Return to Article: Security clearance challenges defy easy fixes
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46634
Several thousands experienced contract investigators were unlawfully suspended by Ms Dillaman of OPM FIS for security concerns that were never proven, which included a process to defame their character; disrupting livelihoods; and being judged as a Federal Employees, which they were not. Those wrongfully accused as criminals made every effort to obtain proper due process, but OPM Officials failed in every sense of the word to provide fair and impartial justice, and purposely disregarded all responses and correspondence. The offices included: Director of OPM; OPM Inspector General; OPM FIS and the OPM General Counsel. Ms. Dillaman, Director of OPM FIS, purposely delays all processes, in conjunction with others, which in it self is the route to the delays of backgrounds and the deception by directors. All those of OPM FIS had deliberately ignored our Constitutional and Federal Laws, Regulations and OPM Notices. Even the OPM General Counsel's Office ignored all responses. OPM FISD continuous deception and delaying, is an endless road. The lack of fair and impartial justice not given and abuse of power, by those within OPM is the real reason, and it is known.
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36065
I have worked for twenty years as a software test engineer. I have not worked for about two years because of my background check.
Seems as if all of the jobs are going over seae. I believe they are using the security clearance so that Americans will not be employed. There are reasons we have clearance but to test software I just do not get it. We need more accessable ways to see whats on our background like a annual free background check so that working Americans can know what is on it.
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33394
I have worked in security programs for over twenty years. Personnel security as we know it is a throwback to World War II. No tweaking here or there is going to fix it. A new mind set in both personnel security and information security are needed before these programs are effective. Unfortunately, only something as terrible as another 9/11 will shake the intransigent, uncreative, and cognitively stagnant bureaucrats that mismanage the Intelligence Community and the DoD.
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33009
If it is so difficult for people to obtain a security clearance and contractors claim they are in critical need of people with them, then why is it so difficult to get a job with a clearance? I have a TS/SCI clearance and good experience, but have been turned down for a job by nearly every major contractor and many smaller ones, and I am not alone. Government contractors seem to be the choosiest beggars in the world. They complain about how long the process is, while there are countless qualified people already WITH clearances that are being ignored. I wonder if the contractors themselves aren't part of the problem. Is it nepotism? Is it shortsightedness? Is it ignorance? Contractors can put all the blame they want on the backlog, but the cure may be in the hiring process itself.
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30995
I currently work for the DoD as a Contract Specialist and have a non-critical sensitive clearance which was granted in 2004, the LOWEST level of clearance one can get, I believe. Since March of 2006 I have been unable to receive a promotion or a lateral reassignment because of the backlog of cases. The agency to which I would like to lateral can neither finish the paperwork for my transfer nor can they offer the job to any other candidate, and the agency for which I currently work can neither advertise for my replacement nor offer me a promotion. Two jobs are effectively tied up all for an adjudication which did not need to happen. This "adjudication" has been going on now for about a year and a half. The resulting loss of productivity and the mismanagement of resources that this situation represents, though relatively small, is important and does affect our support for the warfigher. Pam's comment about unnecessary checks are dead on the money, and I suspect are really designed just to ramp up the billable labor hours that are charged back to the government. Follow the money!
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30985
I am a former OPM investigator who conducted background investigations for security clearances from 1978 through 1996 when the function was privatized. At the time of privatization, there was no backlog. However, OPM and Clinton appointees, specifically the former Director of OPM, Campbell, forced a well run investigation group to privatize. Kathy Dillaman, who was quoted in your article several times, was one of the main forces behind the privatization (she got a promotion to SES) and partly to blame for the mess the clearance process is in today.
Tom Davis came to the aid of the investigators that tried to stop the privatization, however, he was unsucessful in stopping the process the Democratic administration started. So....don't blame the current adminstration for the mess, the blame goes back to the Clinton administration and the former OPM employees who encouraged the privatization because they knew it would mean mega bucks for those that became officers in the private company, USIS, or a promotion for them (as it did for Dillman).
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30976
I think half the reason the system is broke too, is because of really unnecessary "checks" on people not needing a clearance, and or how about agencies that redo clearances not needed, i.e. employees not working with classified info and had no break in service. (Usually this is to look for "dirt" on an employee.) There should be a way to screen these people out so time and resources are not wasted.
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30969
Remember the Clinton/Gore initiative to "Reinvent Government?" Remember what happened in 1993? If not, let me jog your memory. Under the ruse of insufficent work, OPM was ordered by the Clinton/Gore administration to conduct a Reduction In Force (RIF). Although testimony was given to congressional leaders, the result was the release of almost the entire investigations staff. The OPM Director at the time, Jim King, gave his blessing to the RIF, which proved to be nothing more than political window dressing. Before the ink dried on the RIF notices, OPM established it's own private nation wide investigations company better know as US Investigations Service (USIS). For several years, after the RIF, USIS received OPM support in the form of free vehicles, office space, telephones, computers and personnel. They also received 100% of the background investigation requests, which was feed to them by........OPM. Needless to say, USIS was set up for success and they made outstanding profits. So outstanding that several years ago USIS was able to pay many of their employees huge dividends, some exceeding well over $250,000. Background investigations motivated by corporate profit, what a travesty!
I understand now that OPM is resurrecting and re-staffing the Office of Federal Investigations. What happened to USIS? Have they been unable to cope with demands?
There are no easy fixes to this problem. Just a thought, what a shame it is to have so many highly trained and experienced investigators scattered throughout the government. Sometimes we can't see the forest for the trees.
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30968
I retired in 2005 rather than go to work for OPM and, based on conversations with former colleagues, all my fears were justified. The examples cited about cases being returned for stupid reasons are absolutely correct and just the tip of an iceberg. The OPM focus is on bureaucratic compliance and making money and not quality investigations. An example not covered is how OPM assigns cases to agents (who work out of their homes). They have agents passing each other going in the opposite direction as an agent who lives in one area gets a case located in the area where another agent lives. Man hours are lost just getting to the area to work a case (we call it "windshield time"), not to mention the additional vehicle expenses. Assigning cases geographically in a district went out the window when OPM took over. I believe if the "sloppy" cases were perused, one would find the vast majority was completed by contract investigators, not government employed agents. Bottom line is systems and procedures are put in place by professional bureaucrats with little understanding of what on-the-ground investigators have to deal with. I thank my lucky stars every day that I was able to retire when I did.
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30965
Besides examining the much needed steps to reduce process time, DOD should be taking a close look at unnecessary work. Reciprocity, or accepting clearance work done by another Government agency with similar standards, should be accepted without additional work. Thus, an employee with an Army-granted Top Secret clearance should immediately be accorded Top-Secret level access by the Navy. (However, transferring to the intelligence agencies might be more difficult.) This would eliminate thousand of clearances being formed each year.
Some work should be done to confirm that the classication of young adults who are US born and bred whose parents were similarly raised present little risk and their clearances could be granted with minimal work. However, more attention should be given to clearance applications of non-US citizens or residents. There have been several reported incidents involving middle-Eastern language translators.
Another potentially high risk category is the middle-age work force members facing the high cost of college educations.
Other segments of the clearance workload should be examined. It may well be fiscally unsound to initiate clearances on sumer interns, who might not seek employment in "cleared" positions when they graduate from college. Thus a lot of work might be expended on a college student's clearance so that (s)he can work ten weeks during each of two summers. Also, when investigators determine that the object of an investigation has left the firm or Government agency which requested the clearance, an effort should be made to determine whether or not a clearance was still needed.
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30964
I've conducted BI's as a federal agent (1811) and as a contractor to several BI firms doing defense work. I also, for a very brief time, was involved with contract work under the OPM guidelines. The OPM guidelines are convoluted and time consuming with a stilted DOS based system which is unfriendly to the user and causes undue delays. The problem is style over substance. Another problem is the compensation for contract investigators. Almost all companies opt for a point system. This limits the level of effort put into an investigation because if you begin to uncover issues you can't simply go forward and devote the time; you have to negotiate back with the company to justify the time you spend, or suck it up. This is not rocket science. There should be a simple check sheet approach w/o an investigative policy manual which is five inches thick and user unfriendly.
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30953
Great, full article! There's so much to say it can't be covered in a brief comment. This is actually an exciting time in security clearance reform. Our greatest liability is institutional inertia. The old "this is the way we've always done it."
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30947
Why do DHS employees require a new security clearance when they accept a poistion at another DHS agency? This is just plain stupid and a waste of tax payer money. Hasn't anyone ever heard about fraud, waste and abuse?
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30946
More realism would help. Privacy concerns? Get real! Anyone applying for a clearance provides vast amounts of private information, and signs at least one authorization letter so that the information collected by OPM can be shared with "other Federal agencies; Congress (when requested); a court of competent jurisdiction, news media and the general public when the disclosure would be in the public interest and would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy; public authorities responsible for enforcing, investigating or prosecuting violations of statute, rule, regulation or order" and a couple of laws and an executive order."
At the Department of Homeland Security, much emphasis is placed on 'suitability screening,' which is "the process of determining a person's suitability for employment" at DHS. "Suitability-screening standards and determinations are distinct from security clearance standards and determinations" with suitability being defined as "identifiable character traits and past conduct which are sufficient to determine whether or not a given individual is likely to carry out the duties of a job with appropriate integrity." This is not unique to DHS. The 'standards' are established by OPM and codified in federal regulations; however, like some of the absurd OPM investigation policies noted in the article, DHS has expanded the standards. Students graduating from college with substantial student loans, for example, are considered to be too heavily in debt, and are therefore susceptible to exploitation. Individuals with otherwise excellent credit records, but with formally contested tax bills are just as unworthy as sex offenders, drunks, and drug addicts.
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