Pentagon cited again for weak oversight of Iraq contractors

The Pentagon has failed to provide adequate oversight of private companies that support American military operations in Iraq, according to a new report from the Government Accountability Office.

Because of a shortage of managers on the front lines to oversee contractor support, there is no accountability or assurance that the military is getting the services it has paid for, GAO found. Field commanders told GAO of problems getting needed spare parts and cited maintenance that contractors failed to provide.

Oversight remains a problem despite assurances from recently retired Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that the military would comply with a series of recommendations made in earlier GAO reports.

The military's global war on terror has coincided with a massive outsourcing of jobs traditionally performed by uniformed personnel. In Iraq and Afghanistan, hundreds of private companies provide battlefield support to the troops, supplying them with everything from food and housing to Internet service and intelligence analysis.

While 9,200 contractors supported the 1991 Gulf War, the Army alone estimates that at least 60,000 contractors support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the new report (GAO-07-145).

The Pentagon does not know how many contractors currently are working in Iraq and living on the American bases that have sprung up around the country, GAO noted.

This results in millions of dollars being lost each year through waste and abuse, the report stated. The Army estimates that up to $43 million is lost annually due to contractors eating free meals, while also receiving a per diem allowance for food.

The lack of an accurate head count also means that as the military begins reducing the number of bases in Iraq, it will be unable to adequately plan for how many people will remain. The result, GAO said, is that commanders run the risk of either under building or overbuilding living accommodations on those bases.

GAO recommended that the Defense secretary immediately appoint somebody within his office, with sufficient seniority, to oversee contractor performance on the battlefield. In a response to the report, Pentagon officials agreed with this suggestion.

COMMENTS

  • Most egregiously, KBR's (Halliburton) $7 billion no-bid contract to restore Iraq oil production stays in place with the Army Corps of Engineers until Iraq's oil production rises to pre-war levels (2.5 million barrels per day). By some fantastic ledger-domain, and the continued fueling of sectarian violence, Iraq's oil production still remains just below that target level. See, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16299313/site/newsweek According to the Corps: http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/iraq/faq.htm Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) mission is to restore the capability for oil production, oil refining and gas processing to pre-war conditions. The Corps is supporting the U. S. government's goal of restoring the Iraqi people's oil production resources as quickly as possible. RIO's end state objective is to have fires suppressed, environmental cleanup accomplished, oil production levels restored and our personnel safely redeployed back home. Under the humanitarian assistance portion of the mission, we are providing emergency supplies of gasoline, LPG and other petroleum products to distribution points operated by the Iraqi Oil Company. We are also assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to export oil to benefit Iraq. What are the RIO targets and timeline? We began work before hostilities concluded. The duration will depend on the extent of the damage. Damage assessments are ongoing as looting and sabotage continue. The Corps will continue to assist Iraq until pre-war production is maintained. A partnering meeting between the Corps and the Iraqi Ministry of Oil in July 2003 set goals of 2.5 million barrels per day by the end of March 2004 and 3.0 million barrels per day by the end of December 2004. When did the Corps issue its first contract in support of the RIO mission and to whom? On March 8, 2003, the Corps issued a contract to KBR to use for an interim period as a bridge to a competitive contract. It is an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract. Task orders are issued against this contract as needed to obtain services necessary to support the mission in the near term. This contract is specified to be for a maximum of $7 billion. It is for a maximum period of two years with three one-year renewal options.
  • The same problems exist in the United States -- contract oversight is a joke, we have no mangers, and you do not confront a contract because you will be fired. Ask our top level people -- there is no desire in the U.S. military to have manger -- we have leaders. In other words we have guys that change jobs every two years and absolutely have no depth or history for why things are as they are. All new guys have to reorganize so they know how they think things work. They also rewrite all policy because that way they think they might know what the policy is. It’s a total mess and nothing is being done to fix it. The problems are not just in Iraq but reflect problems throughout the Defense Department. The guys in Iraq come from posts in the United States where they have learned their jobs.
  • No one watches these contractors because you may be punished if you do. Case in point -- Bonita Greenhouse. Bonita lost her job after criticizing the Halliburton no-bid contract. After serving as the contracting officer for her whole career, she was suddenly given a negative performance evaluation, dismissed from her role as contracting officer and reassigned as a project manager with no projects assigned to her. No one wants to blow the whistle on these contractors because the corruption is deep. The promise of a future job with these contractors keeps the watchdogs from doing their job.