Return to Article: FEATURES Adapt Or Die
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30045
To what degree does the tearing down and rebuilding of the Army recommended by some of the people quote here represent primarily a path toward better fighting the war we are engaged in now, in Iraq?
The military's institutional decision to respond to the Vietnam fiasco by assuming America would henceforth avoid wars like Vietnam was not without logic. Obviously, even after Iraq the American military will still be engaged in a number of situations calling to one degree or another for the relational skills so helpful in counterinsurgency. With the exception of Afghanistan, however, most of these situations will not call for more than a tiny fraction of Army or Marine personnel, and will scarcely involve the Air Force or Navy at all. Are we, then, talking about transforming the military (or at least a large part of it) primarily to prepare it to fight conflicts similar to the war in Iraq? How far should we expect this transformation to get if -- and surely we must expect this -- the political reaction to the Iraq war will be similar to the reaction to Vietnam, reflecting strong resistance to American participation in a conflict that turned out badly and that America probably did not need to fight in the first place?
The Israeli example is powerful in many ways, but Israel does not have a choice as to the conflicts it must prepare for. We do.
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30018
"In counterinsurgency, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly - the better learning organization - usually wins," according to the newly published Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
I think that is largely wishful thinking. The "home team" seems to win the overwhelming majority of these kinds of conflicts. In fact, you probably need to go back to the Phillipines to find a US success at counter-insurgency. I'm not sure the US military is suited to the task regardless of whether they "get it". COIN is essentially police work.
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29873
It amazes me that, 6-years into the overall fight against this global insurgency and 4-years into the fight in Iraq, Army strategic leadership, specifically those in the Infantry community, still view COIN as "the flavor of the week."
It seems that the mindset that prevaded Army leadership in the 1960s (see Andrew Krepinovich's, The Army and Vietnam), is alive and well today.
The good news is that company grade officers "get it" and will one day lead our Army. Assuming, of course, that the current OPTEMPO doesn't drive them away.
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29831
Yet another fine article in a fine series on revolutionizing the military mindset. Very impressive for a generalist trade pub. Good job, GovExec! Perhaps you can help drag the powers that be into the 21st Century - or, better yet, replace them with new powers that be that "get it". Please keep it up.
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