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Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had a specific vision in mind as he tried to transform the American military into a high-tech 21st-century force. It was taken from Afghanistan, where small teams of American Special Forces rode into battle on horseback, and called in devastating precision air strikes on Taliban fighters.

In speeches, he often referred to that "transformational" battle, as he called it, when he pushed for a lighter, more agile military, capable of rapidly reaching distant trouble spots and bolstered by swarms of overhead sensors and long-range precision-strike munitions. In the invasion of Iraq, he decided to test his pet theories, intentionally keeping the invading, then occupying, army small, substituting precision munitions, robotic eyes and processor power for boots on the ground.

Shortly after American armored forces blitzkrieged across southern Iraq and stormed into Baghdad in spring 2003, military historian Max Boot wrote that the world had just witnessed a new American way of warfare. But the new way of war crumbled as Iraq turned into a low-tech, bloody slugfest with no clear winner, despite four years of heavy fighting and the most advanced weaponry in the U.S. arsenal.

So what of transformation? Some analysts say Rumsfeld forever altered the course of a ponderous Pentagon establishment notoriously resistant to change.

"By compelling the officer corps to organize, think and operate above the levels of their respective services" -- as a collective rather than as individual services -- "the changes Rumsfeld brought about were revolutionary," says Dan Goure, a vice president at the Lexington Institute, an Arlington, Va., think tank.

The maverick secretary forced the military to shift its weapons-buying approach from focusing on each service's wants to seeking capabilities, in other words, enhancing collective effectiveness. "That is transformation, and that has worked," Goure says.

Robert Martinage, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington-based defense think tank, wonders how much of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, intended to match military strategy to available money, will be implemented absent a clear champion for transformation and with entire ranks of the Pentagon's civilian leadership expected to follow Rumsfeld out the door.

Because the QDR avoided cutting weapons programs, the military's future shape and way of fighting now will be dictated by the reality of the grinding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than a theoretical vision. Military leaders are more interested in what will help them win now versus fending off potential threats, Martinage says.

The likelihood is that the ballooning Pentagon budget, driven by the costs of multiple wars, the need to repair battle-worn equipment, provide salaries and health care to troops and buy costly new weapons, will be trimmed by deficit hawks in the new Congress.

In a recent speech, Comptroller General David M. Walker questioned whether the Defense Department can afford the F-22 and Joint Striker Fighter as well as transformational programs such as the Army's costly Future Combat Systems and missile defense.

FCS is the embodiment of the notion of wiring together troops on the ground, sensors, aircraft, satellites and commanders to provide a clear picture of the battlefield and allow troops to make lightning-quick decisions. Transformation has become synonymous with this network-centric approach. But studies show that too much of this kind of transformation puts military operations at risk.

In 2004, GAO reported that networking causes command to become overly centralized and overloads soldiers with so much information that combat operations bog down. As information flows up the chain, commanders thousands of miles from the battlefield but linked by real-time video and communications become involved in decisions at lower and lower levels.

An Air Force officer based in the Persian Gulf recently told Government Executive that before a bomb is dropped in Iraq or Afghanistan, at least six people, all networked together from widely separated command posts, must sign off. "Increased networking capability does not necessarily increase warfighter effectiveness," according to a RAND report released in November.

COMMENTS

• When he first came in, I had hoped Rumsfeld would be good for the Defense Department. But unlike the article says, he had no specific vision. If he had a specific vision, perhaps things would have been different. He wanted transformation, but could never define it. The oft cited example of troops on horseback calling in air strikes may play well in Peoria, but in reality is not transformational at all. Rather it is historic going back over history of the common soldier, when freed from senior "help" using available resources as needed to accomplish the mission. Had he put as much effort into defining it, as he did into berating those who asked for definition, we might have it now. Working for the taxpayer GovExec.com reader Posted December 12, 2006 11:09 PM
• Donald Rumsfeld was a manager and the military is not used to that and does not like it! Management means controls and the military does not believe they should have any controls. Donald Rumsfeld implemented a new mind set in the military that they were not going to fight the big World War II type war or the cold war anymore. He wanted a small fast rapid response force to confront our modern enemies and not the enemies of centuries past. As for his policy position on the war, he supported the president. What do you expect any political appointee to do! Gates will support the president as well but the president is likely to change his mind so Gates will look better than Donald Rumsfeld. One of Rumsfelds greatest problems is the incompetent management staff at the Defense Department and in the services. Gates also will not be able to overcome this problem. There is no payoff for anyone to fix the bad financial management and personnel policies and personnel within Defense and the services. Taxpayer Posted December 11, 2006 6:41 AM
• Greg Grant needs to understand and articulate the difference between a war of invasion and an occupation. Rummy won the war of invasion but could not win the war of occupation. The U.S. military as we know it never should occupy. The war of occupation of Germany after World War II was a failure also! War is to take territory and put it to our use under our control or it is to eliminate a particular group. If we simply are providing training of domestic troops and providing security for a government that we like, we should get out! We have accomplished nothing in Iraq! If you want to get rid of dictators we should have invaded Cuba decades ago. Our president still has an economic boycott of Cuba that has been in place since 1960 (that is 46 years) and obviously has no impact on changing government there! Lift the boycott and normalize relationships with Cuba and we will see a far better Cuba and America! Get out of Iraq and participate in development and treaty talks throughout the region and you will see a far better Middle East and America. You may not see a democracy in the Middle East but you will see a better world. I will never understand why America thinks it has to recreate the world in its own image! We have less than 1 percent of the world’s population and account for 90 percent of the world’s income. We should be able to foster a better world through the proper use of our income. However, Congress has to get that income from the wealthy and distribute it across the world to the poor. However, we will always decide how that money is spent. Thus, we can support governments we favor and improve facilities that help generate more income for us, as well as them. The China is moving in this direction and as its domestic economy reaches a critical mass, it will be able to support itself internally and not be dependent upon the United States as it is now. Once we allow China to reach that point, the United States should begin a significant decline in importance on the world stage as England did when they allowed the United States to achieve that critical domestic mass and become independent of England. Taxpayer Posted December 8, 2006 7:41 AM