Officials say outsourcing partly to blame for Walter Reed failures

During a Monday hearing to investigate widely publicized problems at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, lawmakers and Army officials placed partial blame on a public-private job competition that sapped the facility of workers, and on uncertainty about the slated closure of the center in the ongoing Base Realignment and Closure process.

Several lawmakers questioned whether it had been a mistake to outsource base operations support through a competition conducted under the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76 rules. The Walter Reed competition began in January 2000 and went through numerous protests and appeals. The contractor selected to perform the work, Cape Canaveral, Fla.-based IAP Worldwide Services, finally took over operations on Feb. 4 of this year.

"We certainly could have done it better, and maybe we shouldn't have done it at all," said Lt. Gen. Kevin Kiley, the head of the Army Medical Command and Walter Reed's commander from 2002 to 2004, in response to a question from Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif.

Maj. Gen. George Weightman, who was fired last week from his command of the center after holding the position for just more than six months, testified that over the course of the extended competition, "not knowing the future has affected garrison operations."

Weightman said the combination of outsourcing and the BRAC process, which is slated to close Walter Reed and consolidate many of its services into the nearby, Bethesda-based National Naval Medical Center, was a "huge destabilizing force on the civilian workforce," which he said represents two-thirds of Walter Reed personnel.

In a March 2 letter to Weightman, the Democratic leaders of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and its subcommittee on national security and foreign affairs, which convened Monday's hearing, warned that they would seek further information about a September internal memorandum from Walter Reed Garrison Commander Col. Peter Garibaldi requesting additional personnel for the facility.

In that memorandum, Garibaldi wrote that skilled personnel were leaving Walter Reed through early retirement, voluntary separation and placement at other agencies, in preparation for a reduction in force for employees affected by the A-76 competition. He warned, though, that the center's workload had gone up significantly since it was measured before Sept. 11, 2001, and the expectations on which the competition had been run were out of date.

The commander requested additional personnel to staff the facility during the transition to IAP, as well as a long-term boost to federal employee numbers. The lawmakers quoted Garibaldi as writing, "Without favorable consideration of these requests, WRAMC Base Operations and patient care services are at risk of mission failure."

On Monday, Weightman said attrition reduced the number of employees affected by the competition from a high of 190 down to about 100 people. He said that despite being given authority to staff up to bridge the gap, he was unable to find more than 10 additional people to take positions not slated to last beyond four months.

Earlier in the competition process, the number of affected employees was estimated to be 350, and the committee letter cited that number falling as low as 60, the day before IAP took over base operations last month. Kiley and Weightman repeatedly insisted Monday that the high and low were 190 and 100, respectively, and it was not immediately clear where the discrepancy arose.

The final hearing panel Monday consisted of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Vice Chief of Staff Richard Cody and Pete Geren, the Army undersecretary tapped to serve as acting secretary until a replacement is named for Francis Harvey, who resigned Friday. Subcommittee chair John Tierney, D-Mass., asked who gave the final go-ahead to privatize base operations.

Answering for all three, Geren said he could not explain. "I don't know how the decision is made to engage the A-76 process," he acknowledged.

COMMENTS

  • “Veterans need to be treated at a military hospital.” Well, that seems to be self evident to me, so I assume there’s a story behind the question. Without knowing that story, I can only answer in general and state the obvious. Y’all out there, correct me if I’m wrong. In brief, funds are allocated specifically for veterans. In governmental practice, if you don’t use, you lose. Not using those funds and facilities leads the government to think there is no need and they would go away. The benefit to soldiers is that these doctors, nurses, and other specialists see problems specific to veterans. While each case is individual, there are a lot of things that we suffer that are seen less in the general population. Even relatively common ailments as torn rotator cuffs, degenerate joint problems, and deafness are concentrated in veterans at earlier ages due to continued stress. That doesn’t even mention the amputations, scar treatments, psychological disorders, etc. that are seen in such degrees only at our VA centers. And then there is exposure to everything from radiation to chemical agents that are seldom seen anywhere but here. I may be mistaken but I do believe that if there is no VA support in a specific geographic area for a specific treatment or individual, like Tricare there is a mechanism to seek support. To my understanding, the greatest difficulty in absence of a VA or military facility lies in navigating and securing support within the Byzantine bureaucratic process that was originally designed to ensure efficiency and entitlement. This process is often dictated by congressional oversight and law. This is a problem for veterans, deployed Reserve and National Guard, and often those soldiers with exceptional family members who have special needs. Additionally, all this costs money which is often cut during drawdowns when it is needed most. If your story involves that maze, all I can say is “Good luck!” Tip off
  • Please everyone look at Col. Moore's comments. Col. Moore thinks that we should not blame the person in charge but rather the working stiff that was immediately responsible for the job. This is the military view and it is the source of problems throughout DoD and the services. The mangers are not managers! The managers are leaders! They are just supposed to travel around motivating everyone to take the hill even if the hill does not need to be taken! It is time to get managers and the moves in eliminating the Generals in charge are steps in the right direction. Too bad Gates isn't getting rid of Pace - not only is he discriminating in the labor force but he is in charge of losing the war in Iraq, as is the Army General in Iraq. Maybe Gates will instill management into the managers if he gets rid of enough of them. But that assumes they will get the message - which is a long stretch.
  • To the person who said Ronald Reagan pushed to eliminate “useless” government jobs and reduce the size of government. And your point is? If Reagan hadn't opened the flood gates, no one would have lost a job to outsourcing. All those GS-1 to GS-3 janitors that Reagan got rid of were productive taxpayers with a pension and health care; afterwards they had nothing. And it didn't stop there -- if Reagan hadn't planted the idea, all the GS-5s through 13s that have been outsourced since the 1980s would still be feds. And if you really believe that outsourcing makes the government smaller, then you haven't been paying attention to the number of contractors that work there now.