Government Executive - Authors - David Francis

Defense agency's effort to secure Soviet pathogens grows

David Francis — Wed, 29 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has been working closely with the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan to consolidate dangerous pathogens stored at "antiplague" sites, Scott Levac, manager of the Threat Agent Detection Response program at the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said at a briefing Tuesday. The goal is to create a disease surveillance network for each nation and consolidate biological agents to no more than three sites in each country, reducing the chance that terrorists would acquire the pathogens.

To date, 11 institutes for consolidating pathogens have been established in the five countries. These "central reference laboratories" are former antiplague laboratories converted for use in the program by the United States and the governments of former Soviet states, with the two sides splitting the cost.

The program has also engaged former Soviet scientists with biological weapons expertise by offering them work in the new facilities.

"We have really gone out of our way not only to engage individuals but the [research] organizations" inside each country, Levac said.

The United States expects to spend around $400 million on the program over the next five years, said Jim Reid, director of Cooperative Threat Reduction policy at the Pentagon. He added that close cooperation with the former republics has allowed the budget to grow significantly from the $2 million set aside in 1998.

Cooperation has "allowed us to kind of develop the system in an environment that was supportive of what we were trying to do," he said.

Reid also said that Threat Agent Detection Response is not taking place within Russia. "Significant policy differences" and disagreements over certification requirements have stopped work on the program between Moscow and Washington, he said without elaborating on disagreements over policy or certification.

Top-to-Bottom Cooperation

The Threat Agent Detection Response program is using some former Soviet antiplague sites as bases of operation. The Soviet Union established the sites in order to detect and respond to disease outbreaks, Levac said.

Experts consider the facilities to be public health and proliferation risks, as they contain agents such dangerous pathogens as anthrax, bubonic plague and tularemia. One of the primary goals of the program is to improve security at the antiplague sites in which such agents are being consolidated and to collect dangerous agents from shuttered laboratories before they fall into the hands of terrorists.

All consolidation facilities must meet U.S. Biosafety Level 2 or 3 security standards, which require sufficient security to protect agents that present risks to workers and the public.

Levac said the program functions on three levels - local, regional and state. Experts at the local level are trained to recognize and respond to disease outbreaks. These experts would report any outbreaks to the central reference laboratories, which would then dispatch teams of epidemiologists to respond.

Sentinel stations have been established at the regional level, with the number of stations depending on the size of the country. Workers at these stations are dispatched to recover pathogens from old Soviet research laboratories around the republics, package them safely and ship them to the central reference laboratories.

At the central reference facilities, human and veterinary pathogen samples taken from laboratories around the country are consolidated and cataloged, with information on the pathogens sent to an electronic database in the United States. These laboratories have state-of-the-art security and all workers undergo thorough background checks to protect against security breaches. Each state has at least one of these, Levac said.

This "top-to-bottom" cooperation creates a comprehensive statewide disease surveillance program, Levac said.

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Installation of anthrax detectors at postal facilities nears end

David Francis — Thu, 03 Nov 2005 00:00:00 -0500

By the beginning of December, the Postal Service expects to have installed Biohazard Detection Systems at 282 mail-processing facilities around the country, said Don Crone, USPS manager of mail-processing protection systems. These detection systems are the Postal Service's front-line defense against an anthrax attack through the mail system.

Planning for the anthrax detectors started immediately after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, predating the anthrax attacks that killed five people later that year, Crone said.

"From the engineering side, we immediately went out and started looking at technologies, what was available, talking to the experts, and of course we had a lot of people knocking on our doors with all sorts of ideas and things," Crone said.

The result of the push was the Biohazard Detection System. Developed by Postal Service engineers, the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and Northrop Grumman, a prototype system was installed in Baltimore in June 2002.

The Baltimore system "wasn't a completely automated system like the final version, but had at least assembled most of the technologies and put it into a cabinet," Crone said. "I'll call it semiautomatic at the time. But we were trying to prove out the system."

The completed system combined existing technologies in a new way that allowed individual pieces of mail to be tested for anthrax. A hood positioned over the processing system collects air samples from each piece of mail that are taken into an aerosol collector. In the collector is a cartridge that holds the samples. This cartridge is then inserted into a polymerase chain reaction unit that conducts a DNA test to determine if anthrax is present.

Crone said, however, that the lag time between collection and testing is not a concern. The Postal Service has developed protocols to keep mail from leaving a facility under anthrax testing is complete. Procedures are also in place to track individual parcels that have left the site.

"The idea is to detect it early and contain it in that originating facility so we don't contaminate other places," Crone said.

Each system costs about $175,000, but installation and site preparation push the cost to $250,000. Once installation of the systems is complete, 282 facilities will be equipped with 1,373 machines at a cost of $375 million, Crone said.

The systems have been installed at all large mail-processing facilities around the country. Crone said smaller rural facilities are getting the system as installations come to an end. As of October, 218 facilities have received the system.

Once installed, Northrop Grumman is responsible for maintaining the systems, Crone said. The only interaction postal workers have with the system is to replace cartridges that collect samples. The systems are designed so that Northrop employees are notified immediately if there is a problem.

"The systems actually put out their own alert, so if something goes wrong with the BDS, the diagnostics will send out a message through our network automatically," he said. "A field service rep will get a message right on their Blackberry, directly from a machine."

Crone said the system has so far proven to be perfectly reliable. He said 27 billion pieces of mail have been screened without a single false positive.

If a system were to detect anthrax, the facility would be evacuated and the Homeland Security Department and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention would be notified immediately. The sample that tested positive for the pathogen would be retested. If the result were positive, all employees present at the facility or who had contact with the infected batch of mail would be put on a five-day regimen of the anti-anthrax drug Cipro.

Crone claimed the Biohazard Detection System is the most advanced system for detecting anthrax transported through the mail in the world.

"This is the front line. And it's pretty much cutting edge. To our knowledge there's nothing else in the world that matches this," he said. "The technology all existed, but this is really the only system that we've really taken and completely automated, which is what's unique about this system."

Local postal officials and postal union officials share Crone's enthusiasm for the system.

Workers have been happy with the system, said Sally Davidow, a spokeswoman for the 330,000-member American Postal Workers Union. She said when the machines first arrive at processing facilities, workers generally need time to integrate them into their workplace. After a short time, however, workers become comfortable with the technology, she said.

"I think the reaction is generally positive," she said.

"It's been operating flawlessly," added Baltimore post office spokesman Bob Novak. He said the system had not slowed down operations and has presented no difficulties to workers.

"The good news is that it's never gone off," he said.

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FDA finalizes food bioterrorism rule

David Francis — Thu, 06 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400

The final rule requires all domestic and foreign facilities that pack, store, manufacture or process food in the United States to register with the agency. There are no significant changes between the final rule and the interim draft rule issued in 2003, according to the agency.

"This rule is one of our critical tools for safeguarding the American food supply," acting FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach said in a statement. "By finalizing this rule, we now have another important safeguard in our ongoing efforts to make sure that human and animal foods are protected from a deliberate or accidental act of contamination."

The rule covers facilities that deal with meat, poultry, processed eggs, animal feed, dietary supplements, beverages and food additives. So far, more than 260,000 domestic and foreign facilities have registered with the agency.

The agency said that the final rule would help it to quickly trace contaminated food back to any facility it passed through. This would allow FDA officials to determine if other food from the facility had been tainted.

This is the third FDA food bioterrorism rule drafted after the September 2001 terrorist attacks to be finalized. A rule allowing the agency to detain food for 30 days if it has credible evidence that the food poses a risk was finalized in June 2004. In December of last year, the agency finalized a rule requiring companies to retain records of food origins and destinations for six months to two years, depending on a product's shelf life. The agency has yet to finalize a rule requiring prior notice for imported food shipments.

Former Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said last year that he was surprised that terrorists have not yet attempted to contaminate the supply.

The World Health Organization, in a 2002 report, said that while steps have been taken to prevent terrorist contamination of the food supply, food bioterrorism is perhaps a greater threat than a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction.

"Food is also the most vulnerable to intentional contamination by debilitating or lethal agents," the report said. "The diversity of sources of foods, including the global market, makes prevention difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, many developing countries lack basic food safety infrastructures and are vulnerable to deliberate acts of sabotage."

Food bioterrorism has been used in the past, according to the World Health Organization. In 1984, a cult in the United States contaminated salad bars with salmonella, resulting in 751 illnesses. A disgruntled Texas laboratory worker in 1996 infected colleagues' food with dysentery.

One critic has charged that the new U.S. rules are not sufficient to counter the threat.

"FDA still lacks essential tools to manage the threat of bioterrorism," said Caroline Smith DeWaal, food safety director at the nutrition and health advocacy organization Center for Science in the Public Interest.

"FDA still doesn't do enough inspections of food at the border. FDA still does not have authority to inspect the plants where food is being processed outside the borders," she told Global Security Newswire. "We're relying on a weak safety net."

DeWaal said her group since 2001 has asked for increased funding for food safety programs. She is concerned that costs of the war in Iraq and the recovery from Hurricane Katrina will leave less money for food safety. The fiscal 2006 FDA budget request seeks $180 million for food safety and other counterterrorism activities.

"As the Bush administration considers budget cuts, food safety programs should be exempt from those kind of across the board budget cuts," DeWaal said. "The programs simply cannot afford to be cut."

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GAO criticizes Energy's plutonium disposal effort

David Francis — Tue, 23 Aug 2005 00:00:00 -0400

The report (GAO-05-665) called for moving the stocks to the department's Savannah River Site in South Carolina and also recommended improving monitoring systems for storage containers at Savannah to prevent plutonium leaks once the material is shipped to the site.

About 50 metric tons of plutonium no longer needed by the U.S. nuclear weapons program is now in storage at the department's Hanford facility in Washington state, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Savannah River Site. The 2002 Defense Authorization Act requires the department to develop a plan to store the material at the Savannah site until it can be shipped to the planned Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository for permanent disposition.

Auditors found that the department has fallen far behind in this effort since it was called for in the 2002 defense authorization bill. The department lacks a plan to convert plutonium into a form that can be stored at the Savannah facility. Also, Savannah is not equipped to store the Hanford plutonium, which is still in the form of 12-foot nuclear rods. Savannah is only equipped for standard storage containers, which cannot hold the rods.

"Until DOE develops a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS [Savannah] and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer. Continued storage at Hanford will cost an additional approximately $85 million annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan," the report says.

The GAO also found that Savannah's safety systems cannot properly monitor storage containers. "Without a monitoring capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment," the report states.

The report points out that the department has twice scrapped plans to build facilities at Savannah that would have been capable of storing and monitoring excess plutonium as well as processing the material for eventual shipment to Yucca Mountain. Due to these cancellations, "DOE has no means for processing its most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable for permanent disposition," the report says.

It urges the department to develop a strategy that assesses "the storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all of DOE's sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy should analyze the environmental impact, national security implications, costs, and schedules to safely consolidate, store, and eventually dispose of DOE's plutonium at existing facilities and/or at a new storage facility constructed at one of its sites."

"When this comprehensive strategy is completed," the report continues, "we further recommend that the secretary of energy ensure that each of DOE's facilities' cleanup plans are reviewed to ensure that each site's cleanup goals time frames are consistent with the department's comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition."

Independent nuclear expert Tom Clements, former senior adviser to Greenpeace International, blasted the department for its failure to develop a plan. Clements also criticized Congress for lax oversight of the department's disposal efforts.

"The report affirm[s] what many in the public have long pointed out - that DOE has no comprehensive plan to manage, consolidate or dispose of plutonium," Clements said in a press release. "But Congress is very late in beginning serious oversight of this program. It has already been a decade since the program to dispose of surplus weapons plutonium began and DOE still hasn't developed a workable plan to handle this deadly material. Lack of such a plan, which should have been developed years ago, means a tremendous waste of taxpayer money and a continued threat to public health and safety."

Clements told Global Security Newswire that it is difficult to gauge how much money has been spent on plutonium disposition because the funding has been scattered throughout various spending bills over the last few years. "It's got to be in the billions of dollars," he said.

Clements said all plans to ship plutonium to Savannah must be stopped while the department develops a plan for storing the material. Congress should not allocate more money for construction of a Savannah facility to convert weapon-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors until comprehensive safety plans are in place, he said.

"DOE has tried for many years to fool the Congress and the public that a plan existed to dispose of plutonium. While many in the public have not been fooled, Congress is to share the blame with DOE for this programmatic failure as it has not conducted adequate oversight of the troubled and costly plutonium program," Clements said. "Congress has thrown money at the program without first demanding of DOE a comprehensive plan. Such abuse of the taxpayer must stop and Congress must now hold DOE's feet to the fire."

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Local officials call for more mass transit security funding

David Francis — Fri, 05 Aug 2005 00:00:00 -0400

"The federal government needs to aggressively pursue the research and development of these products, especially in mass transit where you're moving hundred of thousands of people," New Jersey Transit Police Chief Joseph Bober told Global Security Newswire.

Concerns over transit security increased following the terrorist attacks last month against London subway trains and buses. Bober said New Jersey Transit, which transports more than 760,000 people each day, has been on a heightened state of alert since the Madrid train bombing in 2004 and stepped up patrols following the London attacks.

Many officers patrolling the New Jersey Transit system carry radiation detectors the size of a pager during rounds on trains, Bober said. However, detection methods for biological and chemical weapons, like those recently tested in New York's Grand Central Station, are not ready for widespread use and have not been thoroughly tested, according to Bober.

Maria White, police commander with Bay Area Rapid Transit Police in San Francisco, agreed that more federal money is needed to improve defense against a WMD attack.

"We've asked for lots of money to fund some of our security programs and we have not received what I believe would be an acceptable response from the federal government," White said. "We've taken proactive steps to study ourselves, to review our vulnerabilities. But we haven't been able to take all the steps we want to because we don't have the funding."

Patrols have been stepped on Bay Area trains, which move 300,000 passengers daily, following the London attacks, White said. Security cameras are also used to monitor suspicious passengers. White would not elaborate on other WMD detection devices used in the transit system, but said additional security steps need to be taken.

White said the federal government is too reactive when it comes to making security-funding decisions. She said she hopes the London attacks will draw attention to transit security inadequacies like the September 2001 terrorist attacks highlighted holes in U.S. air security. Without additional federal funding, many of the measures transit systems could take to prevent a weapon of mass destruction from being detonated on a subway or bus remain out of reach, according to White.

"We have a big wish list out there as far as for what funding we're seeking and for what," she said. "There is more we can do for detection, whether it be more cameras, or smart technology in those cameras."

Federal support is also lacking for police patrolling trains, said Rich Roberts, spokesman for the International Union of Police Associations, which represents 120,000 officers below the rank of sergeant.

"Our folks in the field have not really seen much support at all," Roberts said. He argued that too much focus has been placed on advanced technological solutions instead of providing money to train officers how to recognize an attack or the symptoms of an attack.

"We're not talking rocket science here," Robert said. "With an excessive focus on high-tech, we've lost the field edge. … Instead of replacing the old ways, you need to supplement them" with new technologies.

Roberts dismissed a recent comment by Homeland Security Department Michael Chertoff, who said local agencies should shoulder the burden for increased mass transit security. He argued that because the federal government is making demands of local law enforcement for improved surveillance and security, "It makes sense for the feds to pick up the tab."

Roberts said security in transit systems and in cities has improved since the Sept. 11 attacks. However, the attacks in London are a reminder that money needs to be spent on additional law enforcement training.

"If you don't have the beat cops out there with adequate support, you aren't going to win," Roberts said. "You aren't going to protect the people."

The Homeland Security Department has been working with other government agencies and private business to develop new technologies, but it is not clear when these would be ready for use or how they would be integrated into security systems, according to Bober and White. Calls to the department were referred to the solicitation and teaming portal Web page of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, where the department posts requests for proposals for new technologies.

Listed on the page is a solicitation for low-pressure chemicals detection systems, which are described as "state of the art and next generation systems that can detect toxic compounds … without coming in contact with the contaminated surface." The proposal does not specify how the system would be used.

A second proposal asks for low-cost, bio-aerosol detector systems, a cheaper, smaller version of the bio-aerosol detector system that can detect airborne toxins. Although the proposal does not give specifics about how the device would be used, it asks that the system be capable of use by "nontechnical personnel."

The House of Representatives has allocated $100 million for transit security in the fiscal 2006 Homeland Security Department appropriations bill. The Senate has allocated $150 million, matching the White House request and the amount allocated in the present fiscal year. The bill is in conference committee.

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairwoman Susan Collins, R-Maine, and ranking member Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., are leading the fight for the extra funding.

"The recent attacks in London again demonstrate that transit systems are attractive targets, and it is crucial that steps be taken to mitigate the potential of another terrorist attack from occurring in the United States," the senators said in a joint statement last week. "Fourteen million people rely on mass transit systems in our country every day. We must provide assistance to system owners and operators to continue rapid deployment of security enhancements."

Collins spokeswoman Elissa Davidson said none of the additional $50 million in the Senate bill is earmarked specifically to improve WMD detection capabilities.

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Pentagon employees seek continued hold on anthrax vaccination program

David Francis — Tue, 02 Aug 2005 00:00:00 -0400

In a brief filed July 29 in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, lawyers for the employees asked the court to dismiss a Pentagon appeal seeking to have the injunction lifted. The challenge to the vaccination program - over fears of possible side effects - by the six anonymous military and civilian personnel led to a District Court ruling stopping the program in October 2004.

The Pentagon, in a brief filed with the court last month, said Food and Drug Administration documentation on BioPort's Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed [AVA] proves the vaccine is safe and effective in combating all forms of anthrax.

The plaintiffs' lawyers have disputed this claim. They have argued that FDA's scientific records show the vaccine to be ineffective in combating inhalation anthrax, the form military personnel would be most likely to face in the field. The lawyers have also pointed to an agency advisory panel that found the vaccine to be effective only against anthrax contracted through the skin.

The agency accepted the panel's view in 1985, but changed its position in 2003 by issuing a final order declaring the vaccine effective against inhalation anthrax. However, a federal judge found that the agency did not follow procedures in making that determination, vacated the order, and demanded that FDA officials open the rule for public comments, the brief says.

"Against this undisputed factual background, the government's claim that FDA has consistently considered AVA to include inhalation anthrax is nothing less than ludicrous. At no time did the appropriate FDA officials or experts ever make such a claim. Moreover, until finally forced to do so by the District Court's decision, FDA has carefully avoided making any official pronouncement concerning the AVA's status," plaintiffs argued in the brief.

The attorneys have accused the Food and Drug Administration of ignoring this scientific record on the vaccine by issuing the 2003 final rule.

"In short, there is ample undisputed, factual support for the District Court's opinion that AVA was not considered to be licensed for inhalation anthrax by FDA, DOD, or anyone else until it became politically expedient, as opposed to scientifically validated, to do so," the brief says.

As the vaccine has never been proven safe, the Pentagon is forbidden by military law from requiring troops to take it, the plaintiffs attorney's have argued. Under U.S. Code Title 10, the military cannot force personnel to take unapproved or investigational new drugs without giving them the option to refuse the drug.

"The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and enjoined the use of AVA [Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed] for the simple reason that the vaccine was an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied/intended use, and that defendant DOD's [Defense Department] involuntary program violated" military law, the brief states. "The undisputed facts show that the only human test of the vaccine did not provide sufficient evidence to support the vaccine's use as a prophylaxis against inhalation anthrax."

Finally, the plaintiffs' brief counters the government's argument that because only six employees challenged the program, the District Court acted improperly by issuing an injunction covering the entire military. The brief says that because the vaccination program was based upon the incorrect safety determination by the Food and Drug Administration and because a mandatory vaccination program affects all military personnel, the District Court acted correctly in stopping the program across all armed services.

The plaintiffs' brief adds that the full injunction saves the government from facing a rash of lawsuits from personnel who claim injury after taking the vaccine. "Without a military-wide injunction, this Circuit [Court] and DOD would face an unmanageable tsunami of litigation. The government complains that any judicial intervention will unduly disrupt military affairs. But the government slyly overlooks the fact that a flood of litigation would be far more disruptive to the military than simply providing informed consent" for the vaccine, the brief says.

The government has 15 days to respond to the brief, said plaintiffs' attorney John Michels. If the court agrees to hear the appeal, a date would be set for oral arguments, Michels said.

The vaccine has been available to military personnel since May under a voluntary program, after the Food and Drug Administration approved its emergency use. Those wishing to receive the vaccine must be briefed on the risks and benefits of the treatment by their commanders and acknowledge receiving the brochure explaining these risks. The vaccine is available to troops deployed in Central Command theaters, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and in South Korea.

As of July 7, half of military and civilian personnel offered anthrax vaccinations under the voluntary program have refused the vaccine, according to Military Vaccine Agency figures.

FDA Commissioner Lester Crawford recently extended the voluntary program until 2006.

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Pentagon appeals decision halting anthrax vaccinations

David Francis — Mon, 23 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400

Justice Department lawyers, in an appeal filed on behalf on the Pentagon, contend that the Food and Drug Administration's documentation on BioPort's Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed proves the vaccine is safe and effective in combating all forms of anthrax.

The vaccine is now only fully licensed as safe and effective against cutaneous anthrax.

"The Food and Drug Administration has repeatedly confirmed that [the vaccine's] label encompasses approval for use against all forms of anthrax, regardless of the route of exposure - including inhalation exposure," the Pentagon argues in the appeal.

The Pentagon is looking to set aside the decision of U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan, who ruled against mandatory vaccinations in October after finding that the FDA had not fully licensed the BioPort vaccine as effective against inhaled anthrax.

The Health and Human Services Department earlier this year granted the Pentagon emergency use authority to resume vaccinations on a voluntary basis. Mandatory vaccinations could resume if the government's appeal is accepted.

A Pentagon Web site lists the chances of adverse event from the vaccination at 1 in 100,000.

More than 1 million service members were inoculated before Sullivan stopped the mandatory vaccination program. Recently released figures indicate that hundreds of military personnel were treated for adverse events following vaccination.

The Pentagon argues that the vaccine's safety and effectiveness against inhalation anthrax are clear from the Food and Drug Administration's scientific records.

The agency has repeatedly declared the vaccine safe, the Pentagon argues. The Defense Department also points out that the agency did not object to use of the vaccine during the first Gulf War. Correspondence between FDA and Defense Department officials also illustrates the agency's belief that the drug is safe, the Pentagon said in the appeal.

A 1950s study in which the vaccine proved effective in protecting mill workers exposed to naturally occurring anthrax is also cited by the Pentagon as evidence of safety.

Finally, the Pentagon cited a January 2004 FDA order that found the vaccine to be safe against all forms of anthrax. Sullivan ruled that order invalid because the agency did not accept public comments and due to questions about the vaccine's safety.

The agency opened the order for comments late last year to comply with the court's order. The comment period closed at the end of March.

The Pentagon argued that in the face of FDA evidence that the vaccine was safe against all forms of anthrax, the court did not have the authority to stop the program because it believed the vaccine was unsafe.

"Even if the court believed that the FDA's January 2004 order did not have independent force as a result of a procedural failure to provide additional notice and comment, that failure would only support vacatur of the order," the Pentagon stated in the appeal. "It would not provide the district court with a basis for revisiting the scope of the [original] license - which has always authorized use of VA to prevent anthrax, without limitation on the route of exposure, and which remains in effect."

Finally, the Pentagon argues that Smith should not have stopped the vaccination program for the entire military, but only for the six anonymous Defense Department employees who filed suit challenging the program.

John Michels, attorney for the six plaintiffs, would not comment on the case until a response is filed on behalf of his clients. The plaintiffs' response is due June 30.

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Chemical weapons depots slated for closure

David Francis — Mon, 16 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400

The bases are set to close once their stockpiles of chemical agents are eliminated, the Pentagon said in a justification document released Friday. Work is scheduled be finished at Deseret and Newport in 2008 and at Umatilla in 2011.

The closings are part of larger round of base consolidations, restructurings and closings that the Pentagon estimates will save $49 billion over two decades, according to Michael Wynne, defense undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics.

Umatilla, in Oregon, is destroying weapons filled with the nerve agent sarin. The Pentagon estimates that closing the base would yield a 20-year savings of $681.1 million and result in the loss of 900 jobs in the area.

Closing the Deseret depot in Utah, which is destroying mustard gas, would lead to savings of $356.4 million over two decades and cost the area almost 400 jobs, according to Defense Department estimates.

Destruction of the VX nerve agent is set to be completed at Indiana's Newport depot in 2008. The Pentagon estimates 20-year savings at $436.2 million and a loss of more than 800 jobs.

News of the closings was not surprising.

"We always knew we would close," Col. Raymond Van Pelt, commander of the Deseret facility, told the Associated Press. "This is good news."

Rep. Greg Walden, R-Ore., who represents Umatilla's home district, also said the closing is welcome.

"As near as I can tell, it's where we wanted to end up - finish the mission and close the base," Walden told The Oregonian.

The Pentagon also plans to shift its Medical and Biological Defense Research branch offices from Water Reed Memorial Hospital, which is marked for closing, to Fort Detrick in Maryland.

The base now houses the main offices of the Army Medical Chemical and Biological Defense Research Program and the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Both programs study new countermeasures for weapons of mass destruction.

The shift is aimed at improving communication between the Defense Department and the Food and Drug Administration to develop protocol for the approval of biological and chemical countermeasures, according to the Pentagon's base closing justification document.

The Pentagon also hopes the move would: improve chemical and biological weapons countermeasures research and development; allow for the integration of programs, preventing redundancy; make the most of "critical professional personnel with expertise in medical product development and acquisition;" and allow for better coordination with Fort Detrick offices, according to the justification document.

Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota is also scheduled to close. The base houses 24 B-1 aircraft, originally designed to deliver nuclear payloads.

Sen. Tim Johnson, D-S.D. said the closing the base would hurt national readiness and vowed to fight for it to remain open.

"Our fight to save Ellsworth isn't over. I plan to work with the Ellsworth Task Force - and the entire South Dakota congressional delegation - to demonstrate to the members of the BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] Commission that closing Ellsworth is wrong for our national defense," Johnson said in a press release. "While we must be realistic about the likelihood of removing the base from the closure list by the BRAC Commission, it is worth the effort to save - for South Dakota and our national defense."

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