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In times of great political peril, American presidents have often turned to the country's wise men and veteran fixers to steer clear of calamity.

Confronted with debacle in war or scandal, they've swallowed presidential pride and thrown themselves at the mercy of the graybeards and insiders willing to put national interest before partisan politics. Thus did John F. Kennedy surmount the Bay of Pigs, Ronald Reagan escape Iran-Contra, and Bill Clinton avoid the final gavel of impeachment.

As the Senate jockeyed this week over a resolution of no confidence in George W. Bush's Iraq strategy, what is perhaps most striking is that all of Washington's fixers and wise men couldn't put a bipartisan consensus on Iraq back together again, despite their fears that such a resolution will move the nation another step toward constitutional crisis over the war.

The frustration of the wise men was on public display last week, when many of them testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Former Secretary of State James Baker, co-chairman of the Iraq Study Group, recalled that both Reagan and George H.W. Bush had faced seemingly intractable showdowns with Democratic Congresses, over the politically perilous issues of Social Security solvency and U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Contras, respectively. Both Republican presidents reached bipartisan deals with Congress to avoid stalemate and paralysis.

"This issue of Iraq is every bit as emotional and important to the country as what we were dealing with back then," Baker said. "So I would like to throw out here for people to consider whether or not there couldn't be some sort of 'grand negotiation' between the executive and legislative branches of government to come together on a way forward on Iraq."

Rather than have the two at each other's throats for the next two years on a matter of great national consequence, Baker asked, "why not get together and agree that both sides are going to do some or all of those things so we can move forward together on Iraq in a bipartisan way? We ought to be able to work across party lines on something as important as this."

Iraq Study Group Co-Chairman Lee Hamilton was equally plaintive in describing the present collision course.

"You folks are headed for some rough patches in your relationship with the executive branch ... as you go through this process ... resolutions that are nonbinding, a supplemental, then the appropriation bill down the line; you're going to have all kinds of amendments and clashes," said Hamilton, a former chairman of the House International Relations Committee and a co-chair of the bipartisan 9/11 commission.

Conceding that it might sound downright "Pollyannaish" in today's ultrapartisan atmosphere, Hamilton nevertheless held out hope that the White House and Congress could yet find a compromise on Iraq. "I wouldn't for a minute think it will be unanimous.... It's not an easy process for you, and you're going to have some tough debates, and there are going to be some hard edges to it and maybe some bad feelings now and then, but it is the process we have to work for a greater unity of effort," he said.

The irony, of course, is that Baker and Hamilton and their Iraq Study Group were the ones tasked with delineating the common ground on Iraq that might put the war effort on firmer footing. The story of how their nearly yearlong effort eventually foundered will likely go down as another missed opportunity in the narrative of the Iraq war. That story is testament to the fierce partisanship that now grips Washington, and the degree to which many Democrats in particular have come to define themselves in opposition to Bush on the Iraq war.

"Part of the problem of finding common ground is that many Democrats have taken such strong positions against the administration on Iraq that they are locked in and can't walk it back," said a Democratic Senate staffer, who asked not to be named.

As a consequence, he said, many Democrats on Capitol Hill were gaming how they would respond to the ISG report, even before the administration essentially rejected it. "Given the anger and frustration with the administration over Iraq, there's a strong tendency among Democrats to take the opposite position of whatever the administration supports."

The story of the Iraq Study Group and the looming showdown over Iraq policy also speaks, however, to the Bush administration's instincts in jealously guarding presidential prerogative, and its stubbornness in not ceding to Congress any significant influence on the war.

"President Bush has talked about this week's resolution as playing into the hands of the enemy, and he's right in the sense that the first principle of strategy is unity of effort, and that begins in Washington," said a longtime Republican involved with the Iraq Study Group. "But Baker-Hamilton offered Bush a chance to avoid the no-confidence resolution and get people on the same sheet of paper. Not seizing that opportunity was a terrible political blunder, with the almost inconceivable result that they lost someone like [Republican Sen. John] Warner [of Virginia]. These guys have the worst feel for congressional relations of any administration in the past 35 years."

True, the Iraq Study Group report contained much for the Bush administration to dislike. The group had dropped references to "victory" in Iraq, and it called for a gradual withdrawal of U.S. combat units by early 2008 as the mission shifted from direct U.S. operations to supporting the Iraqi security forces. It called for a diplomatic offensive that would involve negotiations with all of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran, and thus took a swipe at the Bush administration's reluctance to negotiate with adversaries. To administration officials, the whole tone of the report suggested that it was a prescription for managing retreat rather than a recipe for victory.

What seems to have been lost on administration officials, however, is the fact that the ISG report was also a political document, designed, in the manner of such grand bipartisan bargains, to provide political cover for those willing to meet in the middle on a divisive issue. Yes, it called for acceleration in the training of Iraqi forces and a gradual withdrawal of U.S. combat brigades by 2008, two recommendations that came directly from U.S. commanders in Iraq.

Republican national security experts who endorse that general shift in mission include such luminaries as retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Bush 41's national security adviser; Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of State and national security adviser for the Nixon and Ford administrations, and a frequent adviser to Bush 43; and Baker himself, the consummate Republican deal-maker.

What's more, the ISG report made such withdrawals "subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground," a loophole that the Bush administration could drive a couple of combat divisions through.

Likewise, the Baker-Hamilton report cooperatively gave political cover for the administration's "surge." "We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad," the ISG report states, "if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective." In nominating Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, the author of the Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine, the administration assured in advance that its Iraqi commander would determine that very thing.

The report even gave Bush cover to begin negotiating with the previously "evil" regimes. As Baker himself has repeatedly pointed out, the Bush administration already opened diplomatic channels with Iran in 2001 over the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with favorable results. More recently, U.S. representatives also sat down with their Iranian and Syrian counterparts as part of U.N.-sponsored talks about an international financial aid compact for Iraq.

But administration officials only belatedly discovered any congruence between the ISG report and the new Bush strategy. In a January 29 op-ed in The Washington Post, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley noted that the report provided tacit support for a surge.

"The new strategy incorporates other essential elements of the Baker-Hamilton report," Hadley wrote, "such as doubling the number of troops embedded with Iraqi forces, using benchmarks to help us and the Iraqis chart progress, and launching a new diplomatic effort to increase support for the Iraqi government and advance political reconciliation."

In the art of the bipartisan calamity-avoidance deal, however, Hadley's nod to the Iraq Study Group may have been too late. But the Baker-Hamilton report may rise again. If the surge strategy shows progress in the coming months, Bush may want to finally put the war on bipartisan ground to consolidate the gains and sustain it through the inevitable bad days to come. Democratic centrists may want to avoid the overreaching of the early 1970s that painted their party for a generation as weak on defense and anti-military.

If the surge fails or a spasm of violence creates a Tet-like effect in Iraq, then another historical analogy awaits: Richard Nixon in 1974, isolated and alone, powerless to prevent a Democratic Congress from taking ownership of Vietnam through legislative funding cuts. Everyone knows how that story ends.

"Everyone keeps telling me the ISG recommendations were not adopted, but my reading is that a hell of lot is still in play concerning Iraq," said Daniel Serwer, who served as the executive director of the group and is a vice president at the U.S. Institute for Peace. "We have the administration's strategy, the congressional hearings, and now talk of a resolution. We'll have to see where Iraq policy ultimately comes out."

COMMENTS

• Okay, give me a break. Blaming the “new kids on the block” for a fiscal fiasco that’s been in the works for six years is a tad overkill. I worry that any major legislation crammed through within 100 days will be exactly what you would expect; rushed and slipshod. Most of these folks are freshmen; do you really want them slinging their legislative might hither and yon, willy-nilly? At least give them the chance to look before they leap. As for the vote of confidence, I get the impression that many of the opposition party wish for such a referendum also even if not proclaiming it from the mountain heights. Almost everyone wants to distance themselves from a losing legacy. I do hope we can get past the finger pointing and find some direction soon. Still, remember, if you want something bad that’s usually the way you get it. Tip off GovExec.com reader Posted February 15, 2007 12:36 PM
• This entire Congressional meaningless resolution is a waste of time and money. The voters reflected no confidence when they elected the Democratic majority back into the congress. Now get on with the work and stop this ridiculous resolution crap! Nancy and the boys do not even have a government budget for fiscal 2006 that is half over and they will not start on the fiscal 2007 budget in time to have it on time either! This Congress is as useless as the last! It appears that no existing party in America that can do the job! Get on with the money issues and away from the ridiculous waste of time on meaningless resolutions! Fix social security and Medicare and reduce the defense budget. Get rid of the Department of Energy, the SBA, a large part of Commerce, most of the EPA and several other meaningless government wastes. The major issue however has to focus on social security and Medicare and it has to be now! These should be the major issues in the run for the President and the war in Iraq should be stopped and we should leave! Evidence has shown no connection between Iraq and the terrorists, no weapons of mass destruction and no reason for the war. Now they are trying to get into it with Iran to justify the existing position and that is a fatal error by all. Nancy better get on with what is important and stop looking to see what will get her re-elected or will get her party elected. Republicans better get away from the right and start looking at the damage they have done to the United States and start fixing it. taxpayer Posted February 15, 2007 9:16 AM
• Is this article a joke? The primary reason cited for the failure of the Iraq Study Group is the Democrats anti-war, anti-Bush hostility? Really? It's only the second reason that the administration, unlike the Cuba Missile crisis, just rejected the group's conclusions? Third, is there no place in the article to question whether a wise-men group, might not be so wise? Because the article doesn't mention the tiny, little detail, that almost no non-American and non-British Middle East specialist (i.e. no one who wasn't already tainted by the war) thought that the report made any sense? Because let's not forget that a lot of Democrats just thought that the document was dumb right from the start. And although the "liberal hawks" jumped to support it -- almost everyone who called the war right from the start thought that the report was a pathetic, weak, watered-down joke. It reeked of a political deal that was disconnected from reality. Please if you write an international story, read outside-of-D.C. reports. The Internet is there to learn -- use it. Samuel Knight Posted February 12, 2007 9:33 AM