. Some people should not come to government if they are not going to like the speed of it.”

Nearly all those interviewed commented on the speed (or more accurately, the lack of speed) in government. Heather Higginbottom, former deputy secretary for management and resources at the State Department, said, “I have found that everything takes more time than I had anticipated. Everything here takes a lot more follow-up than what I had been used to … Some of the delays are legitimate, but it has been more time consuming than I thought. The State Department can be a frustrating place, but it is not intentionally frustrating. You just have to wait for lots of things and lots of sign-offs. Everyone needs to be involved.”

You get the idea. While a crisis might speed up the bureaucracy, government requires patience and a long timeframe. Quick hits are possible, but they are the exception rather than the rule. Prospective appointees need to understand their temperament and style. There is room for some entrepreneurship in government, but again it is the exception.

Scrutiny

Finally, prospective appointees have to decide whether they wish to make their lives an open book. An FBI investigation is required for all appointees, as well as intense scrutiny of an individual’s financial situation. In addition to the candidate, the candidate’s family might also come under public scrutiny, all of which could play out in the press.

The nominee’s entire career also comes under the microscope. Controversial incidents from the past are likely to receive renewed attention. It is not very difficult to find past speeches and comments that can be raised in a congressional hearing. That’s what happened during the confirmation hearings of former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. When asked to comment on the confirmation process, one interviewee said, “I certainly wish I had written fewer articles over my career.”

Being invited to serve as a political appointee is a high compliment but even those with the best credentials must weigh the decision carefully. Individuals should make sure that they are accepting a position for the right reasons and are indeed qualified for the position offered.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. This article is adapted from Succeeding as a Political Executive (with Paul R. Lawrence). His email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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While Biden’s Cabinet Is Important, Watch the Sub-Cabinet

Mark A. Abramson — Fri, 04 Dec 2020 10:51:58 -0500

While much of Washington is focused on President-elect Joe Biden’s cabinet nominees, smart observers are paying as much attention to the selection of the sub-cabinet—the deputy secretaries, agency heads and assistant secretaries. The success of the Biden administration will rest heavily on these selections and on the transition team’s ability to match the right person with the right position. All of the candidates will likely be qualified; the challenge will be finding the person with the best skill set for each position.

During the Obama Administration, I had the unique opportunity to interview 65 members of the Obama sub-cabinet. Many were interviewed three times during their tenure to better understand their learning curve in real time.

Based on the interviews, transitions teams should be asking two key questions about each sub-cabinet position to be filled: Is it a policy or management position? If it is a management position, what type of organization is it?

Policy v. Management

A key first step is determining whether the predominant activity of the position is making policy or managing an organization. While those running organizations are frequently involved in policy-making, the skills and background needed for managerial positions are significantly different than those in policy positions.

There is an important distinction between policy jobs and management jobs. While many come to Washington to “do policy,” much of agencies’ work is about executing—not making—policy. The concepts of a “policy person” and a “managerial person” are archetypes that can be used in sorting candidates for the right job. A policy person is clearly appropriate for the position of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the Department of Health and Human Services. Based on observations over the years, a “managerial” person faces a high probability of being frustrated by “all the talking and debating” in a policy job.

Conversely, a policy person may find a “managerial” position frustrating. Managers, in contrast, find great satisfaction in serving in agencies where there are clear objectives and performance data. As William Taggart, former chief operating officer at the Education Department’s Office of Federal Student Aid put it, “There are two separate sets of skills—the implementers are not the policy folks, and the policy makers are not implementers.”

Maurice Jones, former deputy secretary of the Housing and Urban Development Department, came to a similar conclusion. Jones says, “The problem is that people don’t come to the federal government to do execution … You can have the greatest, most innovative policies ever, but without execution, these policies can’t succeed.”

If the position is a management position, what type of organization is it? It is important to distinguish between the following types of agencies:

Production agencies: These have clear deliverables to the public, such as providing student loans, veterans’ benefits, and transportation security.
Regulatory agencies: These regulate the nation’s safety and health and include agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Scientific agencies: These conduct the nation’s research and development and include agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

One of the crucial tasks for the Biden transition team is determining the set of experiences most needed in a specific position at a specific point in time. Most candidates will have distinguished professional careers and impressive educational credentials. But the key question is whether an individual has the right set of experiences for a specific job at the point in time when she or he is selected.

Consider the White House decision in 1998 to seek a “manager” as the head of the Internal Revenue Service. Throughout its previous history, the IRS had always had a distinguished tax lawyer as its head. In 1998, a decision was made to look for a business executive who would be able to manage the information technology challenges then facing the IRS; Charles Rossotti was selected. The right set of experiences had changed for the IRS. In 2013, President Obama nominated another individual with extensive business experience, John Koskinen, to serve as IRS commissioner.

Another example of the White House deciding on a new set of desired experiences for a position was the selection of Michael Bromwich to take over the Interior Department’s Minerals Management Service in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill crisis in the Gulf of Mexico. Instead of seeking an individual with the traditional set of energy and natural resources experience for MMS, a decision was made to recruit an executive with crisis management and turnaround skills. Additionally, at that point in the history of MMS, it was appropriate (and perhaps necessary) to select an individual who had not had previous experience with the energy industry.

During the Trump administration, many key sub-cabinet positions were vacant for much of the administration. It is thus even more crucial that the Biden administration find the right people for the right job and move quickly toward their nomination and confirmation. There is no shortage of qualified candidates; the challenge is putting them in the “right” position.

Mark A. Abramson is president of Leadership Inc. This article is adapted from Succeeding as a Political Executive (with Paul R. Lawrence). His email address is mark.abramson@comcast.net.

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Whoever Wins the Election, There Will Be a Transition

Mark A. Abramson — Tue, 03 Nov 2020 10:15:18 -0500

In anticipation of the forthcoming presidential transition, I find myself recalling the Cole Porter song “Another ‘Op’nin,’ Another Show” from the 1948 musical “Kiss Me Kate.” Presidential transitions are indeed the prelude to the opening of another show when a new administration assumes the challenge of governing—that’s true whether the president is actually new or returning for a second term. Since coming to Washington in 1975 as a young professional, the 2020 transition will be the 12th transition I have observed. It is an exciting and energizing 13 weeks.

Over the past 45 years, I have participated in preparing numerous management recommendations for presidential transitions. (I wish I had $20 for each of those recommendations to add to my grandkid’s college funds.) Most of these focused on what government should do. Some were adopted, some were rejected, some were ignored.

In thinking back on those recommendations, I am struck as to how few of them focused on implementing policy—how government should undertake a new policy. The success of new policies largely depends on the success of developing an implementation strategy, which all too often is missing. While I have no doubt that policy proposals will be abundant during the next 13 weeks, I am less confident about the plans for bringing those policies to fruition.

Strategies for Success

The strategies presented below are primarily focused on improving management. The initiatives include a variety of activities, from comprehensive legislative reform packages (such as the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act) to individual agency improvement plans (not requiring legislation or executive orders). Management reform can mean many different things to different people. A new administration will need to sort out these concepts by evaluating different implementation strategies.

Implementation Decision One: Should we do “one big thing?” Given the current COVID-19 pandemic, there is a strong case to be made for strengthening the federal government’s ability to more effectively respond to the pandemic and to implement the distribution of a forthcoming vaccine. The new administration will have to evaluate and improve the capability of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Food and Drug Administration for starters. Given the bandwidth of a new administration, improving government’s pandemic response capability may be enough to take on during the first year of the administration.

In the past, the “one big thing” implementation approach has been in response to a national crisis. In response to 9/11, the George W. Bush administration focused on improving the federal government’s ability to combat terrorism and future terrorist attacks. The response included the creation of the Homeland Security Department, truly a “big thing.”

Implementation Decision Two: Should we create a large scale management improvement initiative? There are three examples of this approach in the past seven administrations. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter launched the “Presidential Reorganization Project.” Teams of political appointees and career civil servants were created to develop reorganization proposals. The initiatives resulted in the creation of two new cabinet departments—Energy and Education—and the Office of Personnel Management (which was also part of the administration’s Civil Service Reform project).

In 1982, President Reagan created the Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (PSSCC), more commonly known as the Grace Commission. The Commission consisted of private sector volunteers, “donated” by their companies, who were organized into departmental teams. No civil servants were assigned to the Commission. The “job” of civil servants was to answer questions and provide materials to the private sector volunteers. (To some civil servants, the Commission had the feel of a mild-mannered Inquisition.)

In 1993, President Clinton created the National Performance Review. Unlike the Grace Commission, NPR consisted of career civil servants assigned to work on NPR’s various work groups. At its peak, NPR consisted of around 250 civil servants. Under the direction of then Vice President Gore, NPR (later renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government) continued throughout the entire Clinton administration and implemented many of its recommendations over their seven years.

Implementation Decision Three: If we decide not to do one big thing or to create a large scale management initiative, how can we improve the operations of government? Perhaps the most worthwhile undertaking by a presidential transition team is to inventory the wide array of existing “tools” already in place throughout government, which can undertake new management initiatives. Prime candidates for use by a new administration is the President’s Management Agenda, which includes Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) Goals (required by law). While there is always a tendency to throw out anything in place from prior administrations, the President’s Management Agenda and CAP Goals have become institutionalized and a norm has been established to keep these institutions in place and to use them.

In addition to the PMA and CAP Goals, there are numerous government councils, through which the administration can work to advance its goals. There is the President’s Management Council (consisting of Deputy Secretaries), the Chief Information Officers Council, the Chief Financial Officers Council, and the Chief Acquisition Officers Council, to name a few. These councils, which provide continuity between administrations, can be used to implement policy proposals to improve management in government.

Implementation Decision Four: How do we respond to the need for quick legislative “fixes”? There is a growing movement in Congress (also reflected in Biden position papers) to respond to the many weaknesses found during the Trump administration in the plethora of oversight and administrative laws now in place. Prime candidates for revising/updating include the Inspector General Act, the Vacancy Act, the Hatch Act, and Ethics in Government Act, to name just four laws in need of revision.

During the early days of an administration, the full team of political appointees is not yet in place and career civil servants are occupied by their daily business as well as orienting their new political bosses. Instead of overloading the existing workforce, a new administration can create SWAT teams totally dedicated (with no additional responsibilities) to revising existing legislation. These SWAT teams can be staffed by detailees from agencies and temporary hires. Such SWAT teams can give additional bandwidth to a new administration without overwhelming the new team and the career civil service.

The most important takeaway for transition leaders is that you will need an implementation strategy. Welcome to another op’nin, another show!

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History Does Repeat Itself: Lessons from the Polio Vaccine

Mark A. Abramson — Tue, 21 Jul 2020 13:30:28 -0400

The summer has presented an opportunity to catch up on podcasts. One of my favorite historians is Harvard professor Jill Lepore, author of the award-winning These Truths: A History of the United States. Lepore recently launched a new podcast series, “The Last Archive,” in which each episode explores a story from American history. In episode 6, “Cell Strain,” she chronicles how the polio vaccine was launched in the 1950s.

I clearly remember taking the cherry-flavored oral polio vaccine while in elementary school. Jonas Salk, the scientist who developed the vaccine, was a hero in my household. I also remember newsreels showing children in iron lungs. But other than the cherry-flavored vaccine, Jonas Salk, and iron lungs, I actually knew very little about the history of the polio vaccine.

Enter Jill Lepore with “Cell Strain.” In March 1953, Salk announced the development of a polio vaccine, after which it underwent two years of clinical trials. During that time, over 440,000 children were inoculated with the vaccine and another 210,000 children received a placebo; 1.2 million children received no vaccination and served as a control group.

There is an interesting side-story to the field tests Lepore explores. For the tests, children had to have blood drawn, which then had to be tested on cells. Those cells came from Henrietta Lacks, the African-American women whose cancer cells were the source of the HeLa cell line, the most famous cell line in medical history. The cultures were tested at the Tuskegee Infantile Paralysis Center which had been founded in 1940 to treat Black children with polio and to serve as a research and training base for Black health care professionals. At its peak, 20,000 tube cultures were shipped per week and by 1955, the Tuskegee HeLa team had shipped over 600,000 cultures. Lepore speculates that this story was kept largely out of public view because various officials did not want it widely known that blood from white children was being mixed with cells that came from a Black woman.

The big day arrived on April 12, 1955, when Salk announced the efficiency of the polio vaccine and that it was ready for distribution. That evening, Dr. Salk went on the CBS News program “See It Now” with Edward R. Murrow to discuss the findings and his view that there should be some “central intelligence” to inform distribution plans for the vaccine, which he believed should be mandatory. As Lepore recounts, “The scientists had done their part to protect kids from polio, now the government needed to step up with its central intelligence on ways to get the vaccine out to the public.”

It turned out, however, that the government had no plans for how to distribute the vaccine, despite knowing for two years that it was coming. The day after the Salk announcement, April 13, Oveta Culp Hobby, the first Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, went before Congress and disputed suggestions that the distribution should be regulated or managed by the federal government or that it should be compulsory.

Frustrated, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered Hobby to quickly develop a plan for vaccine distribution since summer was coming and the rate of infection rose with the heat. Hobby, a conservative Republican donor from Texas, was slow to respond, so Eisenhower called a cabinet meeting to discuss his desire for free federal distribution of the vaccine. But Hobby wanted states, corporations, or charities to distribute the vaccine—anybody but the federal government. As Lepore explains, she opposed “socialized medicine.”

At the cabinet meeting, Hobby proposed waiting to see how many states would provide the vaccine themselves without federal funds. Governors, however, wanted the federal government to take charge. The cabinet argued about how to pay for the vaccine for poor children whose families could not afford it. Hobby proved an implacable obstacle to planning, and even declined to decide what federal agency should take the lead in distributing the vaccine.

Grilled at hearings that summer by unhappy members of Congress, Hobby insisted the problems could not have been foreseen. Forced by Congress to take some action, she finally developed a program to allocate grants to states to provide funding for the delivery of the vaccine to poor children, but continued to make it clear that the federal government would not “take charge” or make the vaccine “compulsory.” More hearings ensued, and while some lawmakers called for Hobby’s resignation, she support from Sen. Barry Goldwater, who shared her fear that a government vaccination program would be “socialized medicine by the back door, not the front door.”

Despite the wrangling over polio vaccine distribution, four million children were vaccinated by July 1955 and a national health crisis was avoided—without much help from the federal government. Later in July, Hobby resigned from the government.

In this summer of 2020, a trip back to the summer of 1955 is indeed a worthwhile journey. It’s an opportune time to reflect on lessons learned from fighting previous public health crises.

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What the Careers of Diplomats Can Teach the Rest of Government

Mark A. Abramson — Tue, 25 Feb 2020 14:16:55 -0500

The State Department is receiving a lot of attention these days. In November, career foreign service officers Marie Yovanovitch, William Taylor, George Kent and David Holmes were in the national spotlight during the House hearings on the impeachment of President Trump in relation to his dealings with Ukraine. These previously little known State Department officials, two of whom have since left their positions, received daily press coverage for several weeks.

Two recent books provide deeper insight into the work of the State Department and the life of career foreign service officers. In his memoir The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and The Case for Its Renewal, William J. Burns recounts his 33-year career in the department from 1981 to 2014. And in The Ambassadors: America’s Diplomats on the Front Lines, Paul Richter discusses the experience and multiple assignments of four ambassadors in the Middle East from 2001 to 2017: Ryan Crocker, Robert Ford, Anne Patterson and Chris Stevens.

Both books are highly informative about what government actually does on the front lines. (It would be worthwhile to have similar books describing the jobs of public servants in other departments and agencies.) Burns describes diplomats as harnessing all the tools of American statecraft “from the soft power of ideas, culture and public diplomacy, to economic incentives and sanctions, intelligence-gathering and covert actions, and military assistance and the threat of force—to achieve policy aims. Diplomats are classic organizers, whether in mobilizing the levers of American influence, shaping international alliances, or bridging divides with adversaries.”

While the State Department is facing many current management challenges, the career model of the foreign service—a “rank-in-person” system in which rank remains with employees regardless of the positions they hold—presents an interesting alternative to that of the civil service. What can other agencies learn from the State Department and the careers of the ambassadors Burns and Richter profiled?

Lesson One: Experience Matters

One cannot help but be impressed by the vast experience accumulated by foreign service officers over their careers. When administrations needed what Richter calls “cool heads in hot spots,” they could call upon a cadre of senior career officers with extensive experience in the Middle East. During his career from 1971 to 2012, Ryan Crocker held six ambassadorships. During her career from 1973 to 2017, Anne Patterson held four ambassadorships. Burns served 10 secretaries of State in various capacities, including ambassador to Russia, ambassador to Jordan, assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, undersecretary for Political Affairs and deputy secretary. Each of their positions prepared them for their subsequent assignments and each built an extensive network of contacts and colleagues worldwide, which they tapped into during their assignments.

Lesson Two: Development Matters

Based on “purposeful” assignments throughout their careers, foreign service officers gain experience in different types of positions and in different nations. The four ambassadors Burns and Richter profiled served both in the field and at headquarters during their careers. The foreign service model is based on the importance of mentorship (both formal and informal) during assignments early in an officer’s career. Burns describes his early experience working as minister-counselor for political affairs in Moscow: “There is no playbook or operating manual in the foreign service, and the absence of diplomatic doctrine, or even systematic case studies, has been a long-standing weakness of the State Department,” he wrote. “Throughout my formative years, good mentors mattered most of all–accomplished diplomats from whom I could draw essential lessons about negotiating and leadership. Experience was passed from generation to generation, and I never had a better role model than Tom Pickering.”

Lesson Three: Rank-in-Person Matters

One of the most interesting components of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act was the creation of the Senior Executive Service, which gave SES members rank-in-person with the expectation of increased mobility within their own departments and across the government. In addition, the new law allowed SES members to take a “political” position with rights to return to a career position after the “political” position. In the State Department, similar provisions have been widely used and seen clearly in the careers of Burns, Crocker, Ford, Patterson and Stevens.

There continue to be few examples of career civil servants in domestic agencies who have had the opportunity to serve the nation in multiple departments and agencies. As the number and importance of cross-agency policy goals continue to increase, there is a growing need for experienced civil servants who can move from agency to agency (or goal to goal) and bring their experience to bear in new situations. In many ways, that was the vision for the Senior Executive Service. The experience of the State Department demonstrates that rank-in-person can indeed be an effective tool for administrations to deploy when they need “cool heads in hot spots.”

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When Government Does Not Work: A Primer

Mark A. Abramson — Tue, 12 Nov 2019 10:00:00 -0500

Alternative titles for the recent book by Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael D. Shear, both Washington correspondents for the New York Times, could have been Border Mess or Border Chaos. The book, Border Wars: Inside Trump’s Assault on Immigration presents a distressing picture of Washington at work (or not at work), both on the frontline of these particular “wars” and in policy making. As a case study in mismanagement, Border Wars reminds one of The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast, in which Douglas Brinkley describes government’s failure to respond effectively to that crisis. Unlike Hurricane Katrina, however, problems related to border management and immigration are ongoing.

Border Wars is indeed a disturbing book to read. It describes three significant failures of government:

Policy Failures

The primary culprits in policy-making failures are both houses of Congress and the White House. Davis and Shear describe numerous failed attempts to come to any agreement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals bill, which aims to address the status of individuals who were brought to the United States as children and, in many cases, have no experience of their nation of origin, as well as other immigration legislation. The title of Norm Ornstein and Tom Mann’s 2012 classic book, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, is still applicable today. There are no heroes who artfully architect policy compromises in Border Wars.

Administrative Failures

The book devotes several chapters to describing the child separation crisis on the border. The challenge of reuniting children separated from their parents proved much more difficult than anticipated by any of the federal agencies involved. Alex Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Services, told his staff that it shouldn’t be that hard to reunite families. Davis and Shear report that Azar said, “We have databases to keep on top of such things.” But it turned out that was not the case. The HHS computer system contained almost no information about a child’s parents.

Davis and Shear report, “Customs and Border Protection gave HHS one number; Immigration and Customs Enforcement gave them another; DHS headquarters offered a third . . . Over several weeks, Azar and his team were given 60 different sets of data, each contradicting the others.”

The book documents the difficulty agencies have cooperating in shared mission areas. Seventeen years after creation of the Homeland Security Department, it seems that putting related agencies under one roof has not made it easier for them to work together.

Process Failures

As a long-time proponent of “speeding up” government and streamlining government processes, Border Wars makes a strong case for the need to get things right before implementing new rules. In developing new regulations imposing limits on public benefits for immigrants (the public charge rule), Davis and Shear report that the 250-page draft regulations were delivered to top officials at Citizenship and Immigration Services with “the urgent message that comments should be provided by the next morning at 8 a.m.” As with the infamous Muslim ban, the proposed regulations, once issued, quickly spawned lawsuits, and now the courts will be left to sort it out.

The book contains several interesting stories of civil servants who followed the processes that they had spent their careers respecting. Larry Bartlett, a veteran career official who oversaw refugee admissions at the State Department, defended a State Department report that showed refugees made positive economic contributions to the nation. Bartlett was removed from his position in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and moved to the Freedom of Information Act office. Eventually, with little fanfare, he reclaimed his previous position. Davis and Shear write, “The inspector general was still looking into allegations that he and others had been targeted for political retaliation.”

In Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Scott Shuchart and his colleagues began to hear stories about a pilot program in El Paso to separate children. Shuchart sent a “stinging, six-page memo” that predicted “family separation and ‘zero tolerance’ prosecution of border crossers” would lead to a “chaotic crisis.” Not surprising to anyone who followed this issue, “The plea fell on deaf ears,” according to the authors.

There are no management recommendations or policy proposals in Border Wars. Davis and Shear are journalists focused on documenting history. But there are clearly lessons to be learned from the book. All new administrations enter office with a long list of policy goals on which they campaigned. Most administrations (both Democratic and Republican) discover that success in implementing those policy proposals is largely dependent on their ability to understand the bureaucracy they now run. Their ability to successfully translate policy proposals into clear “implementable” (and legal) actions that agencies can undertake is key. Border Wars illustrates the adage that haste makes waste when trying to implement new policies. There are few shortcuts in government. Future administrations, pay heed.

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The Challenge of Managing Up

Mark A. Abramson — Thu, 12 Sep 2019 10:00:00 -0400

When Random House announced earlier this year that the former Defense Secretary and retired four-star General Jim Mattis would be writing a book for publication this fall, Mattis went to great lengths to make clear that he would not be discussing President Trump in the book. Instead, he promised a book that would convey some of the lessons he learned in his 43 years of service. (The book had been under contract before Mattis became defense secretary in 2017).

In many ways, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead (written with Bing West), is a companion piece to Admiral William H. McRaven’s 2019 book Sea Stories: My Life in Special Operations. Both books tell numerous war stories and present a flyover of their respective distinguished careers. Both books take us into battle and describe the ethos and culture of two of the military’s most elite organizations: the United States Marine Corps and the Navy SEALS. It’s hard not to be impressed by the variety of assignments and preparation for command that Mattis and McRaven received over their long careers. Both books discuss their early assignments in which they learned to lead, what Mattis calls “direct leadership.”

As a long-time reader of countless management and leadership books, I found little that was new in Mattis’ approach to managing his men (there is little discussion of women, who now comprise 7% of the Marine Corps). Many other leaders have talked about the importance of “delegating as much authority as possible to proven Marine and Navy commanders below me.” The book does contain brief discussions of assignments where he was responsible for “transforming” organizations—his time as head of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and his tenure at both the U.S. Joint Forces Command and as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation. The book contains only two paragraphs on his time managing the Defense Department (we will have to wait until his next book to learn about his experience in the Trump administration).

What I found most interesting was not Mattis’ views on leading others, but his discussion of his frustration with bosses above him. While I am sure Mattis was a great leader of his troops, he does not appear to have been as skilled in managing up. There were three notable incidents in which the General strongly disagreed with his bosses (not an uncommon experience for those who have served in government at any level):

Mattis at Tora Bora

The most self-reflective chapter in the book describes the decision by his military chain of command not to permit Mattis to pursue Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains. “We in the military missed the opportunity, not the President, who properly deferred to his senior military commander on how to carry out the mission,” Mattis wrote. “Looking at myself, perhaps I hadn’t invested the time to build understanding up my chain of command . . . I should have paid more attention and gotten on the same wavelength as my higher headquarters if I wanted them to be my advocates . . . If I had to do it over again, I would have called both the ARCENT commander and Admiral Moore and said, ‘Sir, I have a plan to accomplish the mission, kill Osama bin Laden, and hand you a victory. All I need is your permission.’”

Mattis in Fallujah

The most interesting war story is Mattis’ experience in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004. He opposed the attack on Fallujah but his objections were overruled. “I had made my objections clear. While some might urge a senior officer to resign his post in this circumstance, your troops cannot resign and go home. They will carry out the specific order regardless of whether you are still with them,” he wrote. During the first battle of Fallujah, Mattis’ troopers were ordered to “stand down” several times and ultimately pulled out. “I believed I had let my men down, having failed to prevent the attack in the first place and subsequently failing to prevent a stop order once we were deep inside the city. It was a tough time for me, because higher-level decisions had cost us lives, but now was not the time to go inward. You must always keep fighting for those who are still with you.”

Mattis as head of Central Command

Mattis led CENTCOM from 2010 to 2013, until he was removed by President Obama. A more detailed discussion of his removal from command would have been very interesting, but Mattis noted only that, “my traction inside the White House was eroding. It was no secret in Washington that the White House was wary of my command at CENTCOM and increasingly distrusted me. While I fully endorse civilian control of the military, I would not surrender my independent judgement . . . While I had the right to be heard on military matters, my judgement was only advice to be accepted or ignored. I obeyed without mental reservations our elected Commander in Chief and carried out every order to the best of my ability.”

I came away from Call Sign Chaos with two distinct takeaways. The first was that General Mattis was seldom let down by his troops in the field (although there were instances where he was disappointed in their performance). The second was the numerous instances in which Mattis felt let down by those in command above him (both military and civilian leaders). He was often disappointed in their frequent lack of clear guidance (in contrast to his constant efforts to provide clear mission statements to those below him).

There are many books on managing those below you in rank, many of which Mattis has read and cites. But there is a shortage of books on the challenge of working with those above you and how a leader effectively responds to decisions with which he or she disagrees. One option is resignation, which Mattis rejected after his recommendations were overruled in Fallujah. We will have to wait for Mattis’ next book to learn the decision-making process that led to his resignation as Secretary of Defense in December 2018. Managing up is indeed a challenge for all leaders.

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Four Leadership Takeaways from Ash Carter

Mark A. Abramson — Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:00:00 -0400

In his sprawling 466-page new book, Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon, former Defense Secretary Ash Carter covers a lot of territory. There is something for everyone. He provides a comprehensive overview of how the Pentagon operates, both on the military side and on the civilian side. He discusses five major strategic challenges facing the United States: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and the threat of terrorism. There is also a detailed discussion of “troops in action,” including understanding of the chain of command, combat readiness, and the importance of clarity of purpose.

The book also sets out to be a guide for new political executives, as well as career executives throughout government. Carter is eager to pass on what he has learned during his nearly 40-year career in and around the Defense Department. There are four key management takeaways for federal leaders.

1. Experience Matters

Prior to confirmation to his confirmation to serve as the 25th Defense secretary in February 2015, Carter had served in three key presidentially-appointed positions at the Pentagon. During the Clinton administration, he served as assistant secretary for Defense for global strategic affairs, and During the Obama administration, he served both as under secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, and deputy secretary. Even when he wasn't directly working in government, Carter served on the Defense Science Board and Defense Policy Board as well as on numerous other advisory committees.

Carter represents the honorable tradition of the “in-and-outer,” individuals who held academic or private sector positions in between their government service. They came back to government service with extensive experience in their fields. In Carter’s case, he describes how he had seen Defense “not only from ‘up on the bridge,’ where policy is made, but also ‘down in the engine room,’ where all the gears turn and the money is spent.” To say he was well prepared to lead the Defense Department is an understatement. Today, the pejorative term “revolving door” (often deserved) is used to describe the careers of many political executives. Carter describes what the career of an “in and outer” looks like and makes a strong case for experience serving as the primary criteria for political appointments.

2. Facts Matter

Carter was trained as a scientist (as were former Defense Secretaries Harold Brown and William Perry). Carter writes, “I am a scientist by inclination and training—which means that a policy of using hard facts as the basis for action is deeply ingrained in me.” Carter’s first experiences with Defense involved work on the controversial issues of where to base MX missiles, the Star Wars missile defense program, and the Nunn-Lugar nuclear threat reduction initiative. “I was exposed early and often to one of the central challenges faced by any government policy-maker: figuring out how to make solidly fact-based decisions in an atmosphere of intense, emotional, often vitriolic political debate—and how to win enough support for those decisions that they can be effectively carried out for the good of the country,” he writes.

Carter’s reflections on the use of facts in decision making is indeed timely. He writes, “In times of extreme partisan polarization, those in leadership roles may feel tempted to skew their judgements according to what is ideologically correct or politically expedient. It may work for a while—but plans made without due regard for fact generally backfire, reflecting the way reality ultimately takes revenge on those who try to ignore it.”

Carter concludes, “The truth matters—and in most cases, in the long run, the truth wins out. At least, that has generally been the case in my public career until now.”

3. Preparation Matters

One cannot read Inside the Five-Sided Box without noting the importance of preparation on two levels—individual and organizational. Both Carter and the Defense Department take preparation seriously. As an executive, Carter discusses the importance of preparing adequately for congressional hearings, press briefings, and meetings. He writes:

“We’ve all seen how being unprepared for a curveball from an influential representative or senator can get a cabinet officer in trouble, generating a needless controversy that might take weeks to defuse. I preferred to invest my time, thought, and energy beforehand and so prevent such controversies from ever arising . . . While preparing for a press appearance, I generally composed my own material . . . When a major announcement was in the offering, I would often devote most of a weekend to composing a first draft, since it was impossible to fit the job into a busy workweek.”

This same discipline and preparation are also seen within the department and throughout the military services. While it is clearly the department’s “job” to always be prepared, Carter devotes a chapter to the key ingredients of readiness. Many other federal departments and agencies could learn from the department’s approach to preparing for its key mission.

4. People Matter

The final section of the book is titled “People Matter Most.” While many memoirs of political executives focus primarily on their policy-making initiatives, Carter’s memoir focuses on people—troops, the department’s public servants, and his personal staff. Throughout the book, he is generous in singly out (naming names) the people with whom he worked closely on Defense initiatives. Many memoirs give the impression that there are just three or four people in addition to the author working on these important issues. For those who know government well, people do indeed matter and the success of any leader is dependent on how well they manage and lead their workforce.

Memoirs range widely in the quality of the author’s insights. For future political and career executives, Ash Carter’s offers many valuable lessons.

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Going to the Moon: Reflections on a Government Success Story 50 Years Later

Mark A. Abramson — Wed, 12 Jun 2019 20:17:44 -0400

On July 20, 2019, the nation will celebrate the 50th anniversary of one of the federal government’s greatest success stories: the Apollo 11 moon landing. In his new book, American Moonshot: John F. Kennedy and the Great Space Race, historian Douglas Brinkley describes then-President Kennedy’s decision to send astronauts to the moon and how federal leaders planned and executed the mission. Mark Abramson recently spoke with Professor Brinkley, the Katherine Tsanoff Brown Chair in Humanities and Professor of History at Rice University, about American Moonshot and the factors that determine whether government missions are successful.

Mark Abramson: What are the origins of American Moonshot?

Douglas Brinkley: I grew up in Northwest Ohio in Perrysburg. I was eight-and-a-half years old when Apollo 11 landed. It was a highwater mark in my youth. Ohio has a long history of aviation pioneers: the Wright Brothers, John Glenn, Neil Armstrong. My house was full of NASA memorabilia. I was excited that we had gone to the moon.

There were several other key events leading to American Moonshot. In 2001, NASA invited me to interview Neil Armstrong as part of their oral history project. It was an incredible experience. In 2005, I moved from Tulane University to Rice University in Houston. Rice has a long historical relationship with NASA. My office is short walk from the Rice football stadium where President Kennedy delivered his famous 1962 speech on reasons for going to the moon. Also, in recent years, NASA has released new documents in their archives and important documents have been declassified. There is now a robust field of space history.

I also discovered that nobody had written a book about President Kennedy’s decision to go to the moon. I thought I could finish the book before the 50th anniversary of the Apollo landing. It took me three years of non-stop writing to finish the book.

MA: What has been the reaction to the book?

DB: I have been surprised by the amount of mail I have received. Hundreds of people have written to me thanking me for writing American Moonshot. They told me about their participation in the project—some as government employees and some as contractors. They wrote about the great pride they still feel in being part of the Apollo project. They wrote about working for NASA on a specific launch or writing a computer program for the mission. These letters demonstrated the satisfaction that working on an important public mission can bring to people. Over 400,000 citizens were involved in getting us to the moon.

MA: What lessons did you learn about what it takes for government to plan and execute a successful program?

DB: The most important lesson is that leadership starts at the top. You need true leadership that stays focused on the task at hand, which President Kennedy provided. Another lesson is the importance of working with both Democrats and Republicans, which President Kennedy did. Hyper-partisanship is not useful in getting things done.

During the planning of Project Apollo, NASA did two important things. First, they listened to political reality. They knew that they would have to engage the entire nation in the project. They made sure many states received government funding as part of Apollo. Second, they made smart decisions about contractors and subcontractors. They choose the best companies to participate in Apollo. They knew which companies had the engineering and technical know-how. The government did not waste money in going to the moon. The project came in well within budget. The 1961 funding estimate was between $20 to $40 billion. The government did not underestimate the cost. The final cost was about $25 billion.

Project Apollo also showed us that great leaders and presidents can bring the government together with the private sector and academia. An effective president learns how to engage other leaders and bring them together with government to work on common goals. We need a healthy relationship with the private sector and citizens.

In addition, President Kennedy was a master salesperson for NASA. He told the country that space exploration was going to be expensive and would cost every family 50 cents a week. NASA continued to communicate effectively with the public throughout the Apollo program. The agency constantly communicated the benefits of space exploration for the nation.

The real heroes of Project Apollo were public servants. They were top notch people who got the job done. My experience has shown me that government employees are very honorable people doing first-rate work. I regret that they are often get beat up by pundits and do not receive the credit they deserve.

MA: I enjoyed your book The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf. Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated an unsuccessful government program. How would you contrast that with the success of Project Apollo?

DB: Presidents have an obligation to pick the right, qualified people to run their agencies. President Kennedy picked James Webb to run NASA. He had exactly the right credentials. President George W. Bush picked Michael Brown to run FEMA. Brown had no managerial skills. He had previously been the head of the International Arabian Horse Association. FEMA did not have a leader who knew how to talk to the nation, which created a lack of confidence by the public in FEMA.

During the hurricane relief efforts, FEMA seemed AWOL. NASA talked directly to Americans throughout Project Apollo and was honest about their successes and failures throughout the project. NASA during Apollo is a real role model in communicating with the public. Government agencies do not communicate as well today.

My admiration for James Webb increased throughout my research for the book. He was an ex-Marine who understood science and industrial mobilization. Coming from North Carolina, he also knew how to talk to Southern congressmen during deliberation over NASA’s budget. He was a smooth operator and knew how to manage and how to work effectively in Washington.

Project Apollo demonstrated the importance of presidential and agency leadership. President Kennedy demonstrated constant vigilance in ensuring that NASA was being run effectively.

MA: You have also written about Teddy Roosevelt in the Wilderness Warrior and Franklin Roosevelt in Rightful Heritage. What did you learn from both Roosevelts and President Kennedy?

DB: I learned about the importance of a “can do” positive attitude. Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan were all successful in providing optimism to the public. Presidents need to capture the imagination of the public and provide the nation with goals on which they can pull together. It is healthy for the nation to have ideas and goals being debated, such as a war on cancer and an “earth shot.”

The Roosevelts and President Kennedy talked about the importance of public service. Another President, James Madison, said that democracy can only work if our leaders are explaining government and the constitution to citizens. The nation should now be devoting more time to treating history as an important subject. Too many young people today don’t understand the importance of serving our country.

MA: In 1999, you published The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey Beyond the White House. Have you thought about updating it?

DB: Yes, I would like to update his post-presidency. As historians, we tend to give Presidents upward revisions as we get further away from their presidencies. Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush are all receiving upward revisions. The only exception is Richard Nixon. His tapes included anti-Semitic and other derogatory language which have hurt his presidential standing.

I have found that if you live your life with deep-seated integrity, history will treat you well. People like George Shultz and Zbigniew Brzezinski demonstrated integrity and telling the truth to their bosses. You have to be honest and not abandon your principles in government. It is all too easy to not tell the truth to your boss in order to stay in good standing with the boss.

MA: Tell us more about your views on the importance of public service.

DB: There are amazing things happening today in NASA and other government agencies. I am concerned that many young people are not considering going into government. Many are being poached by the private sector. I hope that the private sector space companies will not dominant recruiting the current scientific talent pool.

We need to convince young people that serving in government can be both exciting and important. I hope government can make itself attractive to millennials. Government service has many rewards and can be very exciting. Public servants might make less money than they could in the private sector, but it is hard to put a price tag on serving your country.

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You Don’t Need Leadership Training to Lead

Mark A. Abramson — Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:20:47 -0500

In November 2018, retired Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal published his third book, Leaders: Myth and Reality (with Jeff Eggers and Jason Mangone). The retired four-star general, a legendary Special Forces operator whose last military assignment was commander of all U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, has devoted decades to the practice and study of leadership. His two previous books were Teams of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (with Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell) and My Share of the Task: A Memoir. He’s now a partner at the McChrystal Group, a leadership consulting firm.

Leaders examines six types of leaders: founders (Walt Disney and Coco Chanel), geniuses (Albert Einstein and Leonard Bernstein), zealots (Maximillian Robespierre and Abu Musab Al-Zarqaqi), heroes (Zheng He and Harriet Tubman), power brokers (“Boss” Tweed and Margaret Thatcher); and reformers (Martin Luther and Martin Luther King Jr.) A separate chapter is devoted to Robert E. Lee in which McChrystal discusses the evolution of his personal assessment of the Confederate general as a leader. Government Executive recently sat down with Gen. McChrystal at his office in Alexandria, Virginia, to discuss the book and reflections on his career.

Mark Abramson: Tell us about the evolution of Leaders. How did you decide the write the book?

Stanley McChrystal: When I came out of the military, I thought there was much to learn from my experience as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. I thought our experience with “team of teams” was not unique to the military. I started working with companies on management and leadership. I also started teaching leadership at the Yale University Institute for Global Affairs. I became interested in better understanding leadership. I wanted to understand how leaders emerge. My team and I selected 13 leaders to study.

MA: What is the message you want readers to take away from Leaders?

SM: Too often, people put leaders on pedestals and think leaders are special persons. I don’t think that is true. I wanted to demonstrate that there are many opportunities to lead. People can make a choice to lead when they see an opportunity to do so. All the leaders profiled in the book saw opportunities to lead and made a choice to use an opportunity to lead.

MA: Did you have a favorite leader in Leaders?

SM: I have always been impressed with Dr. Martin Luther King. I was impressed with his flexibility and his ability to compromise. He never lost sight of his goals. He consistently demonstrated leadership and took advantage of the situations to lead when opportunities arose.

MA: What can mid-level managers in government learn from Leaders?

SM: I think there are many lessons about leadership which are relevant to organizations. I want individuals to ponder leadership. You don’t have to be trained to be a leader. Leadership is complex and there is no one model for leadership. I hope that readers will see opportunities for them to lead in their own unique situations.

MA: What can agency heads in government learn from Leaders?

SM: Managing in government is indeed a challenge. There are many external expectations on these leaders. They have to move toward goals. I have seen many good leaders in government. I was impressed with both George Tenet and John Brennan during their tenures at the Central Intelligence Agency. They tried to develop a culture of pride in their organization. They knew they had to manage the culture of the organization. They had a sense of what needed to be changed in their organization and knew how to go about moving toward change. Many appointed leaders in government don’t understand that.

I also admired Gen. Colin Powell during his time at the Department of State. He did a good job in managing the organization. The civil servants at State really admired and liked him and he worked hard to lead internally. I saw the same qualities in Robert Mueller during his tenure at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He led the organization internally. I was also impressed with Leon Panetta during his career in government. He was a leader who always listened.

I have also seen leaders in government who don’t accomplish as much as they would have liked. In many cases, these leaders may have been “right” about their preferred course of action but they did not know how to work effectively within their organizations and did not accomplish their goals. It is often a case of leadership styles and knowing how to work within the culture you are leading.

MA: I enjoyed your memoir My Share of the Task. Which leaders had an impact on you during your career?

SM: When I was a cadet at West Point, I had a counseling session with then Maj. David Baratto. He told me that he saw me as a potential leader in the military. Nobody had talked to me about my potential and this built my confidence. Throughout my career, I remembered the importance of being people focused and lifting people’s expectations of themselves. I was also influenced by a sergeant during my time at the 82nd Airborne Division. This individual often led by sarcasm. He was overweight and did not look like a leader. But he knew his job and he taught me that everybody might not look like a leader and that leaders come in all shapes and sizes.

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