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Return to Article: FEATURES Fighting Folly

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  Desert Shield took 6 months to deploy heavy forces...and those may have been stopped if Hussein had seized Saudi ports/airfields early like he took Kuwait. Task Force Hawk required 20 days to move a small heavy force. Afghanistan is a landlocked country and could never have been supported by sea deployment....I'm waiting for the argument that we don't need better air deployability of heavy forces???

  The lack of a credible middle ground between heavy and light Army forces drove requirements for Stryker and FCS. No need for Quad tilt rotors. 190 C-17s and 70 C-5s are able to deploy substantial FCS forces early in any contingency while most heavy and FCS forces sea deploy to ports protected by air-deployed FCS elements.

  In Northern Iraq during OIF, 62 C-17 sorties lifted just 5 M1 tanks and 5 Bradleys along with some M113s and Hummers to protect an airborne brigade over 5 days. With the capability to transport 3 FCS armored vehicles per C-17, you could use those 60+ C-17s to air deploy up to 120 FCS armored manned ground vehicles of different kinds using 40 sorties,limited logistics and combat support assets with another 20 sorties, and still transport the airborne infantry alongside the FCS armor. THAT would be a credible ground force early in any conflict.

  This article questions our capacity to find a well-hidden enemy with FCS forces ON THE GROUND close to the action. Where are the similar arguments questioning how Air Force or Naval air can find and destroy the enemy at will from 20,000 feet???

  FCS armored vehicles will be better protected than Bradley's, offering all around protection. The number of on-board and acccessible sensors far exceed anything a Bradley offers.

  Finally, with daily fuel expenditures of 1.3 to 1.7 million gallons in Iraq, please explain how we fight future wars when gas is scarce and costs more. As of March 2006 we had expended 5 billion gallons of fuel between Iraq and Afghanistan. The FCS hybrid-electric engines coupled with lighter mass, will give us a deployable, survivable and logistically supportable armored force well into the future.

  It never ceases to amaze me that we seldom bat an eye spending billions on Air Force and Naval programs that seldom put boots on the ground in harms way, but moan and groan if the Army dares to suggest it needs modernization.

  Larry Posted August 14, 2007 9:50 PM
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  @Paul: The US doesn't and won't face insurgent "threats". They're only a problem if your army is in another country or if you have an insurgency in your own country. Both can easily be avoided with at least mediocre policy. Once you cause an insurgency or enter the fight against one that's already running, not the insurgency is the threat, but your army the invader.

  Concerning FCS; it's obvious for quite a long time that the underlying vision is an unrealistic exaggeration. The program will for sure yield many new technologies, but it's a safe bet that it will be cancelled or reduced to a research program.

  I guess the Army will be re-equipped, but most likely with force-on-force equipment for pitched battles with Chinese, Iranian, Pakistani and Russian forces. They'll have enough COIN equipment (mostly light armoured vehicles) when they withdraw from Iraq in 2008-2010 just like they had enough helicopters after Vietnam.

  Sven Ortmann Posted May 24, 2007 7:16 AM
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  Strangely enough the "obsolete" Cadillac-Gage V-300 family of vehicles meets almost all of the design criteria for the FCS. Almost, but not quite all.

  However, the 3.75 tons by which even the 90mm armed version falls under the 20 ton weight requirement seems to indicate that the possibility of 'up armouring' them so that they do meet all of the design criteria exists.

  On the other hand, why would the government want to use something that has already proven to be successful and can be built using existing technology?

  I did find the $1,125,000,000,000 (yes folks that's 1 1/8th TRILLION dollars) cost for the "single use" aircraft needed to deploy the 15 FCS brigades to be slightly too rich for my blood.

  Ted Posted May 20, 2007 5:28 AM
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  1. Cozy relationships between the Government and contractors usually make it worse for both when there is an audit - even the small money contracts. Contractors work best under clear and consistent Government oversight. The military needs to improve the training of the workforce to manage contracts - rank and technological expertise does not make a good manager/leader, buts training can lead to better managers and leaders in contract management.

  2. The foot soldier taking ground is the most decisive factor in defeating a well hidden enemy. A soldier able to move and fight in the late night during extreme weather conditions can usuallly take the advantage.

  Mike MacInerney Posted May 15, 2007 9:48 AM
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  FCS was an estimate of what the Army would need in the future. The GWOT has clarified what threats the US will face. Given this clearer vision, the FCS program must be adjusted to meet this clearer vision. For sure, the country does not need a modern mechanized force to confront a symmetrical conventional threat at the expense of meeting an unconventional threat mixed with some high technology forces working to complement each other.

  Paul Posted May 15, 2007 8:44 AM
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  Are we truly applying this concept of risk management to our high value programs and contracts. Removing emotional investments and applying established program review policies will proved an unbiased assessment of the programs worth. "Execution eats strategy for lunch!"

  Steven Allee Posted May 8, 2007 9:13 AM