Government Executive - Authors - John O'Leary

Government Workforce Management—Overdue for an Overhaul

William D. Eggers and John O'Leary — Mon, 22 Apr 2019 13:10:23 -0400

In 2017, it took the federal government an average of 106 days to hire a new employee. In that time, most private sector companies can hire, onboard and begin seeing meaningful contributions from new employees. At the state level, the number of job applicants plummeted 24 percent from 2013 through 2017, despite an 11 percent increase in job postings.

Today’s best companies are all about unleashing the talents of their employees. Government, on the other hand, is handicapped by outdated management rules.

Public sector leaders know better than anyone that changes are needed.

“It makes no sense to me whatsoever that we have to try to recruit, hire, retain, and pay people in a system that was designed in the 1940s,” Angela Bailey, Chief Human Capital Officer of the Department of Homeland Security told the Federal News Network.

The gap between the public sector and the private sector in modern workforce management policies is wide and appears to be getting wider. Successful organizations strive to make their employees successful, both as individuals and as part of a team. Too often, the public sector is locked into decades-old workforce policies, weighed down by rigid job classifications, inflexible pay, and a reliance on seniority as a substitute for capability. The result isn’t good for performance or employees.

This isn’t a worker problem. This is a system problem. High-performing talent wants the kind of meaningful, high-impact work that government has to offer. But agencies’ inflexible, rule-based approach to managing its workforces can make top talent wonder if government is the right place for them to shine.

That’s a shame, because government needs the very best talent to tackle today’s challenges.

To attract the best, government needs to modernize its approach to work. This likely includes greater investment in the skills of current employees.

That won’t be easy. Fundamentally redesigning government work would mean jettisoning bureaucratic controls built up over decades. It could mean investing in employees to help them gain skills they need to tackle the toughest problems. Here are five ideas to consider for such a reform effort.

Recognize the individual worker. Every employee is unique. Governments can adopt more flexible personnel systems, opening the door for higher pay, better use of contractors, and adjusted benefits packages. All-star tech talent commands a huge range of pay in the private market, especially when working for equity. A one-size-fits-all approach won’t meet the demands of today’s top performers.

Simplify job descriptions. When it comes to flexibility, job classifications might be a good place to start. California recently removed more than 700 job classifications. Tennessee reclassified its IT positions in 2013, restructuring the states’ IT organization chart to suit expected technology needs. Tennessee’s employees had to reapply for their old jobs. However, the system offered support for these employees—mapping a path from the jobs the state won’t need to the ones it will.

Reskill workers into new roles. Continuous reskilling can help prepare the workforce for inevitable changes. To prepare public workers for the digital revolution, the UK has created a digital skills “bootcamp,” in which government employees leave their department for a week to learn the tenets of skills like agile development or human-centered design. These employees are offered the necessary background to participate in new agile projects and the opportunity to learn on the job alongside experienced professionals.

Consider how upskilling could improve productivity. A study found that people who learn the most on the job are 47% less likely to be stressed at work. Relaxation leads to gains in focus, and productivity, and further down the road, reduced health care, insurance, and worker’s comp costs.

Use technology to amplify human capabilities. Where training is impractical, technology can supplement current skills. NASA has replaced fat paper instruction manuals for technicians with a 3D, virtual-reality tour of how spacecraft components fit together. Google recently released an augmented reality version of Google Maps, which overlays directions and points of interest on your camera screen. Such augmented reality could extend capabilities in other government jobs as well, for example, overlaying demographic or transit data over a city, or prompting questions during an interview.

The technological revolution reshaping our world demands a new approach to managing human talent. People are the most important resource public leaders have, but the systems in place to manage that workforce are overdue for an overhaul. Creative solutions, from more flexible rules to reskilling efforts, have the potential to help public organizations deliver on their mission and, at the same time, improve morale for employees.

William D. Eggers is the Executive Director of Deloitte’s Center for Government Insights and the author of nine books. John O’Leary is the State and Local Government Research Leader at the Center. Their latest study is The Future of Work in Government.

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The Silent Leader

William D. Eggers and John O'Leary — Thu, 01 Apr 2010 00:00:00 -0400

The legacy of Dwight Ink shows the force behind making policy work.

It was Good Friday 1964, and Dwight Ink was sitting on his couch at home watching televised images of a massive earthquake that had hit Alaska. "It looked like utter chaos," recalls Ink. "I remember feeling sorry for whoever was going to have to put things back together." A few days later, President Lyndon Johnson informed Ink that he was going to be that guy.

History tends to adore the person at the helm, the president who calls the shots from the Oval Office. Overlooked are the bureaucrats who actually carry out the commands. Out of the limelight, Ink served seven consecutive presidents, from Dwight Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan. Now retired, this unassuming bureaucrat was often the one doing the heavy lifting.

Ink went to Alaska. Every engineer he met agreed that rebuilding could not be completed during the state's short construction season. Alaskans would have to abandon the state if Ink couldn't rebuild before a deep freeze halted progress.

"It was a dismal first night," Ink recalls, "I got no sleep at all."

During that sleepless night he had an epiphany. Ink had to think in reverse of the typical approach to managing public construction projects, beginning with the results needed to enable families to stay in Alaska: "We had to figure out, no matter how impossible it might seem, what had to be done by the time the construction season ended, then work backwards," he says.

In a story that reads like the antithesis of Hurricane Katrina, Ink led a swift and efficient reconstruction effort. The 1964 Alaskan Earthquake is largely forgotten today because of Ink's leadership.

After returning from Alaska, he helped Johnson launch the War on Poverty and create the Housing and Urban Development Department. He was in charge of the New Federalism for President Richard Nixon, and led President Jimmy Carter's civil service reform. Ink's knack for delivering results garnered him the nickname "Mr. Implementation."

He also worked at the Atomic Energy Commission. With Cold War tensions at their height, reaching a nuclear treaty with the Soviets was critical. Ink believed the United States' best strategy was to pursue a limited ban on nuclear testing, forbidding atmospheric experiments but allowing for underground testing.

After John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, Ink had to make his case anew. Noted Harvard historian and key Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger strongly disagreed with Ink's approach, and in a meeting the two locked horns. As a rule, a bureaucrat tends to tread lightly with political appointees, particularly famous ones close to the president. Nonetheless, Ink passionately made the case for the limited ban, refusing to back down.

During one heated exchange, Ink saw something that made his career flash before his eyes. "I was aghast to suddenly realize that sitting in a chair along the wall behind Arthur was [Attorney General] Bobby Kennedy," Ink says. "Apparently, Arthur had reported my unseemly behavior, and Bobby had come to see for himself." Ink thought he would be fired.

That didn't happen. Robert Kennedy evidently appreciated Ink's candor. "To my complete surprise, [they] kept me in that role, and at the next meeting Schlesinger was absent and never attended another one," says Ink. Some months later, President Kennedy signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a key step in reducing nuclear tensions during the Cold War.

Ink's entire career was marked by such courage. One of his last assignments was to reduce drug traffic from South America for President Reagan in the 1980s. Rather than stay behind his desk in Washington, Ink ventured to the source of the drugs, only to find himself captured by Colombian drug lords. After a nerve-racking day he was released.

Ink, who had retired in 1976, returned to government twice before his final farewell in 1989.

In today's hyper-cynical Washington, the notion of a good bureaucrat is almost unheard of. Too often, politicians rely on their loyal campaign staffers to manage the bureaucracy-with disastrous results.

Ink believes the political-bureaucratic divide has grown worse in recent years.

"The career service is the only vehicle through which a president can govern. Yet we continue to see instance after instance of White House staff and agency leaders not only failing to reach out to the men and women on whom their political success will largely rest, but also quickly alienating them," he says.

A person doesn't have to be president to be a leader. A good bureaucrat can be a great leader. To reclaim a reputation for competency, government will need more Dwight Inks. It requires a political culture that values and honors capable managers, as well as public servants with the courage to tell the unpleasant truths to their political masters. These days, the word "bureaucrat" is used as an insult. But government relies on career officials who can implement policy initiatives legislated by politicians from both sides of the aisle.

William D. Eggers, global director of Deloitte's public sector research program, and John O'Leary, a research fellow at the Ash Center of the Harvard Kennedy School, wrote If We Can Put a Man on the Moon: Getting Big Things Done in Government (Harvard Business Press, 2009).

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The Silent Leader

William D. Eggers and John O'Leary — Wed, 13 Jan 2010 00:00:00 -0500

A few days later, President Lyndon Johnson informed Ink that he was going to be that guy.

Ink went to Alaska. Every engineer he met agreed that rebuilding could not be completed during the state's short construction season. Without water and sewer systems, Anchorage and other harbor communities couldn't function. Alaskans would have to abandon the state if Ink couldn't rebuild before a deep freeze halted progress.

"It was a dismal first night," Ink recalls, "I got no sleep at all."

He also worked at the Atomic Energy Commission under Eisenhower. With Cold War tensions at their height, reaching a nuclear treaty with the Soviets was critical. Ink came to believe that the United States' best strategy was to pursue a limited ban on nuclear testing, forbidding atmospheric experiments but allowing for underground testing.

During one heated exchange, Ink saw something that made his career flash before his eyes. One of the president's closest advisers, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, was sitting nearby. "I was aghast to suddenly realize that sitting in a chair along the wall behind Arthur was Bobby Kennedy," Ink says. "Apparently, Arthur had reported my unseemly behavior, and Bobby had come to see for himself." Ink thought he would be fired.

Ink, who had retired in 1976, returned to government twice before his final farewell in 1989.

Ink believes the political-bureaucratic divide has grown worse in recent years. "The career service is the only vehicle through which a president can govern. Yet we continue to see instance after instance of White House staff and agency leaders not only failing to reach out to the men and women on whom their political success will largely rest, but also quickly alienating them," he says.

A person doesn't have to be president to be a leader. A good bureaucrat can be a great leader.

To reclaim a reputation for competency, government will need more Dwight Inks. It requires a political culture that values and honors capable managers, as well as public servants with the courage to tell the unpleasant truths to their political masters. These days, the word "bureaucrat" is used as an insult. But government relies on those career officials who actually can implement the policy initiatives legislated by politicians from both sides of the aisle.

William D. Eggers is the global director of Deloitte's public sector research program. John O'Leary is a research fellow at the Ash Center of the Harvard Kennedy School. Their new book is If We Can Put a Man on the Moon: Getting Big Things Done in Government (Harvard Business Press, 2009).

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Blueprint for Disaster

William D. Eggers and John O'Leary — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500

As Washington considers an overhaul of the nation's health care system affecting roughly one-seventh of our economy, a critical question arises: How effective are we at crafting legislation that can be implemented? To answer this question, we partnered with Government Executive in 2008 to survey members of the Senior Executive Service. Less than one-third of respondents believed Congress was effective at designing public policy that worked in the real world. We also surveyed members of the National Academy of Public Administration, with similarly grim results. Fully one-third told us Washington was downright poor at policy design.

It turns out if you want to get federal executives angry, ask them what they think of the legislative design process. Their responses can be scathing: "Policy design at the federal level is pathetic." "Policy design too often is done without consideration of implementation challenges." The consequences of poor design can be severe. Like an architectural rendering that looks good on paper but collapses once built, poorly designed legislation can be a blueprint for disaster.

Just ask California. In 1996, Democrats and Republicans in the California legislature worked together to pass a major redesign of the state's electricity markets. The reforms were intended to introduce competition, spur innovation and lower the cost of electricity by 15 percent-maybe more. That was the intent, anyway. But by 2000, California's electricity system was in shambles. The new law caused soaring prices, rolling blackouts, and the election recall of Gov. Gray Davis. A government reform launched with high hopes had turned into a total disaster. What went wrong?

The short answer is energy companies like Enron exploited design flaws in the legislation, racking up profits and ripping off consumers. What looked good on paper turned into a fiasco when it was implemented.

It is a pattern that occurs frequently in large public ventures. After reviewing more than 75 significant government reforms since the end of World War II, the findings suggest that the root of many failures actually lies with faulty design. The temptation is to blame legislators, an easy target. But lawmakers and their staffs are in an impossible position. The complexity of even a single program area is often beyond the grasp of all but a handful of experts, and legislators are asked to pass laws under politically driven deadlines.

The problem is the process-a system in which design takes place in a vacuum, largely disconnected from implementation. At the best private companies, the concept of "design for execution" is second nature, and designers work closely with manufacturing to avoid drawing up something that can't be built.

As one federal executive said, "There is a gap in communication and understanding between a committee drafting legislation and the federal or state agency responsible for the implementation."

Can the design phase be improved? Yes, but only with a serious commitment from political leaders. These four principles can begin the process of closing the dangerous gulf between those who design public policy and those who implement it.

Think Design, Not Legislation

A bill is really a blueprint for the bureaucracy. "We should be worried about how a bill will work 18 months from now, not just today, but too often we aren't," explains former Rep. Tom Davis.

Involve Implementers

Good implementation cannot save a poor design. Policy implementers who are handed a flawed design face an uphill battle. For example, the Medicare Part D law included an unrealistic timeline, leading to massive problems during the launch. Bringing implementers into the design process could help avoid these sorts of breakdowns.

Evaluate Workability

The Congressional Budget Office provides an objective assessment of the cost of proposed legislation. Why not have an independent review board assess the implementability of a new policy? Just as a building department reviews the design of a house before deciding whether to issue a permit, lawmakers might uncover at least some of the design flaws if they had to submit complex initiatives to the scrutiny of a feasibility analysis conducted by implementation-savvy experts. Design review makes sense at the building department, and it makes sense in Congress.

Probe for Weaknesses

Assign someone to shoot holes in the design at an early stage. If someone isn't looking for the weaknesses during the design phase, rest assured people will be finding weaknesses in the policy after it is launched-with far more serious consequences.

Some readers might find these recommendations hard to take seriously. As one said, "It seems to me that when the two clash, politics is always going to trump design." Perhaps. But the stakes are high, and the current approach to legislative design isn't working. These ideas, if taken seriously, could help improve a process badly in need of reform.

William D. Eggers is the global director of Deloitte's public sector research program. John O'Leary is a research fellow at the Ash Institute of the Harvard Kennedy School. Their new book is If We Can Put a Man on the Moon: Getting Big Things Done in Government (Harvard Business Press, 2009).

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Blueprint for Disaster

William D. Eggers and John O'Leary — Sun, 01 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0400

When Washington designs policies that can't work, the results are grim.

As Washington considers an overhaul of the nation's health care system affecting roughly one-seventh of our economy, a critical question arises: How effective are we at crafting legislation that can be implemented? To answer this question, we partnered with Government Executive in 2008 to survey members of the Senior Executive Service. Less than one-third of respondents believed Congress was effective at designing public policy that worked in the real world. We also surveyed members of the National Academy of Public Administration, with similarly grim results. Fully one-third told us Washington was downright poor at policy design.

As one federal executive said, "There is a gap in communication and understanding between a committee drafting legislation and the federal or state agency responsible for the implementation."

Think Design, Not Legislation

A bill is really a blueprint for the bureaucracy. "We should be worried about how a bill will work 18 months from now, not just today, but too often we aren't," explains former Rep. Tom Davis.

Involve Implementers

Evaluate Workability

Probe for Weaknesses

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