Government Executive - Authors - David Ruppe

Senators critical of Energy Department’s nuclear weapons spending

David Ruppe — Wed, 08 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500

Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., told National Nuclear Security Administration chief Linton Brooks he has "concerns about the efficiency" of Energy Department activities.

"I am unconvinced that we are getting all we can for every dollar," Sessions said, echoing comments he made last month to Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman that suggested $1 billion in savings could be made.

Along similar lines, ranking committee Democrat Bill Nelson of Florida questioned whether the agency might at the Defense Department's request have taken on too many programs, citing early research for the administration's Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

"Perhaps [the Defense Department] is asking too much and money is being spent on projects that we will eventually not need," he said.

Brooks told the committee that the Energy Department's nuclear programs, which also include nuclear nonproliferation and Navy propulsion system work, took "dramatic reductions" in size and spending following the Cold War.

He said further that efforts were under way to shrink the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal by nearly half by 2012. Stockpile maintenance absorbs a majority of the program's budget. The administration has requested $6.4 billion for the stockpile work in fiscal 2007 - the amount it received for this fiscal year - and $9.3 billion for all its nuclear activities.

"We are transforming into a more efficient, more secure complex, but more work needs to be done. NNSA's 2007 budget request will allow us to continue our efforts," he said.

Brooks and other officials have described the Reliable Replacement Warhead program as just such a way of reducing the stockpile, making it more easily maintained, and thereby reducing stockpile maintenance costs.

The idea behind the program, Brooks said, is to "design replacement components that are easier to manufacture, safer and more secure, [and] eliminate environmentally dangerous materials, which also saves money."

The Reliable Replacement Warhead program appears intended to design new nuclear weapons and components to replace or swap out components of the U.S. arsenal as it ages.

He said the program was undergoing a concept design competition, from which one will be selected in the fall for use by the department.

Brooks said the department's fiscal 2007 request for the nuclear weapons programs is $860 million less than was forecasted two years ago, with "about half of that for deficit reduction, the other half redirected primarily to nonproliferation."

He said a congressional cut to fiscal 2006 funding for a Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, intended to address a backlog of weapons complex physical infrastructure maintenance, should delay that program's scheduled completion in 2011 by two years.

In apparent agreement with Sessions and Nelson, though, Brooks said the nuclear weapons complex "still isn't right" in its current configuration because it cannot develop and build new nuclear weapons quickly.

He said administration plans to develop "a modern responsive infrastructure" were intended to address that and that efforts were under way to determine what the infrastructure should look like.

Brooks said there is reason to worry his agency would not be able to afford the Reliable Replacement Warhead program and pay for its other work.

"Right now the Reliable Replacement Warhead is a relatively - it's frightening to use $27 million as a small number - but it is a relatively small fraction of our budget. But if it has the promise it's going to have, the resources for it will grow," he said.

If the warhead program is fully pursued, however, he said the agency could try to fund it by scaling back on life-extension programs for aging weapons.

"The question that we and the Department of Defense are wrestling with is how certain do we have to be that the RRW concept is really going to (a) work and (b) fit in with the country's priorities before we can start shifting resources away," he said.

"My guess is that in the next year or two you will see us walk away from some of the life extension, but that's assuming decisions that haven't been made yet," he said.

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Report encourages Pentagon to focus more on homeland defense

David Ruppe — Wed, 25 Jan 2006 00:00:00 -0500

"The United States' unmatched military technological superiority is no longer enough to guarantee that Americans will be safe and that U.S. forces will prevail in battle and in securing the peace," according to "Restoring American Military Power, a Progressive Quadrennial Defense Review," by the Center for American Progress.

"Nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on the ability to develop and deploy nuclear and biological weapons. In Iraq, suicide bombings and crude explosive devices are claiming more lives of U.S. troops than tanks or enemy troops. New capabilities are required," it says.

The review is intended to provide a counter-vision for the much-anticipated Defense Department Quadrennial Defense Review expected to soon be released.

The group's report advocates cutting development and production of eight major weapons types: the F-22 fighter, Virginia class submarine, DD(X) Destroyer, V-22 Osprey, C-130J transport aircraft, offensive space-based weaponry, further deployment of the U.S. national missile defense system; and "obsolete and unnecessary elements of the nuclear posture."

The weapons are costly but unnecessary, providing little additional advantage over other existing systems, according to the report.

"United States weapons systems are not matched to threats, and the Pentagon has more programs on the drawing board than it can afford" given recent record-setting budget deficit levels, it says.

The report advocates doubling Pentagon expenditures on homeland defense to "at least $20 billion" annually, to increase its capacities to support civil authorities following unconventional and high-explosive attacks or other incidents. The National Guard should focus more on protecting the homeland from major disasters rather than on major combat operations elsewhere, it says.

Among the report's numerous recommendations is withdrawing tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, which it says are costly and have "no strategic utility," while reducing the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal significantly down to 1,000 warheads, with 600 deployed and 400 in reserve. Those numbers, it says, should be sufficient to address military targets in China and Russia, as well as a limited number of targets in "extreme regimes."

"The strategy should be based on two principles: military targets are the only legitimate target for nuclear weapons, and any use of nuclear weapons must be proportionate to the threat," it says.

The report further advocates abandoning development of a new earth penetrating nuclear weapon capability, maintaining a "surge capacity" for building additional warheads if needed, resuming arms control negotiations with Russia, continuing the administration's Reliable Replacement Warhead program, and eventually ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The report advocates pre-emptive U.S. military action against imminent threats, while criticizing the administration's policy of preventive war against possible future threats.

Center senior fellow Lawrence Korb, a former Reagan administration defense official and one of the report's primary authors, unveiled the document Tuesday.

Michele Flournoy, also a former defense official and now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, critiqued the report following its release. Along with the center report, Fluornoy said she had seen a draft of the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review.

Both documents, she said, start from a similar premise: "We're over invested as a military, as the Department of Defense, in capabilities to deal with high-end warfighting, against very traditional military threats and we're under invested in capabilities to deal with irregular warfare, like terrorism, like insurgency and stability operations … catastrophic threats like [weapons of mass destruction] terrorism, and so forth."

She said, though, the judgments about defense strategy that emerge from that conclusion differ in the documents.

"While both documents place a lot of rhetorical emphasis on homeland defense, or priority for the military, in the [center's] document there is much more putting money where your mouth is" - recommendations for shifting money toward homeland security.

In the Pentagon's document, "it's very difficult to find much, with a couple of exceptions," she said.

"Whether or not we all agree with every word in [the center's] document … the fact that you have an alternative on the table to force people to have a constructive debate is absolutely critical at this time, given the stakes involved," she said.

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Report: Annual missile defense spending could double in seven years

David Ruppe — Tue, 24 Jan 2006 00:00:00 -0500

The report, "The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2006," was produced by the Congressional Budget Office and released this month as an update to a September 2004 report.

The study projects an average $13 billion per year cost for missile defense through 2024.

The administration requested about $8.5 billion for the program last year for the current fiscal 2006, according to the report. The annual cost should climb rapidly to $19 billion by 2013, due to major equipment purchases, before dropping significantly to about $8 billion annually by 2024, it says. All figures are in 2006 dollars.

The projections factor the anticipated costs for development, procurement, operation and maintenance of most major Bush administration missile defense initiatives. Administration officials have said they are pursuing a "layered" approach to missile defense, which involves developing multiple technological approaches to striking various ballistic missiles from land, sea, air and possibly space.

The report's projections also incorporate an assumption for the unexpected cost growth of the systems under development, based on historic cost-growth rates for major weapons systems since the Vietnam War.

Without factoring historic cost growth, the report says, the average annual cost would be $10 billion, with a peak at $15 billion in 2013, and an overall cost of $190 billion overall through 2024.

The report incorporates potential costs for the following major systems: Ground-based Midcourse Defense system interceptors and radars; nine low-orbit, infrared Space Tracking and Surveillance System satellites; a boost-phase kinetic energy interceptor system; seven Airborne Laser 747 aircraft; additional Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) short-range missile defense systems; and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) components.

The report also includes costs for the sea-based Aegis missile defense system under development, and space-based and mobile ground-based interceptor systems that are under early consideration. It does not, however, factor the Air Force's SBIRS-High early warning satellites, which are intended for nonmissile defense uses as well, and does not specify how many ground-based, space-based, or sea-based systems it assumes will be purchased.

Victoria Samson, a Center for Defense Information missile defense analyst who released an analysis of the report last week, said she believes the report underestimates the probable cost of the administration's plans. "If they did everything they wanted to, reports have estimated it could run over a trillion dollars," she said, citing a 2003 report by prominent economists that drew such a conclusion.

The projected growth for missile defense costs corresponds with substantial overall Defense Department cost increases, according to the CBO report. Military funding reached $509 billion in fiscal 2005, including $74 billion in supplemental funding, it says.

It says the annual total could average about $522 billion a year through 2011 and $563 billion per year from 2012 through 2024, if historical cost growth and military expenditures to fight terrorists abroad are factored. That estimate, though, appears to assume that supplemental appropriations for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will end in fiscal 2006.

Congress last year pushed back against missile defense budget cost growth, with key senior lawmakers saying the Defense Department would need to reduce some of its ambitions. The report says if the Defense Department chooses to buy no additional missile defense systems, but instead only invests in research and development, it could spend an average $3 billion through 2024.

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Vaccine treatment centers for military personnel partially funded

David Ruppe — Tue, 10 Jan 2006 00:00:00 -0500

While helping to ensure their continuity, the funding is only $3 million of the $6 million sought, leaving the centers to appeal to the Army or other military services to make up the difference.

Key senators and congressmen finalizing the $453 billion fiscal 2006 defense appropriations bill approved the money last month. President Bush signed the bill (H.R. 2863) into law Dec. 30.

Congress in 2000 created the Vaccine Healthcare Centers' headquarters, located at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., as a place for personnel who might have been made ill by anthrax vaccinations to receive specialized assessment, treatment and study.

Three other locations opened in 2004, at the Naval Medical Center in Portsmouth, Va., the Womack Army Medical Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the Air Force's Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas.

None of the armed services, however, has specifically budgeted for the centers. Despite the efforts of Senators Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., lawmakers until now have also refused to fund them directly, leaving Walter Reed to transfer some of its resources.

Meanwhile, the military since 2002 has been conducting mass vaccinations for anthrax and smallpox. The centers in fiscal 2003 and fiscal 2004 combined treated approximately 1,200 recipients of the anthrax and other vaccines presenting a range of side-effects, from muscle pain and chronic fatigue to multiple sclerosis. Many personnel are believed eligible for treatment but unaware that the centers exist.

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Defense Department helps secure former Soviet 'antiplague' sites

David Ruppe — Wed, 23 Nov 2005 00:00:00 -0500

Still, most of the "antiplague system" institutes and regional and field stations across 11 former Soviet states lack sufficient safety and security and their scientists on average are poorly paid, a nongovernmental expert said.

The Pentagon has budgeted $61 million for security at facilities in six countries in fiscal 2006, Andrew Weber, senior adviser for Cooperative Threat Reduction policy at the Office of Secretary of Defense, said this month at a panel discussion on the antiplague sites.

By comparison, the Defense Department provided only $2 million toward the effort in 1998, he said.

"We have now a much more comprehensive program than when we started in the mid-1990s and we have an extraordinary team of experts both directly working for the DOD team, and other U.S. government agencies, and also in the NGO community," he said.

The annual amount significantly increased following the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, he said. Other U.S. and foreign agencies also assist in securing the facilities, he said.

Dual-Use

The antiplague system facilities, 88 sites established by czarist Russia and Soviet Union as a means of detecting, assessing and thwarting the spread of dangerous diseases and most still existing today, are viewed today as potential proliferation and public health threats.

Located in regions where many dangerous diseases such as anthrax, bubonic plague and tularemia are endemic, or through which exotic diseases might spread, some facilities also fed deadly pathogens into the Soviet Union's biological weapons program and continue to collect and retain such material.

While viewed a proliferation risk today, the stations with improvements could provide an effective network for early detection and prevention of the spread of infectious disease, though such activities have been decreasing due to insufficient funding, staff and equipment, experts say.

Security concerns regarding the facilities are described in a draft report prepared by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies that was funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Problems identified included improperly stored samples, aging research facilities, weak or nonexistent security, and underpaid scientists with expertise in biological weapons-related work who might sell their expertise for cash.

U.S. funding, Weber said, supports physical security upgrades, biosafety improvements, modernization of research and storage equipment, consolidation of research and storage activities, and collaborative research programs intended to engage former military scientists in peaceful work.

Assistance efforts have been under way for several years in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, and new programs began this year in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, he said.

He noted the program is funding in Georgia construction of a central, national reference laboratory, where all of the country's dangerous microorganism specimens will be relocated.

Collaborative activities are somewhat limited in Russia for lack of a U.S.-Russian government bilateral agreement, Weber said.

"We've made some progress but it's been difficult," he said. "We need an authorized executive agent from the central government so we … can better meet Russian Federation priorities and better understand Russian Federation priorities at the government level," he said.

Concerns Persist

Despite efforts so far, much work needs to be done to secure antiplague system facilities, according to panel speaker Sonia Ben Ouagrham, co-author of the Monterey Institute study.

"One of the main proliferation threats is the risk of brain drain," she said.

Salaries of facility scientists now average from $20 to $100 per month, varying by country, Ben Ouagrham said.

The potential diversion of pathogens is another main threat, she said.

"Most of the facilities we visited have extensive collections of pathogens that are highly dangerous. These pathogens … most of them have been isolated from nature. But in some cases they are highly virulent, naturally highly virulent, and antibiotic resistant. They also have pathogens that were engineered for BW [biological weapons] purposes during the Soviet times," she said.

"Very few of the facilities have a sufficient security system," she said, citing for instance insufficient personnel and upkeep of facilities.

Ben Ouagrham said the study's authors found no evidence of proliferation since the Soviet network broke apart. She said, though, that good information would be difficult to obtain because of poor security and record keeping, and perhaps because of facilities' interest in avoiding negative attention.

The Defense Department does not yet have programs in five of the former Soviet states with facilities - Moldova, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Weber said he anticipates more U.S. funding in the future could go to securing the stations as work is completed on other Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.

"I think as some of the legacy programs, really high-ticket programs in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear security finish some of their major infrastructure investments … in future years the portion of overall funding that goes to biological threat reduction will continue to increase," he said.

[Editor's Note: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.]

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Senate panel backs bill to create biodefense agency

David Ruppe — Wed, 19 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400

New Agency, Industry IncentivesThe bill specifically would create a "Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency" within the Health and Human Services Department. The new agency would act "as the single point of authority" within the federal government for research and development of medical countermeasures against bioterrorism and natural disease outbreaks. Burr's legislation would also provide incentives that proponents said are needed to encourage the biotech and pharmaceutical industries to invest more for drugs and vaccines for biological defense and naturally occurring disease protections. For instance, the bill would allow Health and Human Services to sign exclusive sales contracts with particular manufacturers for a particular product. It would forbid government purchases of generic versions of such new drugs or vaccines as well as public sales of the products for use as countermeasures.The bill would also provide companies with liability protections for new countermeasures not yet licensed by the Food and Drug Administration, so that a company producing products for epidemics or biodefense could only be sued if the Health and Human Services secretary finds clear and convincing evidence it willfully engaged in misconduct that caused the injury. The bill would provide rebates or grants to encourage companies to manufacture vaccines, medical countermeasures, and pandemic or epidemic products within the United States and would allow the government to help pay the costs of establishing domestic manufacturing facilities.Burr's proposal would provide a "limited antitrust exemption" for the Health and Human Services secretary and the BARDA director that would allow them to collaborate and consult with industry on developing new countermeasures.It also would exempt the new agency from standard Freedom of Information Act and Federal Advisory Committee Act requirements for public transparency and would exempt certain federal cost oversight requirements.Less controversially, the bill also would compensate first responders for countermeasures they purchase and would provide money to encourage development of animal models on which countermeasures could be tested against diseases too dangerous to test on humans.Doesn't Address Flu Threat, Democrats SayCommittee Democrats said they support the general aims of the bill and many of its provisions, including creating the new agency. Democrats said, though, that the bill - targeted at longer-term research and development - does little to improve the country's near-term preparedness for responding to an avian flu outbreak. That would include funding the stockpile of antibiotic drugs and improving the public health infrastructure and surge capacity."Congress may wait for regular ordeals to deal with the pandemic flu, but the flu virus will not wait while we delay," said Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass."We need the capacity to develop the vaccines now. We need to appropriate money now," Harkin said. "We need emergency funding right now, probably to the tune of several billion dollars to begin to get grants out there right now … to build the vaccine manufacturing facilities for flu vaccines. … We need to get these facilities built in the next six or seven months."Burr said including such provisions in the bill would have greatly delayed the measure. He said there is "ample time" to prepare such legislation and that the committee would soon begin work on it for passage next year.Other ObjectionsDemocrats said they also objected to how the liability provisions were written. Company liability protections should only apply when a product is used in an emergency, and not for other situations, Harkin said.Kennedy said the liability protections should be accompanied by a "strong [federal] compensation program" in the bill, because "the rules should not be stacked against patients."Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., criticized the market exclusivity provision for preventing public sale of generic versions of new drugs and vaccines for use as countermeasures against dangerous diseases.Clinton praised the proposed agency creation as "a good idea," but asked how it, as a coordinating agency, would "have more direct control than all the other coordinating positions have had."Chairman Enzi said the committee would try to address Democrats' concerns by possibly amending the bill, but said mutually agreed upon changes would be made by Thursday at the latest.There remain "fundamental differences" between Republicans and Democrats "that we have to work out," Burr said.Democrats said they might seek to amend the bill on the Senate floor.Some nongovernmental organizations have taken a harsher view of the bill's implications than the committee Democrats.It "basically eradicates regulatory safeguards against the production of unsafe vaccines, drugs and devices that the government determines to be for pandemic, epidemic or bioterrorism/security countermeasure use, and then wipes out liability for any drug company or health care provider that makes or dispenses them," the Center for Justice and Democracy in New York said in a recent press release.As a result of the liability provision, the advocacy group said, families or victims of defective countermeasures could "have no recourse, no ability to file a claim or lawsuit, no way to collect any compensation even if the drug company or health care provider was negligent, reckless or in some cases intentionally harmful." ]]>

CIA report offers fresh critiques of Iraq intelligence

David Ruppe — Fri, 14 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400

The 12-page declassified report, completed in July 2004 and published on the Internet Thursday in full by the National Security Archive of George Washington University, was prepared by a group of experts led by former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard Kerr.

USA Today and the New York Times this week reported that the assessment criticizes the Bush administration for not heeding prewar warnings about the possibility of violence among rival factions after the fall of the Iraqi regime.

Beyond that, however, the report appears to contradict two major conclusions in a report from an earlier, prominent panel, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

First, the report concludes that Bush administration views on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and pressure for certain information might have affected the quality of analyses the intelligence community provided.

The previous commission's report, released in March, found "no evidence of political pressure to influence the intelligence community's prewar assessments of Iraq's weapons programs."

The new report also faults the intelligence community for failing to question whether Iraq may have abandoned weapons of mass destruction programs destroyed following the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The previous commission document also noted a failure "even to consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein would decide to destroy his chemical and biological weapons and to halt work on his nuclear program after the first Gulf War." However, it said that even if that possibility was considered, analysts could have justifiably concluded that such action by then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was unlikely.

The Kerr report instead argues that the intelligence community might reasonably have concluded Iraqi WMD programs could have been abandoned given a paucity of information indicating they existed.

"Collection strategies should recognize the extreme difficulty of requiring such a regime to prove the negative in the face of assumptions that it is dissembling," it said.

A post-invasion report from a U.S.-led investigation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, known commonly as the "Duelfer Report," last year concluded that Iraq had abandoned its weapons and programs, was deliberately ambiguous about their fate in the interest of maintaining deterrence, and had no intention of attacking the United States with such weapons.

The Kerr report suggests that pressure to satisfy numerous administration requests for intelligence regarding suspected Iraqi weapons capabilities and links to al-Qaeda might have driven the intelligence community to cut corners and focus on providing the sought-after information rather than providing a more balanced picture.

"Eagerly responsive to quickly developed policy requirements, the quick and assured response gave the appearance of both knowledge and confidence that, in retrospect, was too high," it says.

The Kerr report does not blame Bush administration officials, though, noting that "serious pressure from policy-makers almost always accompanies serious issues." Instead, it says the intelligence agencies failed to exercise quality control checks on analysis. The community was satisfied to produce volumes of information that satisfied the intelligence consumers, it said.

"The extensive layers of critical management review that traditionally served to insure both the validity and standing of finished intelligence products seem to have been ineffective in identifying key issues affecting collection and analysis," it said.

The Kerr report further suggests that daily, close intelligence community contacts with policy-makers may have led to the conveyance of intelligence less tempered with caveats than would appear in written reports.

"In the case of Iraq, daily briefings and other contacts at the highest levels undoubtedly influenced policy in ways that went beyond the coordinated analysis contained in the written product. Close and continuing personal contact, unfettered by the formal caveats that usually accompany written production, probably imparted a greater sense of certainty to analytic conclusions than the facts would bear," it said.

The report says there "remains an open question" about whether "the climate of policy-level pressure" had "contributed to the problem of inconsistent analytic performance."

It notes that while a "constant stream of questions" from administration policy-makers on possible Iraq-al Qaeda connections caused analysts to conduct exhaustive, repetitive searches for such links, the community remained firm that "no operational or collaborative relationship existed."

With regard to suspected weapons, however, because policy views and intelligence community judgments were in accord, "the impact of pressure, if any, was more nuanced and may have been considered reinforcing," it says.

Without so much policy pressure, analysts may have been more inclined to examine underlying assumptions, it said.

"Precisely because we've had such inadequate investigation of this intelligence failure, we still haven't learned the real lessons of what went wrong and it seems like this report has started to correct the balance," said Joseph Cirincione, nonproliferation director at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"There was conscious political effort to push the intelligence in a way that would support an already determined policy. And this report comes closer than any other in recognizing that fundamental reality," he said.

The report says underlying assumptions about Iraqi weapons were not questioned also because of how the intelligence community emphasizes technical intelligence over more qualitative, human-derived intelligence on cultural and political factors.

Intelligence collection efforts were "not focused or conceptually driven to answer questions about the validity of the premise that WMD programs were continuing apace," it said.

The study faulted a disproportionate reliance on satellite collection systems, which it said provided very little accurate information, sought information intended to satisfy preconceptions, and offered "little acknowledgement" of the political and cultural conditions that might influence such programs.

"Analysis of Iraq's WMD programs, therefore, provides an excellent case study for an assessment of the limitations of relying too heavily on technical systems with little acknowledgement of the political/cultural context in which such programs exist," it said.

Little collection was done on the social, cultural and economic impacts "on Iraq of nearly 20 years of war and 10 years of sanctions and isolation," the Kerr report said.

The report said gathering intelligence on "societal issues, personalities and elites" can be more difficult to accomplish than technical intelligence collection. However, "information on the stresses and strains of society may be equally, if not more, important."

Collection of such information, though, "does not fit with the reward system in the collection world and can be difficult to fully assess and integrate with other information."

Intelligence gathering on Iraq also "was the victim of inadequate funding and too intense competition between top priority targets," it said.

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Homeland Security again pushes upgrade to animal disease research facility

David Ruppe — Wed, 24 Aug 2005 00:00:00 -0400

The Homeland Security Department announced in a press release Monday that it plans to replace the center, which for 50 years has focused on diseases dangerous to livestock, with a new facility with increased capabilities at the same location near Long Island, N.Y.

The department told Congress in February that it would like to build a new, massive center for biological and agricultural defense called the "National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility," which could include the highest laboratory security level, Biosafety Level 4. It has requested $23 million for fiscal 2006 to begin design studies. If approved by Congress, the total project is projected by the department to cost $451 million through fiscal 2010.

The department's annual budget justification document delivered to Congress earlier this year did not say it was looking to replace the Plum Island center with the new facility. Rather, it also requested funding for operation of facilities and security improvements at Plum Island.

The department announced Monday that the new facility would "replace" the "important but aging" more than 50-year-old center. As a Biosafety Level 3 facility, Plum Island researches highly contagious foreign animal diseases, including foot-and-mouth disease.

The release says Plum Island needs to be replaced because it "is becoming increasingly more costly to maintain," lacks sufficient laboratory and test space to "support the increased levels of research and development needed to meet the growing concerns about accidental or intentional introduction of foreign animal diseases," and is "completely inadequate to address zoonotic diseases."

Zoonotic diseases are those that can be transmitted between animals and humans, such as anthrax, West Nile virus and spongiform encephalopathy, also known as "mad cow disease."

"There is no BSL-4 livestock-capable laboratory in the U.S. to work on high consequence zoonotic diseases in host livestock species," the congressional justification document says.

A presidential directive issued last year, HSPD-9, called for a plan to develop "safe, secure and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases," the Homeland Security press release notes.

Located about 1.5 miles off the northeastern tip of Long Island, Plum Island diagnoses and studies foreign animal diseases, and it is the only government facility in the United States that studies foot-and-mouth disease.

The executive branch has proposed increasing the biosafety level at Plum Island over the past decade, but has faced local protests and opposition from New York lawmakers. Opponents have argued that operating a Biosafety Level 4 facility at Plum Island could endanger the local population, which includes the occupants of multimillion-dollar homes in the nearby Hamptons, and that the facility could be subject to a terrorist attack.

Plum Island has had well-publicized security lapses in the past, and it has recently been upgrading its security capabilities.

The release Monday says the conceptual design study beginning next year would evaluate giving Plum Island additional Biosafety Level 3 agricultural facilities and "possibly Biosafety Level 4 for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases as called for in HSPD-9."

The study, scheduled for completion by the end of 2006, would alternatively consider maintaining the current scope of work at Plum Island and building additional, higher-security facilities elsewhere, it says.

"The options for a location, or locations, for the biocontainment facilities have not been identified at this time, but will be considered during the conceptual design study," the release says.

The money requested for the design study in fiscal 2006 was included in respective fiscal 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations bills approved by the Senate and House this year, which have not yet gone to conference.

As part of the plan, the department is considering including a threat assessment capability at the proposed facility, which could be cause for concern "from an arms control perspective," says Alan Pearson, director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation in Washington.

The congressional justification document this year says, "There is currently inadequate national capability to perform required biothreat characterization research in a highly secure environment."

"Modern, safe, secure biocontainment laboratories of sufficient capacity to work on high-consequence foreign animal diseases in livestock are a gap in our national strategy," it says.

"Recent natural incursions of SARS, West Nile, and Monkey Pox demonstrate the increasing threat posed by zoonotic agents," the document adds.

Pearson said that doing threat assessment work at a test and evaluation facility could reduce public transparency of test and evaluation activities and noted that a center at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Md., already is being built for threat assessment work.

"There might be some small amount of threat assessment that can't be done [at Fort Detrick] because it involves large animal studies, but that's not a lot," he said.

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Military vaccines trigger special treatment for 1,200

David Ruppe — Fri, 06 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400

The cases, corresponding with a massive Defense Department effort to vaccinate U.S. forces against anthrax and smallpox before and after the invasion of Iraq, included muscle and joint weakness and pain, chronic fatigue, intense migraines, cognitive problems, and severe diseases such as multiple sclerosis. Some of these have ended military careers.

More common and less serious side effects from the vaccines are said to include temporary headaches, fatigue, fever, nausea and dizziness.

In light of the large number people who received the vaccines, the number of serious cases treated by the Vaccine Health Care Centers, a network of four clinics at domestic U.S. military bases, is rare. Overall, the military says more than 1.3 million military and civilian personnel have received the anthrax vaccine, called Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed, since 1998, when it resumed the vaccinations after a hiatus over quality control problems. The military has also vaccinated hundreds of thousands of personnel, many who also received the anthrax treatment, for smallpox beginning in December 2002.

The Defense Department, on a Web site that provides information on the vaccine, maintains the anthrax vaccinations are "as safe as other vaccines" and necessary.

None of the personnel treated in fiscal 2004 "has suffered loss of life, limb or eyesight," according to a statement from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which houses the main Vaccine Healthcare Center in Washington.

Nevertheless, some cases have been quite severe, such as that of retired Air Force Reserve Lt. Col. Michael Gylock, who within nine days after receiving anthrax and smallpox vaccinations in March 2003 started showing symptoms and was eventually diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and some vision loss.

"I've been retired because of it. I'm not fit for military duty," he said. Gylock and other cases were referred to Global Security Newswire by an advocate of soldiers who believe they were harmed by the vaccine.

Questions have surfaced in recent years about the safety of the anthrax vaccine, and when massive numbers of personnel are vaccinated, even a small percentage of rare disorders can add up.

Walter Reed said that about 600 anthrax vaccine recipients in fiscal 2003 and 600 in fiscal 2004 received in-depth assessment or treatment by the centers' staff. In addition, officials have said the Vaccine Healthcare Centers during the two years conducted more than 250,000 telephone, e-mail or face-to-face communications with personnel or physicians to discuss reactions, however minor or major, or to provide guidance on how to avoid or treat complications.

Sufficient funding for the four Vaccine Healthcare Centers, created by Congress in 2001 is in question this year. The centers were not included last year in the Pentagon's fiscal 2005 budget and did not receive a specific congressional appropriation. A nonbinding resolution passed by the Senate urging full funding was stripped from a supplemental appropriations bill this week by leaders from both houses.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon, citing a determination that there is potential for a heightened risk of an anthrax threat to U.S. forces, announced Tuesday it would resume providing mass anthrax vaccinations to service members mainly in South Korea and across the Middle East and South Asia.

"Without the centers [there are] over 1,000 military personnel who would not have gotten the care they deserve, the best possible care we can provide," Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who had proposed specific funding for the centers, said in a Senate floor speech last month.

"If the department believes it is an emergency to resume that vaccine, how can we consider preserving the Vaccine Health Care Centers any less?" he said.

While the data on Vaccine Healthcare Center treatments give some indication of the numbers and types of rare illnesses that may result from anthrax or smallpox vaccinations, there is no definitive data on how many and which illnesses were caused by the military inoculations.

One reason is that the numbers of cases treated by the centers, and otherwise identified through its Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, do not necessarily account for all serious illnesses caused by a vaccine because military reporting on side effects is passive. In other words, the onus is on the soldiers to seek help from the centers and many are said to be unaware the clinics exist, are unwilling to inform superiors they may have a career-jeopardizing disorder, or have had trouble convincing authorities of the illness.

As little is understood about how vaccines cause serious illness, some doctors have appeared reluctant to conclude a vaccination may have caused a specific illness, experts have said.

"Because serious problems are rare, it is difficult for the average base physician to develop the expertise needed to provide the best treatment," Biden said in his speech.

In addition, as multiple military vaccines are often given around the same time, researchers have difficulty determining which one might have been the cause of a particular illness, experts have said.

Furthermore, just because a person had experienced adverse events after those vaccinations, does not necessarily mean the events were caused by the vaccinations, Walter Reed said in a statement.

"Cause-and-effect evaluations require consideration of at least six factors; timing is only one of those factors. Cause-and-effect evaluations are often difficult in individual cases," it said.

Air National Guard Technical Sgt. Rick Brown's case is illustrative of the challenge to understanding causality. A Philadelphia firefighter and formerly an avid bodybuilder and hockey player, Brown said that soon after receiving anthrax and smallpox vaccinations in March 2003 he experienced intense pain in muscles and joints and decreased mobility.

"My first indication was a mass on the side of my neck that was about the size of a grape and immediately my body started feeling really bad. I had open mucus membranes throughout my body, oozing out of my ears, my nose, my penis, my mouth," he said.

Brown said he was eventually diagnosed with degenerative arthritis, including joint and muscle aches, and may have had a heart attack. He was also twice ruled unfit for military work after 19 years of service.

"For a while, my muscles turned to jelly, my joints were just all screwed up," he said.

Brown said he learned of the Vaccine Healthcare Centers from an Internet search. Military physicians were initially unwilling to send him to a center and unwilling to consider that the anthrax vaccination might be causing his illnesses, he said.

"They said, 'We want to send you to a clinical psychiatrist. We want to heavily medicate you,'" he said.

In a case review delivered to Brown, the Vaccine Healthcare Center at Walter Reed said it had identified possible side effects from the anthrax vaccine. It noted, though, causality between the vaccination and such chronic illness has not been proven. The center and another organization are preparing to study that question.

"At the present time, it is impossible to prove or disprove a causal link between the vaccine and chronic problems but efforts are under way … to collect information regarding these problems and continue to define the range of the problem," the center said generically in its review of Brown's case.

Brown, who served for a year in Afghanistan until November 2002, "loves the military" and wishes he could resume service, said he might be forced out before he is eligible for retirement, which is in about six months. "Let's put this stuff on the shelf, because a lot of people are getting sick," he said.

Gylock said an informal Air Force medical board had recommended discharging him without benefits because the illness was not caused by military action. An appeal to a formal board reversed the decision. That board cited a Vaccine Healthcare Center conclusion that his symptoms may have been caused by the anthrax vaccine, he said.

The center, also said, though there is a medical community controversy over whether vaccines can cause multiple sclerosis and that, that "causality cannot be established."

The Vaccine Healthcare Center's "review of my records was probably the most beneficial thing that happened to me," he said.

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Anthrax vaccine treatment funding remains uncertain

David Ruppe — Mon, 25 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0400

Senate leaders negotiated away an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal 2005 that would have provided $6 million for four regional Vaccine Healthcare Centers in the United States that offer treatment and advice on rare but serious side effects from the vaccine.

The Senate instead included a nonbinding statement of support for full funding in the bill, which was approved Thursday.

The Army earlier this year said it would transfer $5.7 million to the centers from another account, but Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) in a speech Wednesday on the Senate floor expressed concern that the absence of confirmed funding could hurt personnel in other military services.

"The centers are in danger of losing part of their funding this fiscal year," he said when he introduced the amendment Wednesday.

"I am very concerned that the funding this year is being redirected because other services have not budgeted for the centers' work, despite the fact that 46 percent of their cases were related to Air Force, Navy, and Marines personnel," Biden added.

The main Vaccine Healthcare Center, located at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., was created in 2001. Three additional satellite centers were opened at U.S. bases last year, at the Naval Medical Center in Portsmouth, Va., the Womack Army Medical Center at Ft. Bragg, N.C., and the Air Force's Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas. Together they received $5 million for fiscal year 2004 and sought $5.7 million for this fiscal year, which began Oct. 1, 2004, and ends on Sept. 30.

Praised last year by two senior defense officials, the centers have not been included in the Army's long-term budget plans or in congressional appropriations bills. They have relied instead on funding transfers in recent years from other Army programs.

A statement released in January by the Walter Reed Army Medical Center said The U.S. Army Medical Command, through its North Atlantic Regional Medical Command, would "underwrite the $5.7 million operation" this fiscal year. Biden's amendment would have appropriated an additional $6 million to the centers by taking the money out of other defense-wide funding in the bill, for the " Global War on Terror Partners Fund," which provides economic assistance to some countries allied in counterterrorism efforts.

"Clearly, force protection in this time of war demands a good vaccination program. Equally clear, that program must include quality care for those who suffer adverse events in every service, not just the Army," he said.

Anthrax vaccinations were required for military personnel until last October, when a federal judge banned mandatory vaccinations, ruling the Food and Drug Administration had not properly reviewed the drug when it licensed it as safe and effective against inhalation anthrax. The judge reiterated last month that the vaccines could be administered voluntarily, though the military so far has not resumed inoculations.

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Army to fund vaccine treatment centers

David Ruppe — Thu, 13 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500

Full operation in fiscal 2005 of the Vaccine Healthcare Center, located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, had appeared in question following decisions last year by the Army not to budget for it and congressional leaders not to specifically fund the program.

Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., over the past year had raised concerns about the future of the program, which specializes in treating and investigating uncommon, severe side effects of anthrax, smallpox and other biological defense vaccines.

According to a statement from Walter Reed released to Global Security Newswire yesterday, however, "The U.S. Army Medical Command, through its North Atlantic Regional Medical Command, will underwrite the $5.7 million operation."

The Medical Command will do so, it said, "in anticipation of funding decisions for fiscal year 2006 and beyond."

Also, "a majority of that FY05 amount will be credited against the Global War on Terrorism," it said.

No indication was given about whether the program would be included in the Bush administration's fiscal 2006 budget, which is expected to be presented to Congress later this winter.

"As a matter of policy, we don't release the dollar figures for budgets until those dollars have been appropriated - that is, until Congress has passed the budget," according to the statement.

Vaccine Healthcare Center officials have applied to include their program in the Army's next long-term budget plan beginning in fiscal 2006.

The center hopes to open, beginning in fiscal 2007, satellite treatment centers in Europe, Hawaii, on the West Coast, and in the northern Midwest - in addition to three already operating in the continental United States.

However, present funding levels are not sufficient to meet the center's current workload, center officials have said.

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Funding for Defense vaccine treatment centers in question again

David Ruppe — Tue, 04 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500

The Bush administration drew congressional criticism last year from Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., for not including in its fiscal 2005 budget $5.7 million needed for operating the Vaccine Healthcare Center, located at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, and three regional centers in the United States.

Defense Department officials in the fall said the network nevertheless would be funded, according to Bingaman.

"Unfortunately, we now understand that DoD may be considering the VHC Network to be an 'unfunded requirement,' which makes continuation of the program rather precarious," Bingaman wrote in the letter, which he has shared with colleagues but not yet sent to Rumsfeld. "We are asking you to address this matter immediately to ensure continuation of this irreplaceable and valuable asset."

Congress did not specifically fund the network, which began operation in 2001, in fiscal 2004. The Army Medical Department's North Atlantic Regional Medical Command at Walter Reed picked up the tab with money from its own budget. An Army spokeswoman told Global Security Newswire last month that that would be the case again.

"The Vaccine Healthcare Center is supported in FY05 by the Army Medical [Command]'s North Atlantic Regional Medical Command," wrote Medical Command spokeswoman Lyn Kukral.

"The problem is that they [the regional command] are not thrilled to be doing it and certainly don't have to fund it," said a congressional staffer who asked not to be identified.

"The Army does not see why it must fund the VHC's when other departments have their personnel use the services," the staffer added.

Bingaman's letter suggested Pentagon officials are backing away from a promise to legislators last fall. An amendment was proposed in the Senate to specifically authorize money for the network in fiscal 2005.

That provision was abandoned, however, after Defense Department officials assured senators that the network would still be funded, Bingaman said in his letter.

"When an amendment was proposed in the Senate to insert a line-item for VHCs, your department came to us and assured us it was unnecessary and stated DoD appropriations already contained $5 million to support VHC operations," he wrote.

A congressional report accompanying the bill praised the centers, recommended Rumsfeld consider expanding the network, and "strongly encourage[d]" the military services to continue funding the programs.

"This network has been recognized as valuable nonredundant effort that has supported improved care of vaccine related rare adverse events, programs to improve the quality of immunization healthcare, and an infrastructure that supports new vaccine insertion like the smallpox program," Bingaman wrote.

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New missile defense director vows more secrecy

David Ruppe — Wed, 27 Oct 2004 00:00:00 -0400

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency in the future will be more secretive about aspects of its national missile defense program as it resumes major flight testing after a two-year hiatus, its new director said in a presentation in Washington Tuesday.

"As we proceed in the future, you'll see more of the program becoming classified," said Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, who became agency director in July following the retirement of Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish.

Obering said officials have an obligation to inform U.S. taxpayers about their investment in the multibillion-dollar system, but said the agency seeks to avoid tipping off potential enemies about weaknesses in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

"Aspects that anyone can glean a vulnerability or a definite determination of capability of the system [are] something that we want to protect," he said.

President Bush has directed the deployment of some components of the system, including as many as six interceptor missiles, by the end of the year, and up to 20 missiles total are scheduled for deployment by 2006.

Critics have argued the agency is already too secretive, concealing from Congress and the public information regarding developmental progress, future deployment plans and costs, and testing to determine whether the system can or will ever work.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., has criticized the administration's decision to cancel nine scheduled flight tests shortly after Bush's 2002 deployment decision.

"This was an unwise move that eliminated the very tests that must be conducted to show whether the system is effective," according to a statement on his Web site.

"The system has also not been tested against realistic decoy balloons that any potential enemy might be expected to deploy. Fielding a system regardless of whether it is effective will not contribute much to the security of our country, and risks wasting billions of dollars on something that doesn't work," it says.

In pursuit of greater oversight, Congress this month passed legislation requiring an operationally realistic test of the system by next October as well as the establishment of cost, schedule, and performance baselines for each two-year developmental phase of the system.

Obering said the agency has "done the stand-down now for two years" of flight testing the system's available components, but said he is planning "at least three flight tests per year over the next several years" and that those tests would be "increasingly challenging."

The first such test, after multiple delays this year, is scheduled for early December, he said.

Obering's presentation, arranged by the nonprofit Marshall Institute, addressed a number of criticisms, including that missile defense is being deployed for political reasons, that it will not be effective against a North Korean threat, and that "we're not going to have a public debate over whether the system works."

He denied any political pressure to deploy the system, noting the decision to deploy components of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense system by the end of 2004 was made by Bush in December 2002.

"I will stand here and tell you this, I have not received one phone call, one message, one pressure from anybody to deploy this system before any time [or] date. … It has always been an event driven program," he said.

Obering said the agency was confident, based on testing so far and on threat expectations, that the components of the system would provide an effective defense against a near-term North Korean long-range missile launch.

"North Korea is a closed society -- but [with what] we can ascertain, what we believe -- we feel confident that this system will provide us more than just a rudimentary capability against that threat," he said.

Obering said he could not say how much the national missile defense system might cost over its lifetime because the government has chosen not to decide on a fixed architecture indicating what it might look like.

Addressing the criticism that the agency has been unwilling to have a public debate over that supposed capability, Obering said he anticipates greater restrictions on information in the future.

He said, for instance, that the agency would not specify the flight test schedule and "would not go into details" on the types of targets and countermeasures the system would face in testing.

"We're not trying to hide things with respect to the American public. What we're trying to say is we have to take a really hard look at this now in terms of an operational capability in the future, of what we need to protect in terms of critical information," he said.

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Army provides no funds for vaccine care centers

David Ruppe — Tue, 18 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400

Exactly why is not clear. The Army offered no direct explanation, instead it forwarded requests for information to the spokesman for the Vaccine Healthcare Centers (VHC) Network. Army Col. Renata Engler, who runs the network, cited Army budget constraints and the process of Army budgeting.

Critics of the Defense Department's vaccine policies have questioned whether there is a strong commitment in the Army and the Bush administration to the network, which by the nature of its work generates evidence of illnesses potentially caused by already-controversial vaccines.

By cutting the funding, "the administration is sending the wrong message to the brave men and women who risk their lives to serve our country by telling them their health is not a priority. In my view it is of the highest priority and I will work to ensure that the program is fully funded," said Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., in a statement last week.

Bingaman plans to introduce an amendment to the fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill, which is on the Senate floor this week, to authorize $10 million for the centers, and "such sums as would be necessary for each fiscal year thereafter."

Congress in 2000 directed the creation of the network, which now operates four sites to monitor and treat severe reactions to vaccines given by the military.

Since the headquarters center opened in 2001 at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, the network has evaluated more than 1,000 patients - military personnel, contractors and civilians - and counseled far more personnel - 139,000 in fiscal 2003 alone - by telephone and e-mail, according to Engler.

In addition, the centers' activities have included: monitoring and researching possible negative effects of vaccines, developing and distributing standards for improving vaccination safety, and providing training, education and guidance about vaccinations to military health care providers.

Senior defense health officials publicly praised them this year. "Our Vaccine Healthcare Centers Network is a network of specialty clinics to provide the best possible care in rare situations where serious adverse events follow vaccination," William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said in March 30 congressional testimony.

In February, Army Surgeon General Lt. Gen. James Peake issued a memorandum repeatedly urging clinicians to utilize the network's resources, while also noting the much-publicized death of a soldier last year shortly after receiving five vaccinations.

While already in operation, the other three centers, at the Naval Medical Center in Portsmouth, Va., Womack Army Medical Center at Ft. Bragg, N.C., and the Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, were expected to have for ribbon cuttings this year.

Funding for the network, though, did not appear in the Army's fiscal 2005 budget request. Engler said she would need a minimum $5.7 million to keep the centers going "with no frills" through the fiscal year.

"But as of fiscal year 2005, we're an unfunded requirement. As of 1 October, our budget is zero," she said.

Suggestions have been made to close down some of the four centers, each of which has 12 clinical staff members, but the centers are overwhelmed, Engler said.

In addition to treatment, each is "trying to do all of this massive response [remote consultation] work," she said.

A total of nine centers based at major vaccination centers worldwide were originally envisioned, she said, but added, "We're really in tight budget times."

Critics of the military's vaccine program suspect an effort to silence the centers.

The Bush administration has "clearly decided that the way to reduce any reporting of anthrax vaccine adverse reactions - and the cost of paying for them - is to eliminate the only clinic in the United States doing valid reporting of the illnesses that result from the vaccine," retired U.S. Air Force pilot and Gulf War veteran Lt. Col. John Richardson wrote in an e-mail.

The Pentagon has been under pressure to stop requiring anthrax vaccinations. Four service members and two civilians are anonymously suing the Defense Department and the Food and Drug Administration over the inoculation's safety, arguing that military personnel should be allowed to refuse the vaccine.

Bingaman this year asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to reconsider the policy in light of "the potential for serious health consequences for our troops" and an apparent absence of Iraqi biological warfare capabilities. No change has been made.

The network lately has been researching several cases of blistering skin rashes and oral ulcers, identified as the rare disease "pemphigus vulgarus," occurring after anthrax vaccinations. It also is aiding investigations of at least 71 cases of myopericarditis occurring following smallpox vaccinations.

Congress created the network following revelations in the late 1990s that the anthrax vaccine was causing a significant number of serious illnesses among military personnel, said Meryl Nass, another prominent military vaccine critic and physician who regularly treats soldiers with suspected vaccination complications.

"Congress pointed out that people, who were becoming ill following vaccinations, needed to be treated appropriately within the military, not just discharged because of their medical disability," she said.

By doing so, the centers inevitably expose vaccine hazards officials may not want to see publicized, she asserted.

To some vaccination proponents, the centers are basically "an invitation to leak," she said.

Engler, who is seeking to put network funding into the Army's next long-term budget plan, the Program Objective Memorandum, offered a different explanation for the network's uncertainty: a general funding shortage.

"We've briefed over the last few months numerous venues, and everyone says you're doing a good job, we need you. … People continue to apologize to us and say we know you're a good thing, we just don't know how to pay for you," she said.

Engler said it is not uncommon for new programs not included in the Army's Project Objective Memorandum to have to compete with other programs for resources.

Since the network's conception, long-term funding has never been certain. The program in its first year was funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In fiscal 2002 and 2003, Congress appropriated money for it directly. During this fiscal year, the Army's North Atlantic Regional Medical Command is sharing funds.

The fact that the Army did not include the program in its previous long-term budget plan [which is the fiscal 2004-2009 POM] could indicate just how much or little it values the network, said defense spending expert Steve Kosiak, budget director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

"To say it's not in the POM, is to say it's not enough of a priority for you," he said.

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Missile defense system called far from ready

David Ruppe — Thu, 08 Jan 2004 00:00:00 -0500

In a phone interview with Global Security Newswire last month, Rep. John Spratt, D-S.C., said several crucial elements of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would not be fielded on time because they have not achieved sufficient technological development.

"We don't have the essential components yet in hand of a ground-based system," he said.

In December 2002 Bush directed the military to deploy an initial missile defense capability by October 2004, which would include six missile interceptors in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. While it appears that the interceptors are on track to be fielded by the deadline, the Missile Defense Agency has indicated that other system components will not be ready and that alternatives will be used.

"They'll deploy something in Alaska and claim it's a protective system, but where's the X-band radar? Where are those crucial systems for detection, tracking, and discrimination" of enemy missiles and warheads, Spratt asked.

"You can put something out there and you can claim we can do it with [existing missile detection sensors] and you can claim its adequate for the threat that we're facing, but it's a long way from what everybody thought was necessary for a minimal system," he said.

Spratt said that U.S. efforts to develop new space-based infrared systems (SBIRS) for target detecting and tracking have "got lots of problems to work out."

"We aren't there yet, I don't think, with the adequacy of detection and the tracking that we need," he said.

For the scheduled initial operations, the system is expected to use Defense Support Program satellites already operating for early warning missions. The agency plans to put the first two Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems, formerly known as SBIRS-Low, into space around 2007 to participate in testing.

The difference between the Defense Support Program satellites and STSS satellites is "orders of magnitude," said John Pike of Globalsecurity.org.

Defense Support Program satellites "basically lose the target after burnout," he said.

Spratt also said he was aware of "real problems" with a missile interceptor booster rocket under development by Lockheed Martin to replace a temporary booster that has been used in testing. Two boosters are being developed, the other by Orbital Sciences.

The Orbital booster, expected to be used in the initial fielding, is scheduled for its first integrated flight test early this year, while the Lockheed booster is scheduled for that testing in fiscal 2005, Aerospace Daily reported Thursday.

Spratt also expressed concern that added thrust provided by the new boosters might challenge the mechanism that joins the booster to the interceptor's kill vehicle.

Spratt called the existing Cobra Dane radar that will be used for closely tracking enemy warheads in space a "poor substitute" for the X-band radar under development, adding, "it faces the wrong way."

A General Accounting Office report in September (a href=http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03441.pdf>GAO-03-441) said the Cobra Dane radar, operating for other missions, had not been tested in a "relevant flight environment" and that there are no plans for using it in an integrated flight test through fiscal 2007.

The Missile Defense Agency also faces challenges from its decision to base the X-Band radar at sea, on a platform possibly stationed on the North Pacific, according to Spratt.

GAO said the radar is scheduled for completion in 2005 but lacks realistic testing in a sea-based environment. It said severe wind and sea conditions "may affect the radar's functionality" and said the radar might be so tested by October 2006.

"I think we're a long way from having a truly up-and-ready ballistic missile defense system," Spratt said.

Spratt said development of the sea-based boost-phase missile system the administration also plans to field in 2005 is in its early stages and could prove an extremely difficult task.

A fundamental challenge to the concept, he said, is posed by the possibility of an enemy firing an ICBM away from the sea-based interceptor. For example, North Korea could choose to launch a missile over China instead of the Sea of Japan.

"A boost-phase system requires that you be able to locate your missile intercept system very close to its intended target. However, if this system is coming out of China and much of its trajectory is coming over land, a boost-phase system simply cannot get there in time," he said.

Spratt dismissed efforts to develop a space-based interception capability, saying an adversary could disable it too easily.

"The problem you've got for space-based systems is any country that can build a ballistic missile can build an [antisatellite system]," he said.

Despite Spratt's concerns, he praised Missile Defense Agency Director Gen. Ronald Kadish for managing the pressures of the job.

"Kadish has got a tough job and I respect the job he's done of trying to keep it on a level track," he said.

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Army claims perfect missile interception record in Iraq war

David Ruppe — Tue, 14 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0400

Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano, who heads the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, told reporters for the first time last week that the Army's analysis showed that its Patriot missile interceptors were successful against all nine Iraqi missiles they engaged.

"The data shows that it hit them nine for nine. That has not yet been released," he said.

"In almost all cases, there is scientific data that shows [the intercepts]. You can almost see the breakup" of the Iraqi missiles, he said.

Cosumano said, however, that a public briefing on the assessment and its results would not yet be made, saying the decision on when that would occur has been turned over to the U.S. Central Command, which separately is investigating three friendly fire incidents involving Patriot batteries during the conflict.

One Army official told Global Security Newswire that the assessment's release could be expected in "weeks rather than days."

Since the war, various Army officials have said the Patriot perfectly defended U.S. forces in the region because it successfully "engaged" nine Iraqi missiles, meaning it attacked the Iraqi missiles and none of the target missiles caused any damage.

Senior officials including Cosumano, however, also cautioned that conclusions about the Patriot's record of actually intercepting Iraq missiles mid-air would need to wait till the release of an after-action assessment of radar and other information conducted by the Army and the U.S. Central Command.

Sparking controversy following the 1991 Gulf War, senior U.S. officials cited high Patriot success rates during that war, but later analyses suggested that far fewer Patriots actually intercepted their targets or killed the warheads.

"We took the lessons learned from Desert Storm [and] put the data recording capabilities in those weapons systems," said Brig. Gen. John Urias, deputy commanding general for acquisition of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

Cosumano reiterated previous statements that not all of the Patriot recorders were operating during the nine intercepts, but said other data including from radar on Navy Aegis ships had been used in the assessment.

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Law could allow military to keep drug information from personnel

David Ruppe — Fri, 05 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400

The provision, contained in the House version of the Project Bioshield Act of 2003, would allow officials to respond to some emergencies by administering drugs to the nation that have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

The law would require officials to inform potential drug recipients of the drug's potential health risks and to get the recipients' consent to administer the drug, but it would also permit the president and other senior officials to waive these requirements when delivering the drugs to U.S. military personnel.

Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn., recently criticized that provision.

"I am concerned that certain provisions of Section 4 of the bill will unfairly treat the men and women of our armed services," he said in a July dialogue with House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Billy Tauzin, R-La.

Existing federal law, that Shays helped draft following the 1991 Gulf War, already permits the president to waive the consent requirement for military personnel if obtaining consent is infeasible, contrary to the best interests of the individual, or not in the interests of national security. In addition, the law requires that potential recipients must be told that they have the right to refuse the drug, although they might be discharged from the military or jailed if they do so. It further requires that all recipients be first informed of the product's unapproved status and of its potential side effects.

Under the proposed changes, the president would continue to be able to waive the consent requirement, but he would also be able to waive the requirement to notify potential recipients that they may refuse the drug. Furthermore, the Health and Human Services secretary could authorize delaying the notification of recipients of their potential health risks. The proposed law says the information would be provided to the drug recipient, or next-of-kin in case of a death, no later than 30 days after the individual received the drug.

Steve Robinson of the National Gulf War Resource Center, a veterans group, opposes the new language.

The military will say it's "for the cause of good order and discipline, because if one person said 'no,' a thousand could. But we're supposed to be the kind of society that evolves and I think our soldiers are smart enough to at least be told of the risks and, in certain cases for certain drugs, have a choice," he said.

Tauzin said the disputed provision was intended only to eliminate an individual's right to refuse a drug, not to deny drug recipients information on potential health risks, except in "extraordinary circumstances."

Tauzin said his committee reviewed the language and found it could be confusing.

"We intend the waiver authority in this bill to be used only in the very extraordinary circumstances that we describe in the bill," he said.

Tauzin said he would work with Shays "to make sure that the final version of this bill from the conference that we will have with the Senate, I am sure, provides that our military are informed of the drugs that are given before these drugs are administered."

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Vaccinations probably did not cause pneumonia cases, Army official says

David Ruppe — Tue, 19 Aug 2003 00:00:00 -0400

Anthrax vaccinations are not considered to be probable causes of 18 serious pneumonia cases involving U.S. Army personnel that were stationed in Southwest Asia, a senior Army medical official said Monday.

"At this point in the review, vaccinations are considered unlikely to be a factor in this series of cases," Col. John Grabenstein, deputy director of the Army's Military Vaccine Agency, said in an e-mailed statement responding to questions from Global Security Newswire.

Army reports say that since March 1, about 100 military personnel in the region have shown pneumonia-like symptoms, and 18-more than half in Iraq-have become seriously ill, requiring ventilator support. Two have died.

Epidemiological consultation teams dispatched by the Army surgeon general to the region and to Germany are investigating the possible causes or contributing factors to the illnesses, including whether the anthrax or smallpox vaccines played a role.

Grabenstein stated, though, that the anthrax vaccine was probably not to blame for several reasons, including: the cases are not clustered in time around vaccinations, the clusters of pneumonia cases have not occurred among other vaccinated people elsewhere, and worldwide hospitalization data shows that pneumonia occurs no more often in anthrax-vaccinated people than in unvaccinated people.

"It's important to realize," he added, "that in over 200 years of giving vaccinations, no vaccine has ever been shown to cause pneumonia. While unusual cases need to be evaluated on their own merits, no vaccination has been scientifically linked to pneumonia in a cause-and-effect way."

Other Causes Ruled Unlikely

A Defense Department spokesman earlier this month said no signs have been found that biological or chemical weapons, including anthrax and smallpox agents, played a role in the illnesses.

In a statement Monday, the Office of the Army Surgeon General also ruled out several other potential causes for the illnesses and said the investigation ultimately may turn up no single cause for the 18 pneumonia cases that are currently under investigation.

"Currently, we have identified no infectious agent common to all of the cases. Additionally, there is no evidence that any of the 18 serious pneumonia cases under review have been caused by exposure to chemical or biological weapons, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or environmental toxins," it said.

The office also said the number of pneumonia cases, including fatalities, is in line with previous annual numbers for Army personnel.

Independent Investigation Sought

Last week, United Press International reported an allegation lodged by Moses Lacy, father of Army Spc. Rachael Lacy, who reportedly died after she displayed symptoms of pneumonia. "The common denominator (in the mysterious deaths) is smallpox and anthrax vaccinations," Moses Lacy said. "The government is covering this up and it is a doggone shame," he said.

Army officials said Rachael Lacy's case is not included in the regional investigation because she was not in Iraq or Southwest Asia.

The family of one of the two soldiers whose deaths are included in the investigation recently wrote Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld urging him to transfer the investigation's direction to the civilian Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention currently are "collaborating" with the epidemiological teams in their investigations, according to the Office of the Army Surgeon General's statement.

The letter, from the family of Army Spc. Josh Neusche, questioned whether information on the pneumonia cases was being withheld.

"We as a family are concerned that we are not being told the truth," the letter says.

The family requested access to medical and vaccine records, as well as numerous other pieces of information.

The parents of another soldier, Spc. Zeferino Colunga, who died in Germany after a reported diagnosis of leukemia, wrote an almost identical letter.

In a statement, Army officials said Colunga's "death was unrelated to the recent cases of pneumonia in Southwest Asia."

Vaccine Possibly Linked to Two Previous Cases

A study of the effects of the anthrax vaccine used on U.S. forces published in February 2002 by a civilian committee of experts did find that the anthrax vaccine might have caused two earlier pneumonia cases.

That study used data from 602 reports of "adverse events" suspected of being triggered by the vaccine given to nearly 400,000 military personnel. The vaccine may have caused six medically serious events, including the pneumonia cases, it said.

The analysis concluded, though, that the number of serious events was not large or unusual.

"At this time, ongoing evaluation of [adverse events] reports does not suggest a high frequency or unusual pattern of serious or other medically important [adverse events]," the study said.

In yesterday's statement, the Office of the Army Surgeon General, also suggested that the numbers of pneumonia cases and resulting fatalities in the region are not out of line with historical data.

"Army-wide, pneumonia serious enough to warrant hospitalization occurs in about 400 to 500 soldiers per year. Based on this historical data, the approximately 100 total cases of pneumonia in CENTCOM [the Central Command, which operates in Southwest Asia] since March 1 do not exceed expectations.

"Death from pneumonia in a young, otherwise healthy population is rare, but it does occur: from 1998 through 2002, 17 soldiers died from pneumonia or from complications of pneumonia," it said.

The Army would not provide statistical information, including data showing whether any of the soldiers who developed pneumonia had recently been given smallpox or anthrax vaccinations, saying such data was still under review.

The epidemiological teams "are currently validating the vaccination records; the long period between vaccination and admission is one of the factors that make vaccination unlikely to be a cause," said Lyn Kukral, a spokeswoman for the surgeon general and the Army Medical Command.

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Energy Department might not release disbanded committee’s report

David Ruppe — Wed, 13 Aug 2003 00:00:00 -0400

Weeks after the Energy Department's nuclear weapons agency dismissed its independent expert advisory committee, the agency is now evaluating whether to release the principal report by that committee, officials said this week.

"The options are you'll either get the whole report or a sanitized version, or the report will be withheld as 'Official Use Only,'" said an Energy Department official who asked not to be identified.

The National Nuclear Security Administration's 15-member advisory committee finished a report on the agency's activities this past spring. The Federal Advisory Committee Act requires that reports by such committees be made public.

NNSA officials have refused to release it so far, however, saying it is being scrutinized by the administration's general counsel's office.

"Apparently they're giving it to someone who's looking over every word. They've brought a specialist in … a special lawyer with an extra large magnifying glass," the official said.

NNSA's defense programs office has recommended that the 35-page document be withheld on grounds that information contained in it is "dated" and "sensitive," the official said.

The freezing of the report and NNSA's recently reported decision to dissolve the committee in late June have drawn criticism from Representative Edward Markey, D-Mass.

U.S. law requires NNSA to "release copies of any reports, where possible, and send such copies to the Library of Congress," he said in a July 29 statement.

"When [the committee members] submitted the report, they were originally told it would be publicly released. Then it was immediately stamped 'For Official Use Only.' Now, some year and a half later, [NNSA is] finally deciding to do something about it and it's undergoing a review from the general counsel's office," said Markey spokesman Benn Tannenbaum.

Department Seeks to "Close Itself Off"

Markey, in a July 29 letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, inquired why the report had not been released, why quarterly meetings of the committee ended in May 2002 and why the committee was dismissed in June through e-mail rather than through notification in the Federal Register as required by advisory committee act.

"The Advisory Committee was created under the auspices of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which means that Congress and the public must be kept informed about the activities-including disbanding-of the committee," he wrote.

Markey added that the Energy Department has endorsed legislation passed by the House this year that would exempt it from the FACA requirements.

That, coupled with the dismissal of the committee, he wrote, "suggest that the Department of Energy is seeking to close itself off from any independent outside expert advice regarding its nuclear weapons programs."

NNSA spokesman Bryan Wilkes said NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks would continue to receive advice from a three-member group called the Nuclear Weapons Council, which consists of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the undersecretary of energy for nuclear security.

"I am uncomfortable with this situation, as the NWC is composed entirely of government officials, and therefore is not really suited to perform the functions of a federal advisory committee," Markey wrote.

He described the committee, appointed by former NNSA Administrator John Gordon, as "the one forum for honest, unbiased external review of its nuclear policies."

Controversial Subjects

The committee's charter required it to evaluate and make recommendations on NNSA activities, including assessments from a policy, performance and scientific perspective of programs, projects and facilities.

Committee members contacted said they did not recall anything particularly controversial about the report.

"I don't think we were exactly trying to burn the house down or anything. I think we were trying to work within the system and be constructive. So I don't think there is anything terribly earthshaking in the report," said Ellen Williams, a University of Maryland physics professor.

The committee did, however, review two initiatives the Bush administration is advocating this year that have been politically controversial: reducing the time needed to prepare for a nuclear test and the Advanced Concepts Initiative, which could include research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons for attacking bunkers and on warheads for destroying deeply buried chemical and biological weapons.

Committee member and University of California at Berkeley professor Raymond Jeanloz said the report, the final version of which he has not seen, might challenge some assumptions the administration has used to argue for those initiatives.

He said, for instance, while administration officials have urged reducing legal restrictions on research and development ostensibly to enable nuclear weapons designers to exercise their skills, the committee found that the initiative mainly involved using old designs.

"Either they're really going to start working on advanced concepts that are really new designs, in which case it seems like they are pushing toward resumption of nuclear testing if we ever put those designs into stockpile. Or, alternatively, this whole story about how we need advanced concepts to exercise the creativity of our designers is really a sham," he said.

Jeanloz said further that the preparation time for resuming nuclear tests was found to be not a question of physical readiness, but rather of diagnosing a suspected problem and developing a test to deal with it.

The committee was told by the national nuclear laboratories that "the nation would be able to perform a test in 3 to 6 months" if the goal was simply to produce an explosion, he said.

"From the labs' point of view, until they know why they would have to have a test to address some hypothetical technical problem, they don't know how long it would take them. So this whole business of a three-year, or a one-and-a-half year, or a half-year delay before they can test is incredibly artificial," he said.

Jeanloz and other committee members said they have not yet concluded that the NNSA's delay indicates an attempt to suppress the results of the report.

"I don't think NNSA is trying to bury things right now. I think they're confused, and in a state of confusion, they can end up doing what I think would hurt them in the long run, which is not to release this whole thing," Jeanloz said.

"At this point, one can say either they are trying to do something illegal or they are just being slow and not being very responsive because that's their nature. I just don't know," said Sidney Drell, a professor of theoretical physics at Stanford University.

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Army describes Patriot missile friendly fire problems

David Ruppe — Tue, 29 Jul 2003 00:00:00 -0400

Addressing two of the Patriot incidents, the briefing document-a PowerPoint presentation of "insights" drawn from fratricide incidents during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom produced by the Army Center for Lessons Learned-says positive electronic means of identifying airborne objects have been demonstrated to have "low reliability."

Jammed communications, aircraft transponders that cannot communicate with air-defense crews and some "atrophied" air-defense skills are identified as problems by the briefing, which urges using "procedural methods" of identification.

"Positive" methods of identification generally use electronic means, including radar, friend-or-foe identification transponders, computers and communications equipment, while "procedural" methods rely on tactics, techniques and procedures such as predesignating safe areas for friendly aircraft.

The briefing also urges strict adherence to procedures for identifying and targeting suspected enemy activity, as well as having "robust communications" and standardized battlefield identification systems.

The document further recommends the systems be operated manually and not put on automatic.

"Every effort must be made to avoid autonomous fire units," it said.

The low reliability of the Patriot's identification capability already was known, according to the briefing.

"Past exercises and tests run in SWA [Southwest Asia] indicate the percentage of aircraft that [are positively identified] remains too low. There are too many points of failure," it says.

Philip Coyle, the former Defense Department director of operational test and evaluation, said joint-service testing as far back as the early 1990s identified communications problems associated with air-defense systems when attempting to identify a friend or foe.

"This clearly was not a priority in the development of this equipment and should have been," he said.

The Patriot system currently is the Army's only operational ground-based theater air-defense system.

Designed originally for defense against enemy aircraft, the Pentagon has invested $3 billion since the 1991 Persian Gulf War to improve the Patriot's ability to track and destroy ballistic missiles, according to a recent congressional study.

The briefing document was prepared by the Army center following Operation Iraqi Freedom to help quickly disseminate lessons learned from various friendly fire incidents.

It does not say explicitly what the causes were for the three incidents, which led to the deaths of two airmen. The Army and the U.S. Central Command have been conducting investigations, and so far no reports have been released.

During the conflict, two coalition aircraft were believed shot down by the Patriot-a British Tornado fighter aircraft on March 24, killing two pilots, and a U.S. Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter on April 2, killing the pilot.

The Tornado reportedly failed to re-enter Kuwaiti airspace from Iraq in a predetermined zone cleared for friendly aircraft and reportedly carried an identification beacon that could not communicate with the air-defense system.

The third incident involved a U.S. F-16 which was targeted by a Patriot system left by its crew to operate automatically so they could take cover, and the radar mistakenly identified the aircraft as a foe.

Many of the briefing's recommendations identify problems not necessarily specific to the Patriot, but more generally to difficulties created by the U.S. military's increasing emphasis on consolidating multiple pieces of surveillance data to provide a more complete picture of the airspace, said Coyle.

"Basically, the problems stem from a lack of interoperability and from fusing together data from many different sensors in a complex battle space. It's a tough problem requiring interoperable equipment and sophisticated computer routines that can sort through what's happening," he said.

In an official report in 1995, Coyle wrote that problems in then-recent tests stemmed in part from different services and weapons systems using various message formats, standards, terminology and algorithms for correlating target-tracking information.

The briefing document says the previous tests and exercises showed identification transponders on aircraft became jammed because they were overloaded by electronic requests for their signal.

"Communications continue to be a choke point, and not all elements on the battlefield have continuous access to the datalink air picture," the briefing says.

The briefing says better capabilities are needed to allow air-defense controllers to directly communicate with aircraft.

"More emphasis must be placed on designing the theater voice and data communication architecture," it says.

The briefing also cites a weakness with Patriot operators.

"Over the past 12 years, Patriot Tactical Control Officers have been trained to focus primarily on TBMs [theater ballistic missiles], and some skills necessary to maintain situational awareness have atrophied. Maintaining friendly and enemy SA [situational awareness] for all air tracks is critical," it says.

The Army is reportedly stepping up development of a new identification system called Blue Force Tracking, as a result of the war, Federal Computer Week reported recently.

The Senate Armed Services Committee in a report earlier this year expressed concern that "longstanding" combat identification and friendly force tracking needs have not been pursued "in the most expeditious manner."

"Recent military operations have further demonstrated the high risk of fratricide on the modern battlefield and re-emphasized the need for comprehensive, interoperable combat identification and blue force tracking architectures," it said.

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Pentagon report outlines chemical, biological defense needs

David Ruppe — Mon, 02 Jun 2003 00:00:00 -0400

The various needs-and the solutions planned to address them-were outlined in the annual report of the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program provided to Congress in April and released to the public last month.

To develop improved chemical and biological defense technologies, the Pentagon this year requested more than $1.1 billion to research, develop and acquire chemical and biological defenses in fiscal 2004, up $35 million from the previous year's request.

At a March congressional hearing, the senior Pentagon official overseeing the effort said U.S. forces are becoming better prepared for operating in chemical and biological warfare environments, but conceded that there are shortcomings.

"I believe that the forward-deployed troops are the best protected that they can be," said Dale Klein, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense.

Nevertheless, "we wish we had better standoff detectors, we wish we had better antibiotics, we wish … we knew what was coming so that we could detect to prevent rather than detect to treat," he said.

Michael Powers, a senior fellow at the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute here who recently completed a review of U.S. biological defense activities, similarly said there are two particular weaknesses in U.S. biological defense capabilities in particular, both on the prevention side: detection and vaccine availability.

The detection weakness is of particular concern because the military's approach to chemical and biological defense focuses on preventing contamination. Post-exposure treatment is a less preferable option, as it would inevitably require removing soldiers from the battlefield.

"Their emphasis is really on preventing exposure rather than preventing disease," he said.

Detection Capabilities

The report specifically says there is a need for battlefield chemical and biological detection systems that are able to detect and identify in real time all known chemical and biological agents.

"Current technologies require a high level of logistical support and lack discrimination in biological standoff detection," it said. "Real-time detection of biological agents is currently unavailable and is unlikely in the near- to mid-term, though investment efforts are reducing detection times."

Detection devices are needed for a range of entities, from ships to vehicles to soldiers, according to the report.

Soldier Protection Systems

Insufficient detection systems, Powers said, hinder soldier contamination avoidance efforts because soldiers may not have enough time to don their protective equipment.

"What you want to do is provide ample warning that an agent could be moving through your area so you could don your gas mask," he said.

The recent Pentagon report says efforts are underway to develop protective clothing that is longer lasting and less burdensome to the soldier in terms of weight and heat.

"Individual protection equipment must also provide protection against emerging threats, such as novel agents or toxic chemicals," it says, suggesting that the challenge will be difficult and complex. "Integral respiratory protection requires tradeoffs between physiological performance parameters such as pulmonary function, field of regard, speech intelligibility and anthropometric sizing against constraints of cost, size/weight, protection time and interfacing with other equipment."

A breakthrough could be pending, according to the report, as a new mask now in the final stages of testing is expected to offer increased protection, improved comfort and usability.

Funding also is directed toward technologies to reduce the weight, volume, cost and deployability of chemical- and biological-safe shelters and to integrate skin and respiratory protection systems into major weapons systems.

That, too, can be a challenge, as protection is sought for incorporation into major land, sea, and air weapons systems - for instance, within the Army's Comanche, Crusader, Bradley, Breacher, Heavy Assault Bridge, Future Scout and Cavalry systems.

Decontamination Systems

More efficient, less destructive decontamination systems also are needed, the report says.

"Existing systems are effective against a wide variety of threat agents, yet are slow and labor intensive and present logistical, environmental, material and safety burdens," it says.

According to the report, existing systems are inadequate for decontaminating electronic equipment or for a large area, such as a port or airfield. The military is searching for decontaminants that are not water-based or corrosive, can be used on equipment to neutralize a wide range of agents, pose no "unacceptable" health hazards and require reduced manpower and logistics to implement.

Medical Defense

Another major biological defense weakness, said Powers, is the availability of vaccines for the many possible biological weapons threats.

The nature of the science and technology, he said, forces the Defense Department to develop specific vaccines for a broad array of potential threat agents, often after a lengthy testing processes for safety.

The military currently lacks Food and Drug Administration-licensed vaccines for a number of biological weapons threats. Work is underway to develop and license vaccines for Q fever, tularemia and smallpox. There are options, however, for the development and licensing of 10 other vaccines, the report says.

In the next two years, the military expects to have licensed a paste for reducing chemical agent exposure to skin and a pretreatment for protection against soman, a nerve agent. It also aims to produce a new system for identifying and diagnosing biological agent exposure, licensing the antibiotic cyprofloxacin for treating anthrax and approving a shorter dosing schedule for administering anthrax vaccine, the report said.

Anthrax vaccination currently requires a primary series of six doses given over 18 months, with an annual booster to maintain immunity.

"The protocol makes it difficult to complete before deployment of forces or to ensure that mobile forces, once deployed, are administered the proper regimen," it said.

Work also is underway to assess the effectiveness of current medical countermeasures on nontraditional chemical and biological agents and to assess the effects of low dose exposure to chemical agents on soldiers.

Powers says the military is much more prepared to deal with the chemical threat than the biological threat."

"Longstanding programs within the Chemical Corps, a lot of the training and education programs that have been underway for several years if not decades have really focused on the chemical weapons threat, or dealing with the biological threat in sort of the context of a hazardous materials response," Powers said, noting that the military is much more prepared to deal with a chemical threat than a biological one.

"What DoD I think has come to realize in the past couple of years … is a sort of gradual shift to recognize the difference in both the threat and necessary response for chemical and biological weapons and a recognition of the important role played by the public health and the medical care providers within DOD in dealing with the biological weapons challenge," he added.

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Pentagon cancels three more missile defense tests

David Ruppe — Fri, 18 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400

Now, only two flight-intercept tests remain between the most recent, failed test in December and the limited deployment some 20 months later. So far this year, the Missile Defense Agency has announced the cancellation of six planned intercept tests, four of which were originally scheduled to occur before any interceptors were fielded.

"The Missile Defense Agency has a lot riding on the next two flight intercept tests. It won't be easy to successfully conduct two complex tests involving new hardware and software, and perhaps with new objects in the target cluster as well," said former Pentagon testing director Philip Coyle.

Explaining the change, an agency spokesman cited "program data needs" and a busy schedule preparing for the deployment.

The tests have been politically charged, with Pentagon officials citing the test record of five successful intercepts in eight attempts as proof that a limited system is ready field as a test-bed, and critics questioning whether tests have been simplified or cancelled to ensure a successful record.

Recent Cancellations

The cancellations were reflected in the Pentagon's recently released 2004 budget request documents, which included a schedule of planned "Integrated Flight Tests," or IFTs, of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which is being developed to destroy long-range enemy warheads in space.

The schedule shows that IFT-16-which would have been the 11th intercept test and which officials earlier this year said was scheduled to occur just prior to the system's deployment-is no longer planned.

Pentagon officials announced in January that three predeployment intercept tests (IFT-11, -12, -13) were cancelled, with the latter one replaced by two nonintercept flights (IFT-13A and IFT-13B) to test two prospective replacements to an unsatisfactory missile booster.

The remaining two predeployment intercept tests are IFT-14 and IFT-15, which will involve one or both of the two possible follow-on boosters, according to the agency.

"IFT-16 was to have been the dress rehearsal for deployment," said Coyle, the former assistant secretary of defense in charge of testing during most of the Clinton administration.

It's "the big one before the deployed test bed," said Matt Martin, an analyst with the Center for Nonproliferation and Arms Control.

Scheduling and "Program Data Needs" Cited

Missile Defense Agency spokesman Richard Lehner said in an e-mail that IFT-16's cancellation, and a plan to focus on an already scheduled nonintercept flight test of the system's radar around that time, "better meets the program data needs during the summer/fall [2004] when we are simultaneously installing interceptors at Fort Greely and VAFB [Vandenberg Air Force Base] and doing system integration check-out and testing."

The agency is renaming the nonintercept test, which was called Radar Characterization Flight 2, IFT-16A, Lehner said.

Lehner's comments, Martin said, suggest the deployment goal of October 2004, set officially by President Bush in December, might be interfering with the system's testing program.

"I can certainly imagine that they are having trouble trying to deploy and test at the same time and I think that in itself points out the weakness of the plan. [The plan] says you've got to test, because they have only succeeded in the most basic tasks at this time. Now they're saying you can't test because we have this political mandate to deploy," he said.

Martin added the cancellation might, intentionally or not, support the deployment objective by eliminating the risk of a test failure just prior to the deployment and presidential elections.

"IFT-16 was planned in the fall of 2004, which happily, coincidentally is right in the middle of the election season," he said.

Lehner appeared to dismiss the significance of IFT-16 as a test run, saying the system's capabilities already have been validated in previous testing, and would be further tested with a new booster or boosters in IFT-14 and IFT-15.

"The GMD system's capability has already been demonstrated for initial operations in previous and ongoing intercept tests, ground tests, modeling and simulation and numerous exercises," he said.

The budget documents also show tests IFT-19 and IFT-20 also have been scrubbed. They would have occurred after the scheduled deployment.

Lehner said, "It is likely the test objectives from those flights will be consolidated into earlier tests."

Tougher Testing Ahead

Martin charged the intercept-testing regime so far has lacked realistic complexity.

"They haven't done anything really to stress the system yet. All they've really proven right now is the hit-to-kill ability … that's certainly impressive, but they aren't doing anything to move forward," he said.

He said two of the eight completed tests were repeats of previously failed tests and the most recently failed test "as I understand it had nothing that added any complexity to the system."

Lehner wrote that "In order to develop more operationally realistic tests" after 2004, officials are considering redesigning some tests to try intercepting two enemy decoy warheads aimed at a single target or two targets.

They also are considering launching targets from the air, rather than the ground, so the system could be tested against targets from a "more realistic direction," he said.

"The test program is and will be flexible over time and will be adjusted from time to time to take advantage of new and/or improved technology and also to make efficient use of expensive and/or scarce resources for each and every test, as well as construct the tests to take advantage of new capabilities demonstrated or projected by potential adversaries," he said.

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U.S. takes targeting precautions to avoid chemical, biological release

David Ruppe — Tue, 08 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400

Army Lt. Col. Thomas Woloszyn, who is in charge of chemical and biological defense for the U.S. Central Command at its Joint Operations Center in Qatar, said in an interview Friday that U.S. forces have sought to incorporate factors such as wind direction into bombing decisions to try to minimize the potential for casualties resulting from a chemical or biological release.

"A lot of emphasis is placed on minimizing collateral damage and if we can check the weather reports, and get the most accurate [reports] as possible prior to a strike, we'll do that," Woloszyn said.

"There have been times when we have not struck targets based upon that wind, and based upon those decisions, and that's all part of the targeting process," he said.

As for where suspected stocks might be located, "We don't know what's there or where it's at. So a lot of times we have to project the worst case," he said.

Another approach to minimizing casualties, he said, is to consider the use of so-called "agent-defeat" weapons, which can minimize the dispersal of targeted WMD agents by incinerating them. He would not say whether such weapons have been used in the last three weeks.

Woloszyn said U.S. forces would seek to destroy weaponized agents that could be used against U.S. forces, but might generally avoid striking a known production facility of chemical or biological weapons.

"What we want to do is limit the enemy use of those weapons on the battlefield. So if he's got a production plant, we may not need to destroy it. [As a] matter of fact, we probably don't want to destroy it, we can just limit his access" to those sites, he said, by perhaps destroying a bridge, cutting off power, or laying mines.

Woloszyn said so far, there has been no evidence that the thousands of bombing and cruise missiles strikes against Iraqi government and military infrastructure during the conflict have struck any chemical or biological agents. "There have been no releases that we can detect, or any casualties that we can see that were inflicted that could result from chem or bio," he said.

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White House seeks repeal of ban on low-level nuke research

David Ruppe — Thu, 06 Mar 2003 00:00:00 -0500

The Pentagon included the request in its fiscal 2004 defense budget request. Within the request is a provision to repeal a 1994 law banning research and development of nuclear weapons with yields below five kilotons.

Democrats expressed concern the administration's request would harm U.S. credibility internationally on arms control and nonproliferation issues.

"This ban has been a pillar of arms control for the past decade. I consider it completely irresponsible of us to be asking for this now considering the fact that we are attempting to disarm other people around the world," said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., in a hearing yesterday of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

"I think it has great potential to harm what little credibility this administration has left on arms control," she said.

The text of the proposal suggested the repeal is needed in part for national security reasons, to be able respond to challenges in international security, and to train young scientists.

An Energy Department official advocated the repeal Thursday at the House hearing.

"I do support repealing the legislation," said Everet Beckner, deputy administrator for defense programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

"The reason for that is primarily one of it's causing us to stop some analyses from occurring, which is a natural extension of work that you would do at higher yields," he said.

Tauscher asked whether research prevented by the ban has ever harmed the national security of the United States.

Beckner said, "I think to date it has not. But looking to the future I'm not certain."

Under questioning, Beckner also said the U.S. national laboratories lately were having "great success" in making new hires from universities.

The Pentagon may seek the option of using the low-yield warheads, experts said, for striking deeply buried and hardened underground bunkers, and also possibly for striking enemy chemical and biological weapons sites, with the idea the extreme heat from the blast would destroy the dangerous properties of those weapons.

Critics have charged the blast from the weapons would be harmful to any nearby populations, would be questionably effective and would break the taboo of using nuclear weapons.

Beckner said further research is required to know whether the weapons might work as hoped against chemical and biological agents.

"We know that we have to understand much better in the future how you destroy chemical and biological agents, as opposed to disbursing them. … As we study the problem more fully, we realize how difficult it is, specifically to kill biological agents," he said.

The requested repeal comes as the Bush administration is preparing for a possible war on Iraq in part because of Baghdad's pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The administration is also handling a crisis with North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty in January.

The United States is one of five countries allowed to possess nuclear weapons by the treaty, but those five agreed to make good faith efforts toward total nuclear disarmament over time.

Tauscher asked Beckner, "What do you think the ramifications would be if we repealed this ban to our credibility in the world that we are actually committed to arms control, to removing weapons systems not increasing systems, and that we are not kind of talking out of both sides of our mouths [when the United States] is attempting to prevent other people from getting nuclear weapons?"

Beckner said his job as a scientist was not to address such questions, but rather is to "assess the threat to the country and propose solutions."

Rep. Heather Wilson, R-N.M., who released a controversial report last month urging the repeal, said she thought it was "an illusion to think that we would be safer if we don't let people think about, explore things that we might find frightening, because they would never be able to come back to us with options."

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Pentagon projects budget plateau after initial increase

David Ruppe — Fri, 07 Feb 2003 00:00:00 -0500

The Missile Defense Agency is forecasting no significant overall budget growth for its research, development, test and evaluation programs over the next six years, following a requested increase of $1 billion for next year, according to an agency budget document released Monday.

The agency expects to spend between $7.7 billion in fiscal 2004 and $8.7 billion in 2009 on research, development and testing of its systems, according to the budget documents. It says it budgeted $6.7 billion research, development, test and evaluation in fiscal 2003.

A senior Pentagon official said Friday the military was planning to spend more on missile defense this year than last because of an increase in development and testing of systems.

"Why are we spending more? Well we've moved, as I've told a number of you, from the research side to the development side in a much bigger way. Once the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty went away we could start doing more than just speculating about sea-based capabilities, for example," the official said.

With the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty last June, the Pentagon was able to incorporate Navy sensors into its high-profile, long-range intercept testing.

Also contained in the 2004 budget, according to Pentagon officials, is increased funding for purchasing a range of systems and upgrades to deploy an initial missile defense capability by the end of 2005. Pentagon officials estimate those purchases will add $1.5 billion to the missile defense budget over the next two years.

By the end of fiscal 2005, the agency plans to procure numerous systems for fielding an initial capability to defend the United States, including up to 20 ground-based missile interceptors, 20 sea-based interceptors deployed on three reconfigured ships, land- and sea-based radar and sensors, and 15 upgraded surveillance and tracking ships.

At Least $9 billion Requested

The agency's budget projections do not account for future weapons purchases by the services, however, nor for funding requested by the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for missile defense programs, which total nearly $1.4 billion for fiscal 2004.

Counting the requested Missile Defense Agency budget, and requests for Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff programs, the Bush administration is asking for an estimated $9.1 billion for fiscal 2004, making it the Pentagon's largest budgeted weapons program.

Defense budget analyst Christopher Hellman, of the Center for Defense Information, said that Pentagon missile defense total should be closer to $10 billion, as it does not account for $713 million requested for the Air Force in 2004, which the Pentagon identifies as having a missile defense mission.

Missile defense critic John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, said he is skeptical the Pentagon's forecast budgets will sufficiently fund the administration's plans.

"They claim that these additional capabilities are not all that expensive, $1.5 billion over two years, so that's why the budget does not go shooting up," he said.

"If I were the conservatives and looked at this budget over five years or six years, and looked at this deployment in Alaska and California, I'd say, 'is that all there is?' From the left, you'd say, 'is this the camel's nose under the tent?'" he said.

Baker Spring, a Heritage Foundation missile defense proponent, says the $1.5 billion should be sufficient.

"This is an incremental cost, it's not coming from zero. [It is] coming from a baseline that was already $8 billion," he said.

"There has been a train now for over a year planning for a Pacific base and test bed. It's that increment that takes you from the test bed to that operational capability that you really need to account for here," he said.

Congress, in the past two years, has appropriated more than $1 billion each year for missile defense above the agency's request.

Questions About the Budget

The total Pentagon missile defense budget request only recently climbed to its currently stated $9.1 billion level. The Pentagon requested $3.5 billion in fiscal 1998, $4.7 billion in 2001, and $8.3 billion in 2002.

Those increases began during the Clinton administration. The Bush administration is now pursuing more aggressively a broader range of interceptor systems and sensors and a complex integrated command and control system for identifying, tracking and destroying ballistic missile threats in various stages of flight.

Rep. John Spratt (S.C.), the House Budget Committee ranking Democrat, recently argued that the administration's funding level is too high.

"The problem with this emphasis on missile defense is that it draws both funding and attention away from nonproliferation efforts, which have an enormous potential," he said at an Arms Control Association event last month.

"While the defense budget has grown substantially over the last three years, funding for nonproliferation essentially stands where it stood in President [Bill] Clinton's last budget," he said.

The Bush administration did request significant increases for nonproliferation budgets this year, an 8 percent increase for the Pentagon's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, a 30 percent increase for the Energy Department's nonproliferation programs, and a 17 percent decrease for the State Department's smaller nonproliferation budget, resulting largely from cancelled nuclear aid for North Korea.

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