GovernmentExecutive.com

Whatever his legacy as an architect of the war in Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has already earned a place in American bureaucratic history as one of its most ambitious organizational reformers. Despite intense resistance from both inside and outside his department, Rumsfeld is determined to create a faster, leaner military before he leaves office.

Rumsfeld may be one of history's most ambitious reformers, but his actual impact is far from assured. Many of his proposals are either still under consideration in Congress or only in the early stages of implementation in the department, and all are threatened by declining public support for both the war in Iraq and Rumsfeld himself.

His public approval has fallen from 78 percent before the war to just 42 percent now. The longer the war drags on, the more Rumsfeld's bureaucratic revolution becomes a target for his adversaries both inside and outside the department.

Rumsfeld's revolution involves nothing less than a long-overdue confrontation with what he calls "an era of the unexpected and unpredictable." Focusing on the increased threat from lightly armed, highly agile adversaries in the war on terrorism, he began converting the rhetoric of revolution into a new reality in both what the military delivers and how it delivers it.

Although he started his second tour of duty as secretary of Defense in 2001 by telling reporters that normal management techniques rarely work in the Defense Department, Rumsfeld is actually following the same organizational principles that have allowed private companies such as Intel, Marriott, Proctor & Gamble, and Volvo to compete against their agile adversaries. In a word, he is building what may well be the world's largest robust organization, meaning one that is well hedged against vulnerability, yet well prepared to exploit opportunities for gain.

Rumsfeld's first pillar of a high-performing department is alertness to the uncertainty that surrounds all organizations today. Instead of preparing for a handful of possible futures, Rumsfeld wants the military to prepare for a landscape of hundreds, if not thousands,of futures.

Rumsfeld's second pillar is agility, which resides in a much more flexible military and civilian workforce. He wants the military to be ready to go anywhere on a moment's notice, which means faster ships, new fighting vehicles and a much more responsive civil service. Although federal employee unions have fought his new personnel system from the beginning, the old system fails every test for creating an agile, highly trained workforce. It is slow on the hiring, permissive on the promoting, hyper-inflated on the annual grading, and notoriously cowardly on the firing.

Rumsfeld's third pillar is adaptability, which involves a range of high-tech weapons, increased investment in research and development, and more flexible personnel and administrative systems. Whereas the Navy used to deploy ships on a rigid, six-month schedule, it now maintains a surge capability to move five or six carrier strike groups into combat in 30 days, with another two available for action 60 days later.

Rumsfeld's fourth and final pillar is alignment around a clear mission. He wants the military to be able to assemble and reassemble forces and weapons as adversaries exploit new vulnerabilities, which requires joint training across blended fighting units, and an end to the military rivalries that used to paralyze cooperation.

The transition to this robust organization has not been orderly, but it is well under way, driven by Rumsfeld's unwavering focus on often-neglected management systems. Many of the generals and admirals who thought they could outlast Rumsfeld's search for what some called "immaculate warfare" are now in retirement.

So are many of the political and career executives that occupied needless layers of bureaucracy. Between 2001 and 2004, the number of Pentagon executives has fallen 21 percent, from 361 to 284, including an entire generation of assistant undersecretaries, all but one assistant deputy assistant secretaries, and roughly two-thirds of principal deputy assistant secretaries and assistant deputy undersecretaries.

The transition has hardly been perfect either. Rumsfeld has taken criticism for sending an under-equipped, under-trained fighting force to police post-war Iraq, and has managed to anger most members of Congress with his base closing plans (which is, of course, part of the strategy for winning approval of the entire package).

Rumsfeld's plans also remain mired in outmoded administrative systems that have been slow to change, growing difficulties meeting recruiting targets in hard-to-fill positions such as information specialists, and budgetary realities. Even if the nation could afford the more than 80 new weapons systems the department has under development, its acquisition offices remain dangerously understaffed and overworked. And the increased outsourcing that Rumsfeld announced early on has created new competitors for the talent his department so desperately needs as its baby boomers begin to retire.

If Rumsfeld's revolution succeeds--and I would not bet against him--he will have built an organization with the capacity to move quickly in response to new threats. The question is whether it will still be able to respond to the "old" threats lurking in the shadows of past adversaries such as Russia and China. If those threats reemerge, as well they might, the department will need enormous capacity to respond--not an easy task if the Iraq war drags on.

For now, however, Rumsfeld deserves credit for trying. There has been plenty of rhetoric in past administrations about revolutions in military affairs, but few secretaries have given transformation much attention until Rumsfeld. He may yet accomplish the unthinkable by turning one of the world's greatest bureaucracies into one of its lightest, leanest, and most robust. If Iraq goes his way, Rumsfeld could well end up as both one of government's greatest reformers and one of its greatest secretaries of defense. If Iraq continues to draw down the military's strength for years into the future, he may well turn out to be remembered as neither.

COMMENTS

• Hey right side: The SecDef fostered the big lie and sent our youth into battle based on a series of lies. The great Rumjy revolution is all based on lies and power. Stop trusting because all they do is lie to you and everyone else. trusting Posted August 30, 2005 6:57 AM
• The only revolution we need is for Rumsfeld and his followers to revolve out of the door and out of our lifes. He was the wrong person during his last tour as the SecDef and there has been no improvement. The question is what is he owed and by whom. dave Posted August 12, 2005 9:17 AM
• "It is slow on the hiring, permissive on the promoting, hyper-inflated on the annual grading, and notoriously cowardly on the firing." All these things Mr. Light describes may well be true in some degree or another with all agencies. The issue isn't with the organization. It's with the behaviors he describes - Slow, permissive, hyperinflated, cowardly - all are descriptions of behavior not organizational structures. No amount of organizational change will replace integrity. There are rules in place to care of these things Rumsfield wants. He is just too lazy use them. Any system that we use will in the end will be compromised by those who will try and take advantage of it. Leadership is all about setting a good example. I have yet to see that with this administration. As to right-wing Ricky, that kind of jingoistic tripe went out years ago with Senator Joe McCarthy. Try using the frontal lobes instead of the medula oblongata once in a while. You might be surprized what a little critical thinking will do for your outlook. Mike H. Posted August 11, 2005 1:13 PM